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The 39th Round Table on current issues of International Humanitarian Law (IHL),
held in Sanremo, gathered together international experts, representatives of
governments and international organizations, academics and military officers to
engage in open and fruitful discussions on the complex issues of weapons and
international rule of law. 
The Round Table provided an important opportunity to address the crucial topic
of the protection of civilians which, now more than ever, constitutes a critical and
delicate issue in today’s international and non-international armed conflicts.
Non-state actors, urban warfare, weapons smuggling and autonomous
armaments are some of the issues currently at stake. Considering the multiple
transformations characterising the contemporary international scenario, it is an
extremely difficult task for all the actors to implement IHL in this specific area. 
The proceedings of this Round Table, in line with the Sanremo Institute’s
tradition, aim to further develop and contribute to the ongoing debate on these
issues.
The International Institute of Humanitarian Law is an independent, non-profit
humanitarian organization founded in 1970. Its headquarters are situated in Villa
Ormond, Sanremo (Italy). Its main objective is the promotion and dissemination of
international humanitarian law, human rights, refugee law and migration law. Thanks to
its longstanding experience and its internationally acknowledged academic standards,
the International Institute of Humanitarian Law is considered to be a centre of
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As technology relentlessly modifies and shapes today’s civil societies at 
an ever-dynamic pace, the same applies to weapons development and usage 
in the scenarios of conflict worldwide. The ultimate challenge facing 
international humanitarian law (IHL) today is to ensure that both applicable 
law and legal debates keep astride of any such developments, so they 
remain within an appropriate legal framework, thus preventing them from 
possibly unleashing overpowering effects in the medium and long term.  
The 39th Sanremo Round Table on current issues of humanitarian law, 
jointly organized by the International Institute of Humanitarian Law and 
the International Committee of the Red Cross, took place in Sanremo from 
8 to 10 September 2016, with the purpose of dealing with issues related to 
new weapons and engaging in open and fruitful debates in keeping with the 
traditional “spirit of Sanremo”.  
Experts from a wide range of backgrounds, including representatives 
from governments and international organizations, academics, military 
officers, legal advisers and international experts, gathered together to 
analyze and further discuss the core principles at stake in the relationship 
between the development of new weapons and the application of IHL. 
The Round Table focused – as also did the message of the Secretary-
General of the United Nations which was conveyed to the audience at the 
event – on the crucial topic of the protection of civilians which, now more 
than ever, constitutes a critical and delicate issue in today’s international 
and non-international armed conflicts. The indiscriminate use of certain 
lethal weapons, as well as the use of weapons which cannot ensure respect 
for the principle of distinction, in densely-populated areas, and the brutal 
reality of city warfare, too often cause unnecessary suffering to those who 
are not directly involved in the fighting and give us, once again, a clear idea 
of how difficult it is to ensure the effective protection of the civilian 
population in warfare.  
Although such actions have been condemned by the international 
community, it is hard to ensure accountability, in particular, when 
perpetrators belong to the ever-growing community of non-state actors. 
Several protocols and treaties have been signed through the years to 
regulate the use of weapons but how can compliance of non-state actors 
with IHL regulations be effectively ensured? There is no easy answer to 
such a question, in light of the difficulties of weapons control and the 
smuggling of and easy access to weapons, particularly in certain areas of 
conflict. Furthermore, even though States are no longer the only actors on 
the stage, they can still play a significant role in addressing issues of 
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compliance with IHL through an efficient regulation of weapons reviews. 
They can also control and possibly reduce their stockpiles of conventional 
and unconventional weapons, as well as monitor and address the 
development of autonomous weapons and cyber warfare. 
The proceedings of this Round Table, in line with the Sanremo 
Institute’s tradition, aim to further develop and contribute to the ongoing 
debate on these specific issues. I am confident that their publication will 
provide a useful instrument to highlight, once again, the increasing 
importance of the promotion and enforcement of international humanitarian 
law and human rights in this very rapidly changing security environment. 
Fausto Pocar 






















































Mayor of Sanremo 
It is for me a real privilege to extend, on behalf of Sanremo and its 
Municipality, my warmest welcome to the distinguished authorities, 
international experts and all the guests who are here this morning at the 
opening session of this important Round Table on current issues of 
international humanitarian law, organized by the International Institute of 
Humanitarian Law, which Sanremo has had the honour to host and which 
its Municipality co-founded forty-six years ago. 
I am pleased to recall that the Institute plays an important role for the 
city of Sanremo, not only as a centre of excellence in the field of training 
and research but also as a forum for reflection on a wide range of 
challenges that humanity is facing today. It is because of this unique role 
played by the Institute since 1970 in this city and around the world, that I 
would like to confirm the commitment of the Municipality, already 
expressed at the beginning of my mandate as Mayor, to support, wherever 
possible, the activities of the Institute and to reiterate its determination to 
strengthen its co-operation and collaboration. 
This 39th Round Table very well matches the vocation and tradition of 
Sanremo, which, since its origins has served as a crossroads for 
international exchanges and meetings between nations. The presence, once 
again, of such a large group of important and prominent representatives of 
governments and International Organizations, leading academics and senior 
military officers coming from different regions of the world gathered in our 
city is a great source of pride which should inspire us to further support the 
initiatives organized by the Institute. 
I am sure that, thanks to the work of the experts invited by the 
International Institute of Humanitarian Law this Round Table will provide, 
once again, fruitful debates and set out the guidelines for possible solutions.  
Let me now express my warm thanks to the organizers of this Round Table, 
Professor Fausto Pocar, President of the International Institute of 
Humanitarian Law and Ms Christine Beerli, Vice-President of the 
International Committee of the Red Cross. I would also like to thank Mr. 
Serpa Soares who shared with us an important message from the Secretary-
General of the United Nations, Mr. Ban Ki Moon. 
I wish you all a successful Round Table and hope that you may return to 







Permanent Representative of Italy to the Conference on Disarmament 
Grazie Presidente, Signor Sindaco di Sanremo, Signore e Signori. 
Desidero in primo luogo esprimere il mio più vivo ringraziamento per 
l’invito a partecipare all’apertura dei lavori della trentanovesima edizione 
della Tavola Rotonda sull’attualità del Diritto Internazionale Umanitario 
organizzata dall’Istituto Internazionale di Diritto Umanitario, Sanremo.  
Un sentito ringraziamento va anche al Comitato Internazionale della 
Croce Rossa ed alla sua rappresentante oggi qui presente, la Vice-
Presidente Mme Christine Beerli, per la cooperazione nell’organizzazione 
dell’evento.  
Un cordiale saluto anche al Dottor Miguel Serpa Soares, Under 
Secretary General for Legal Affairs delle Nazioni Unite. Ho l’onore e il 
piacere oggi di farmi interprete del saluto e del più cordiale augurio del 
Ministro degli Affari Esteri e della Cooperazione Internazionale, Onorevole 
Paolo Gentiloni, impossibilitato a partecipare personalmente ma che ha 
voluto accordare il suo Patrocinio a questo annuale appuntamento che 
punteggia tradizionalmente la vita dell’Istituto. Patrocinio cui si affianca 
quello del Ministero della Difesa.  
Sanremo non è soltanto una bellissima città universalmente conosciuta 
nel mondo per le sue ben note attrazioni turistiche e culturali, ma ha anche 
il merito di ospitare questo straordinario centro di eccellenza per lo 
sviluppo delle attività giuridico-internazionali nel nostro Paese. 
Un’istituzione che può vantare una consolidata capacità di attrazione a 
livello internazionale, come testimonia l’ampio e qualificato livello di 
partecipazione ai vari panels. Mi pare quasi superfluo sottolineare 
l’importanza che attribuiamo alla nostra collaborazione con l’Istituto e 
quanto sia prezioso il suo contributo in un settore come quello dello 
sviluppo del Diritto Umanitario che rappresenta uno dei punti focali del 
tradizionale impegno del nostro Paese sia nel quadro onusiano, sia 
nell’ambito dei vari fori multilaterali per il disarmo, la non proliferazione 
ed il controllo degli armamenti di cui Ginevra rappresenta un polo 
essenziale. 
L’impegno del Ministero degli Affari Esteri e la volontà di intensificare 
la nostra cooperazione su tale terreno sono testimoniati non soltanto dal 
Patrocinio e dal sostegno finanziario concessi a tale evento, ma anche dalla 
significativa presenza di rappresentanti del Ministero, alla guida di struttu-
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re di rilevante importanza in rapporto ai temi trattati. Saluto a questo 
proposito con piacere la presenza, in qualità di Chair del Panel relativo alla 
V sessione della tavola rotonda, dell’Ambasciatore Francesco Azzarello, 
neo-direttore dell’Autorità nazionale per le autorizzazioni dei materiali di 
armamento (UAMA) del Ministero degli Affari Esteri e già Ambasciatore 
all’Aja nonché Rappresentante Permanente italiano presso l’OPCW 
(l’Organizzazione per la Proibizione delle Armi Chimiche), del cui 
Consiglio Esecutivo è stato Presidente. Prima di svolgere alcune 
considerazioni sui principali temi in agenda, mi permetta, Signor Presi-
dente di condividere un ricordo di carattere personale.  
Vorrei cogliere questa occasione per rendere omaggio alla memoria 
dell’Ambasciatore Maurizio Moreno, ex Presidente dell’Istituto che pur-
troppo ci ha lasciato recentemente. L’Ambasciatore Moreno è stato uno dei 
miei più cari maestri avendo collaborato a lungo con lui durante la mia 
carriera, in particolare quando era Rappresentante Permanente d’Italia alla 
NATO. Lo ricordo con particolare affetto in tale circostanza nella 
consapevolezza dell’importanza da lui attribuita alle attività dell’Istituto ed 
in particolare all’annuale tavola rotonda.  
But with your permission, Mr. President, I would like to continue in 
English. I am very pleased to note that the themes to be addressed during 
this Round Table are very relevant to our work conducted in Geneva, in the 
framework of the Conference on Disarmament and of the other organs of 
the UN disarmament machinery, as well as in many other disarmament and 
arms control processes relating to both conventional arms and weapons of 
mass destruction. Armed conflicts and warfare are, as they have always 
been, dynamic phenomena.  
For a few decades now, non-international armed conflicts have 
increased in number and intensity, leading to a necessary adjustment of the 
rules of warfare that were previously aimed at regulating only international, 
state-to-state armed conflicts. Armed non-state actors have risen to the fore, 
occupying a place previously dominated by governmental forces, and their 
action in war defies traditional laws and principles. Access to weapons, 
especially conventional weapons, has become easier, as production 
technologies are easily replicated and weapons materials and components 
are easily procured. Finally, the growing pace of scientific and 
technological advances, that involves all domains of our life, has an impact 
on the development and use of weapons and, in general, on the security 
sector.  
The development of more and more sophisticated weapons, means, and 
methods of warfare, and their possible humanitarian impact, pose new 
challenges to the international community, not only domestically, where 
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their compatibility with the rules and principles of international 
humanitarian law must be assessed, but also internationally, where their use 
must be regulated, and is, in some cases, prohibited. As the reality of 
warfare changes, the legal framework designed to regulate it must also 
evolve. Addressing these new developments requires a complex 
multidisciplinary approach, which takes into account security as well as 
legal and humanitarian dimensions. At the same time, it requires us to 
constantly reaffirm our commitment to the respect for, and promotion of, 
existing international humanitarian law (IHL). Italy fully shares the guiding 
principles of IHL and is deeply involved in their promotion and effective 
implementation. In this regard, I would like to underline that international 
humanitarian law is an integral component of training programmes for our 
Armed Forces. 
Italy is indeed a party to all the Conventions that prohibit or restrict 
weapons due to their excessively injurious or indiscriminate effects. In 
particular, Italy plays a leading role in the Convention on anti-personnel 
landmines and the Convention on cluster munitions. Both Conventions 
have written a new, fundamental chapter of international humanitarian law. 
In this regard, let me recall that Italy completed the destruction of its entire 
stockpile of cluster munitions and related sub-munitions on 31st October 
2015, five years ahead of the deadline established by the Convention. Since 
our ratification of the Ottawa Convention, we have devoted close to 50m 
EUR to clearance, stockpile destruction and victim assistance activities in 
relation to any kind of explosive remnants of war. Last January, we 
assumed the Chairmanship of the United Nations Mine Action Support 
Group for the next two years.  
Without entering into the details of several issues we daily address in 
our work in the different disarmament fora in Geneva, let me share a few 
thoughts on some of the topics that this meeting will discuss. One of the 
themes that will be treated during this workshop is represented by the issue 
of lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS). While an internationally 
agreed definition of LAWS does not yet exist, we consider these as systems 
that could select targets and decide when to use force, and would be 
entirely beyond human control. As you are aware, the legal, ethical and 
operational implications of the development of such systems and of their 
possible future use have been addressed in several meetings held in Geneva 
in the framework of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons 
(CCW). This issue will be at the centre of attention during the upcoming 
Review Conference of the Convention, set to take place in December in 
Geneva, which will consider the creation of a group of governmental 
experts tasked with deepening discussions on the LAWS issue. Italy has 
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actively participated in this work and is firmly committed to continuing to 
do so.  
In this regard, I cannot but express the hope that our co-operation with 
the International Institute of Humanitarian Law of Sanremo will further 
increase, in light of the strong connection between its expertise and the 
work awaiting us in this domain. Another issue that draws much attention 
and concern from the international community is represented by the 
increasing use of improvised explosive devices, so-called IEDs, in both 
non-international and international armed conflict, as well as in non-
conflict situations, particularly in the perpetration of terrorist acts. Italy 
shares the concern about the use of IEDs.  
We have been actively engaged in the work of the CCW on this issue 
and support any initiative aiming at identifying effective measures to 
prevent IED use and counter their destructive impacts. The increasing 
involvement of non-state actors in conflict and their possible access to 
weapons of mass destruction, raise serious and legitimate concerns in the 
international community, which Italy fully shares, particularly in relation to 
terrorist acts. In this regard, we reiterate our support for the full 
implementation of UNSCR 1540, and stress the importance of a successful 
outcome of its Review process by the end of this year. 
In concluding, Mr. President, I would like to commend the initiative of 
this round table as an example of interaction between the political, 
diplomatic, military and academic domains that Italy has always considered 
central to effectively respond to the evolving challenges of the international 
security environment. The contribution of academic and research 
institutions, NGOs and other civil society organizations, especially in the 
form of technical knowledge and experience from the field, continues to 
remain central in our work to reaffirm and promote the crucial role of 
international humanitarian law. I look forward to the discussions of this 
round table and to the contribution that this initiative will certainly make to 
the ongoing work on these diverse, complex and highly relevant issues in 






President, International Institute of Humanitarian Law, Sanremo 
The purpose of this Round Table is to discuss and clarify current issues 
regarding the application of international law on weapons and other means of 
warfare, in light of current technological developments and abusive practices 
which characterize an increasingly worrying scenario of contemporary armed 
conflicts. International law, particularly international humanitarian law 
(IHL), is relatively clear on most of these issues and sets out established 
principles which should be complied with in any kind of armed conflict, 
whether international or non-international, which rotate around the basic 
principle that the use of weapons and means of warfare is not unlimited. Both 
customary international law and treaties impose limitations which restrict the 
choice of weapons that parties to a conflict may use in warfare.  
These limitations are inherently linked to fundamental principles of IHL - 
the principles of distinction, the principle of proportionality, precaution and 
the principle of humanity - which are undisputed under international law. 
These restrictions entail, therefore, the prohibition of weapons which are 
inherently discriminatory and unsuitable for ensuring respect for the principle 
of distinction, of weapons which are of a nature to cause superfluous or 
unnecessary suffering, and, additionally, of weapons which are intended, or 
may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the 
natural environment. The same prohibitions impact on the use of other means 
of warfare, as reflected in practices in the conduct of military operations 
which are incompatible with the above mentioned principles of IHL, as, for 
example, the use of sexual violence and the use of children in hostilities. 
Treaties have been adopted to reflect such prohibitions with the aim of 
ensuring compliance with the limitations imposed by international law on 
the use of weapons and other means of warfare, and some treaties have 
been widely ratified. I will not mention them here. Under some of these 
treaties, however, and under other treaties, such as the Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC), violations of the obligations to comply 
with the said limitations on the use of weapons and other means of warfare 
have been declared to be serious breaches of IHL and defined as crimes 
under international law. In parallel, or even earlier than the adoption of 
specific treaties, customary international law has evolved to take into 
account new weapons technologies, as well as new (or new use of old) 
means of warfare, and has devised more specific rules to ensure compliance 
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with the said limitations, and to repress violations, as reflected in numerous 
instruments of the United Nations and in the increasing, and increasingly 
substantial, jurisprudence of international courts, including international 
criminal courts, human rights courts and quasi-judicial bodies. 
However, many issues concerning the legality of weapons remain on the 
table and need to be discussed and clarified. The Round Table will take up 
the issue of the compliance with the States’ obligations to conduct weapons 
reviews, as set forth in Article 36 of Additional Protocol I, an obligation 
which has become more and more relevant particularly in light of the 
increasing pace of evolving technologies. Considering the limited number 
of States which conduct such reviews, the reasons should be clarified and 
ways and means should be identified to encourage all States to conduct 
such reviews.  
The Round Table, however, will not only deal with such a procedural 
means of control of the legality of new weapons but it will also focus 
largely on best practices in applying IHL to new weapons and new means 
of warfare in order to respect the prohibition of the use of weapons li likely 
to violate the principle of distinction or to cause superfluous injury or 
unnecessary suffering. How IHL applies to the development of new 
technologies such as autonomous weapons and cyber capabilities remains 
an issue to be further explored, bearing in mind that its basic principles 
should be firmly observed.  
How to ensure compliance and prevent violations is a core issue that 
follows the clarification of the law and the modalities of its application. It is 
a general problem in that it refers both to the use of traditional weapons and 
new weapons, but special consideration will be given to weapons that make 
use of new technologies. This issue does not only concern regular armies, 
but it also poses delicate issues particularly when an armed conflict 
involves the participation of non-state actors, which is most frequently the 
case in the current scenario characterized by non-international, rather than 
international, armed conflicts.  
Special consideration will be justifiably given to issues of compliance 
and prevention of violations with respect to the prohibition of other means 
of warfare, such as the use of sexual violence and the use of children in 
hostilities, which are increasingly brought to the public attention through 
the media. 
The presentations of speakers and panelists, together with the ensuing 
debates, will no doubt add substance to the already long catalogue of issues 
and will allow for a better understanding of the role of IHL with regard to 
weapons and other means of warfare. I look forward to listening to the 





Vice-President, International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva 
Thank you for giving me the opportunity to address this distinguished 
audience. It is a pleasure for me to be here at the 39th Sanremo Round 
Table on current issues of international humanitarian law (IHL). 
This year’s Round Table allows us to reflect on a fundamental feature of 
warfare – weapons – the essential means to attack or defend during armed 
conflict; to neutralize enemy combatants and military objectives. 
In today’s armed conflicts, however, the main victims are invariably 
civilians. Fighting often goes on for many years, with massive use of heavy 
weapons, reducing cities to rubble. One obvious example is the towns and 
cities of Syria, where the widespread devastation of homes, hospitals and 
infrastructure has resulted in a level of suffering that almost defies 
description. There are many others. 
In armed conflicts such as those in Syria and Yemen, Afghanistan and 
South Sudan and many others around the world, the ICRC’s humanitarian 
mission entails not just life-saving assistance, but also the protection of 
civilians, also through the promotion of respect for international 
humanitarian law in the choice of weapons. The ultimate aim is to prevent 
the type of massive destruction we have been witnessing from happening in 
the first place. 
The impact of weapons in warfare is so critical that it is not only 
regulated by the general rules of IHL, but also by a series of specific 
treaties limiting or prohibiting their use, as well as, in some cases, their 
stockpiling, production and transfer. 
The general rules of IHL regulating the conduct of hostilities – 
distinction, proportionality, precaution – constrain the manner in which 
weapons can be used during armed conflicts. In order to be able to comply 
with the law on the conduct of hostilities, a fundamental principle is that 
the choice of methods and means of warfare is not unlimited. 
So, what are the limits? The first limitation aims to protect civilians by 
prohibiting the use of indiscriminate weapons, a specific rule of customary 
law encompassed by the IHL prohibition of indiscriminate attacks. The aim 
of the second limitation is to protect combatants by prohibiting the use of 
weapons which are “of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary 
suffering”. The roots of this customary IHL norm can be found in the 
earliest weapons treaty - the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration prohibiting 
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explosive projectiles.Since then, weapons technology has evolved rapidly, 
for instance, in the domain of unmanned robotic weapon platforms. 
While it is always difficult for international law to keep pace with 
technological developments, the development of norms on weapons has, 
nevertheless, been quite dynamic in recent decades. States have agreed on a 
whole series of treaties prohibiting or regulating the use of certain kinds of 
weapons. 
Thanks to the mobilization of civil society, international organizations, 
the ICRC and many States, chemical and biological weapons and weapons 
that “keep on killing”, such as antipersonnel mines and cluster munitions, 
have been banned. We can also celebrate the fact that in some cases 
weapons were prohibited before ever being used on the battlefield, as was 
the case for blinding lasers and for exploding bullets in the St. Petersburg 
Declaration. 
Furthermore, at a time when so many of us are rightly deploring the lack 
of compliance with IHL by parties to armed conflicts, we should recognize 
that among all rules of IHL, those prohibiting the use of certain types of 
weapons are among the most respected. Many lives have, in fact, been 
saved thanks to these treaties. 
The ICRC has taken an active part in the development of IHL applicable 
to weapons. It has done so over the decades – as it continues to do today – 
following its unique “evidence-based” approach. First, the ICRC witnesses 
the effects of the weapons on combatants and civilians directly in its field 
operations. Second, it collects knowledge and expertise from independent 
and governmental experts on health, technical, military or legal aspects 
which, combined with the ICRC’s own expertise, allows the Institution to 
develop specific recommendations that are relevant, practical and address 
humanitarian concerns. These humanitarian concerns are the drivers of the 
ICRC’s approach, which at times converges with security-driven 
disarmament approaches. 
This Round Table is mainly dedicated to contemporary challenges 
related to weapons issues. And the merit of the programme over the next 
days is that we will discuss very concrete matters. Without mentioning 
them all, I would like to say a few words from an ICRC perspective on 
some of the topics that will be discussed. 
One of these concrete issues is how to improve compliance with the 
obligation for States party to Additional Protocol I to review the legality of 
new weapons. Weapons reviews are a way to ensure that a State’s Armed 
Forces are capable of conducting hostilities in accordance with its 
international obligations and that new weapons are not employed 
prematurely under conditions where respect for IHL cannot be guaranteed. 
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It is, therefore, in each State’s interest to assess the legality of any new 
weapon that they develop or acquire. 
On the question of whether weapons reviews are adequately 
implemented, it is frankly deplorable that only a few States are known to 
have established mechanisms to assess the legality of new weapons. Having 
said that, it is important to stress that legal reviews do not provide all the 
answers. Efforts to strengthen national review procedures should be seen as 
complementary to and mutually reinforcing of international discussions on 
new technologies of warfare.  
Cyber warfare and autonomous weapon systems are two technological 
developments giving rise to a range of complex issues, notably in relation 
to the necessary legal review processes, but also in terms of ensuring 
compliance with IHL and ethical acceptability. 
Cyber means and methods of warfare are increasingly referred to as 
possible tools to inflict damage on the enemy without using traditional 
kinetic operations. The fast development of military capacities in this 
domain calls for a clear reiteration of the obligation to ensure that such 
methods and means of warfare are used (and are capable of being used) in 
accordance with IHL. Fortunately, cyber warfare, as far as we know, has 
not had any dramatic humanitarian consequences to date. Our collective 
responsibility is to reflect on the potential human cost of cyber warfare in 
an environment where essential services are increasingly connected and 
interdependent. 
Another challenge in the domain of technological developments relates 
to advances in robotics more specifically, the increasing autonomy of 
robotic weapon systems and their critical functions of selecting and 
attacking targets. 
Of course, there is a moral and ethical issue at stake here. Is humankind 
ready to enable a computer programme to effectively decide to kill human 
beings? There are legal challenges too, particularly around the question of 
whether respecting all the rules of IHL would be possible when deploying 
increasingly autonomous weapon systems. In order to maintain the 
necessary human control over weapon systems and the use of force, and 
ensure compliance with IHL and the dictates of public conscience, States 
will need to set limits on autonomy in weapon systems. 
However, in today’s armed conflicts, civilians are not killed by 
computers or autonomous weapon systems. Every year, many hundreds of 
thousands of them are displaced, wounded or killed because of the 
widespread availability and misuse of weapons. Moreover, the increasing 
urbanization of warfare in recent years, combined with the use of weapon 
24 
systems capable of delivering massive explosive force over a wide area, has 
taken a particularly devastating toll on civilians. 
Explosive weapons that have a wide impact area are generally not a 
cause for concern when used in open battlefields. But when employed 
against military objectives located in populated areas, the likelihood of 
indiscriminate effects is high. The humanitarian consequences are often 
dramatic and wide-ranging. Beyond direct death and injury, the impact of 
damage and disruption to critical infrastructure such as power plants or 
water systems, or to services such as hospitals, can ultimately be even more 
deadly. 
This is why the ICRC considers that explosive weapons with a wide 
impact area should be avoided in densely-populated areas. 
I referred earlier to the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration. It is worthwhile 
recalling how this first international weapons treaty came about. In 1867 
the Russians developed a projectile that was able to explode on contact 
with the human body. 
Considering that the bullet they just developed would have inhumane 
effects, the Russians themselves suggested that the use of this bullet be 
prohibited by international agreement. One year later States agreed to 
prohibit this weapon. 
International relations today are, of course, not the same as they were in 
the 19th century. States appear generally more averse to any kind of 
normative development. However, in some cases the general rules of IHL 
have appeared insufficient in addressing the human cost of particular 
weapons. When this has been the case, the ICRC and the Red Cross/Red 
Crescent Movement, together with civil society and many States, have 
played an important role in raising awareness on unacceptable harm caused 
by particular weapons and in advocating for clarification or development of 
the law. And we continue to do so. 
For example, the entire Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement has, 
since 2011, been calling on States to negotiate with urgency and 
determination a legally binding international agreement to prohibit the use 
of and completely eliminate nuclear weapons, in accordance with existing 
international commitments, within a time-bound framework. 
Clearly, given the prominent role of this weapon of mass destruction in 
the defence policy of some States, the political implications of these 
debates are enormous. What is also clear is that any use of these weapons 
would have catastrophic humanitarian consequences. Moreover, as long as 
nuclear weapons exist there remains a danger of intentional or accidental 
nuclear detonation. Indeed, some experts warn that the risk of such a 
detonation is higher today than in the recent past. We now have much 
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greater knowledge of the extent of civilian harm that use of these weapons 
would cause. In addition, humanitarian organizations have made very clear 
that there is a lack of sufficient capacity at national and international levels 
to respond effectively to such a humanitarian catastrophe. In the face of the 
overwhelming evidence of the unacceptable humanitarian consequences of 
any use of nuclear weapons, States must urgently take action to prohibit 
and eliminate these weapons. 
We are now embarking on three fascinating days of substantial debates 
on a range of issues pertaining to weapons. I look forward to some very 
productive and constructive discussions. 
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I would first like to thank Professor Pocar for his kind invitation to the 
Secretary-General to attend this Round Table.  
Over the past year, we have been celebrating the 70th anniversary of the 
United Nations. I have participated in a number of events to celebrate this 
occasion which proved to be an excellent opportunity for me to reflect on 
the achievements of the United Nations in many different areas in this 
period of time. In this regard, I would like to take this opportunity to briefly 
look back at the role of the United Nations in the development of and 
compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL).  
 
 
UN’s role in IHL matters 
 
At a first glance, it seems natural to me that the United Nations has been 
involved in IHL matters since the early years of the Organization. 
The United Nations was established in the aftermath of the Second 
World War, which saw violations of IHL on a massive scale. Thus, it is 
hard to imagine a United Nations that would not deal with IHL matters. 
Looking at the Charter of the United Nations, the language is couched 
broadly to allow the United Nations to deal with humanitarian issues. The 
Charter, therefore, sets out in its first article by stating that one of its 
purposes is “to achieve international co-operation in solving international 
problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character”. It is 
significant that it refers to “international problems of a humanitarian 
character”.  
The legislative actions of the principal organs of the United Nations also 
reveal the extensive role played by the Organization in IHL matters. From 
the late 1960s to the 1970s, the General Assembly adopted a series of 
resolutions entitled “Respect for human rights in armed conflict”, which 
contributed to the reaffirmation and development of IHL rules, particularly 
those pertaining to the protection of civilians, and supported the successful 
conclusion of the Additional Protocols in 1977. Since then, the Assembly 
has regularly dealt with IHL matters pertaining to specific conflicts and 
thematic areas. 
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The Security Council has also reaffirmed in its resolution 1502 adopted 
in 2003, “its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international 
peace and security and, in this context, the need to promote and ensure 
respect for the principles and rules of international humanitarian law”. 
Additional Protocol I of 1977 further confirms the role of the United 
Nations in IHL matters in a concrete manner. Article 89 of that Protocol, 
therefore, provides that “[i]n situations of serious violations of the [Geneva] 
Conventions or of this Protocol, the High Contracting Parties undertake to 
act, jointly or individually, in co-operation with the United Nations and in  
conformity with the United Nations Charter. ” 
These elements all confirm that the United Nations has a crucial role to 
play in IHL matters. 
 
 
Development of IHL 
 
One area that I wish to highlight is the role of the United Nations in 
developing IHL instruments. Looking back at its history, many multilateral 
treaties related to IHL have been negotiated and adopted within the 
framework of the United Nations. 
In fact, many of them relate to weapons, which is the theme of this 
Round Table. These treaties are: 
• The Convention on Conventional Weapons; 
• Its first three Protocols; 
• The Convention on Chemical Weapons; and most recently 
• The Arms Trade Treaty. 
 
The General Assembly played a key role in developing these treaties by 
convening diplomatic conferences and instructing the Conference on 
Disarmament to draw up the treaties. As far as the Arms Trade Treaty is 
concerned, after the Final Conference held in 2013 failed to adopt the draft 
Treaty, the General Assembly instead successfully adopted it. The Arms 
Trade Treaty entered into force on 24 December 2014. 
There are also other relevant treaties related to IHL which were 
negotiated and adopted within the UN framework, such as the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court and the Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in 
Armed Conflict. 
The General Assembly was also instrumental in these instances, as it 
mandated the International Law Commission and the Commission on 
Human Rights, and convened diplomatic conferences to draw up these 
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treaties. As far as the Optional Protocol is concerned, it was adopted 
directly by the General Assembly. 
I should also mention that these multilateral treaties that I have just 
mentioned are all deposited with the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations, and my Office, the Office of Legal Affairs, discharges the 
depositary functions on behalf of the Secretary-General. 
In this regard, my Office annually organizes a Treaty Event in 
September during the high-level week of the General Assembly, which 
provides a unique opportunity for Heads of States, Heads of Governments, 
Foreign Ministers and other senior government officials to undertake 
various treaty actions, including signature to and ratification of IHL-related 
treaties. 
We hope to contribute to wider acceptance of IHL-related treaties 
through these Treaty Events. 
 
 
Compliance with IHL 
 
I wish to note that the United Nations’ contribution to IHL has not been 
limited to the development of new instruments, but has also extended to the 
strengthening of compliance with the existing rules of IHL. 
Among other bodies, the Security Council, the General Assembly and 
the Human Rights Council, in particular, have played a key role in ensuring 
compliance with IHL. 
A well-known example of the Security Council’s contribution in this 
area is the establishment of and support to international and hybrid criminal 
tribunals, including the International Criminal Tribunal for former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), 
their Residual Mechanism, and the Special Court for Sierra Leone. 
The Security Council has also mandated the Secretary-General, his 
special representatives and envoys, peacekeeping missions and special 
political missions to monitor potential violations of IHL in ongoing 
conflicts. These mandates now cover a number of conflict situations around 
the world, ranging from high-profile conflicts such as Syria to other 
protracted conflicts such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo and 
Afghanistan. 
These mandates also cover thematic areas such as protection of civilians 
in armed conflict, children in armed conflict and conflict-related sexual 
violence. In particular, the Secretary-General is specifically mandated to 
indicate those parties which have recruited children, committed violence 
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against children, attacked schools and hospitals, as well as parties which 
may have committed sexual violence in times of armed conflict.  
For its part, the General Assembly has regularly dealt with a number of 
conflict situations and has exerted pressure on the parties to the conflict to 
abide by IHL. Such conflicts include Afghanistan, the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, Syria and the former Yugoslavia.  
It has also made efforts to ensure wider acceptance of various IHL 
treaties, particularly the Additional Protocols of 1977, and has adopted 
resolutions specifically dedicated to the status of the Additional Protocols. 
In these resolutions, the Assembly has also requested the Secretary-General 
to submit reports on the measures taken to strengthen the existing body of 
IHL, based on information provided by Member States and the ICRC. 
The General Assembly has also occasionally recommended the 
Government of Switzerland, as the depositary of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention, to convene a Conference of High Contracting Parties to ensure 
compliance with the Fourth Geneva Convention in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory. The General Assembly made such recommendations 
in 1999, 2009 and 2010. 
With respect to the Human Rights Council, which is a subsidiary organ 
of the General Assembly specialized in human rights issues, the Council 
has also mandated a number of fact-finding missions, commissions of 
inquiry, special rapporteurs and independent experts to report on violations 
of international human rights law. Their reports have, in practice, also 
included accounts of possible violations of IHL. Currently, these mandates 
cover such situations of great concern such as in Syria, the Central African 
Republic, Mali, Somalia, the Sudan, the Occupied Palestinian Territory and 
Libya. 
In the next few minutes, I would like to explore more in detail two 
particular areas in which the United Nations has played a role in improving 
compliance with IHL. 
 
 
Protection of civilians 
 
First is the issue of the protection of civilians in times of armed conflict. 
This issue has been particularly high on the agenda of the Secretary-
General 
In his latest report to the Security Council on the protection of civilians 
in armed conflict, the Secretary-General has reported that, at the end of 
2015, more than 60 million people had been forced to flee their homes as a 
result of conflict, violence and persecution. He also warned that 
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humanitarian needs are at record levels and more than 80 per cent of United 
Nations humanitarian funding is directed at conflict response. 
In this context, the Secretary-General has taken the initiative to urge 
parties to the conflict to renew their commitments to protect civilians by 
complying with IHL. The Secretary-General, therefore, issued a joint 
statement with the President of the ICRC last October, and convened the 
World Humanitarian Summit last May to, among other things, call upon all 
those concerned to renew their commitments to protect civilians in times of 
armed conflict.  
The concept of “protection of civilians” has been around in the United 
Nations for quite a while now, and I would like to take this opportunity to 
take a step back to reflect upon this concept. 
IHL is evidently the primary source of rules that deal with the protection 
of civilians in times of armed conflict, and there are specific and detailed 
rules in this regard. 
These include: 
• The obligation to distinguish between civilians and combatants; 
• The obligation not to direct attacks against civilians; 
• To attack only combatants; 
• The obligation not to carry out indiscriminate attacks; and 
• The obligation to take precautions before and during an attack to 
minimize civilian casualties. 
 
IHL also envisages the establishment of zones under special protection, 
such as neutralized zones and demilitarized zones, in order to provide 
protection for the wounded, sick and civilians from the effects of hostilities. 
So, the protection of civilians in the context of IHL is based on a number of 
detailed rules of IHL. These rules comprehensively deal with the protection 
of civilians in times of armed conflict. 
However, “protection of civilians” is also a notion that has increasingly 
been used in the context of United Nations peacekeeping activities, and not 
strictly within the context of IHL. You may recall that, in 1999, the 
Security Council for the first time tasked a peacekeeping operation with 
protecting civilians under imminent threat of physical violence. More 
specifically, the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone was tasked with 
that mandate in the context of the conflict in that area. 
Since then, the Security Council has regularly mandated peacekeeping 
operations to protect civilians under imminent threat. Today, United 
Nations operations in Abyei, the Central African Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Darfur, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Lebanon, Liberia, 
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Mali and South Sudan are all mandated to protect civilians, and in most 
cases, to “take all necessary measures” to carry out this mandate. 
In practice, the mandate to protect civilians under imminent threat has 
been implemented in various ways, such as by monitoring compliance with 
international human rights law and IHL, conducting patrols, setting up safe 
areas, and, in exceptional cases, by offensive operations against armed 
groups. 
Recently, the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan, 
or “UNMISS”, has been facing immense challenges in dealing with 
civilians who were displaced by the conflict and sought refuge in UNMISS 
premises. According to the latest report of the Secretary-General, there 
were nearly 170,000 people who were residing in six UNMISS sites for the 
protection of civilians. Early this year, in February 2016, there was large 
scale violence inside the Malakal protection site, where more than 47,000 
people were housed, which resulted in many deaths and injuries. This gives 
an idea of how difficult it is to implement the protection-of-civilians 
mandate. 
I wish to note at this juncture that the notion of “protection of civilians” 
in the context of peacekeeping is not based on IHL, but is a mandate that is 
given by the Security Council pursuant to the Charter of the United 
Nations. 
While the notion of “protection of civilians” is separate and distinct in 
the context of IHL and peacekeeping, the actions taken by peacekeeping 
operations to protect civilians could be complementary to the actions taken 
by the conflicting parties to protect civilians pursuant to their obligations 
under IHL.  
However, while recognizing this complementarity, I should also 
emphasize that the measures under IHL to protect civilians, and those 
measures authorized by the Security Council should, at times, be very 
clearly distinguished. 
For example, during the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the early 
1990s, the Security Council, under Chapter VII of the Charter, designated 
certain towns as “safe areas”, including Srebrenica, and mandated a 
peacekeeping operation to protect them, also by the use of force. At the 
same time, based on IHL provisions, the parties to the conflict voluntarily 
concluded an agreement which required them to withdraw their forces from 
Srebrenica, and ensure the security of Srebrenica by removing hostile 
elements from the town.  
In his report on the “Fall of Srebrenica”, the Secretary-General indicated 
that the confusion between the two types of measures may have contributed 
to the tragic events in Srebrenica. In this connection, the Secretary-General 
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stated that there might have been confusion as to whether the “safe areas” 
were imposed on the parties to the conflict and protected by a military 
force, or rather voluntarily agreed to by the parties and protected by 
demilitarizing those areas. 
The report also refers to concerns expressed at the time that “in failing 
to provide a credible military deterrent, the safe area policy would be 
gravely damaging to the [Security] Council’s reputation and, indeed, to the 
United Nations as a whole.” 
I believe that we have a lot to learn from the past experience, and that 
the caution of the previous Secretary-General is still valid today in the 






Apart from the protection of civilians, I would like to briefly touch upon 
the issue of humanitarian access. In recent years, we have witnessed 
increasing difficulties in providing humanitarian assistance to civilians 
affected by armed conflicts, such as in Syria, Yemen and Ukraine. The 
United Nations has been particularly concerned with the obstacles in 
delivering humanitarian assistance to Syria across the border. 
IHL clearly provides for the obligation of the parties to allow and 
facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian relief for civilians 
in need. However, the requirement to obtain consent of the host State in 
crossing the border to deliver humanitarian assistance was particularly 
problematic in the context of Syria. 
This has prompted the Security Council to take measures. Resolution 
2165 adopted in 2014, which is binding, authorized UN humanitarian 
agencies and their partners to use specific border crossings in Syria, in 
order to ensure that humanitarian assistance reached people in need 
throughout the country through the most direct routes. This authorization 
has most recently been extended to 10 January 2017. Pursuant to this 
authorization, a number of humanitarian convoys have used the border 
crossings to delivery aid to Syria. According to the latest report of the 
Secretary-General, during the month of July 2016, 335 trucks crossed the 
Syrian border under the terms of the Security Council resolutions. 
Resolution 2165, however, still required the United Nations to notify the 
Syrian authorities of the instances in which the border crossings were used 
by the United Nations humanitarian agencies and their partners. Moreover, 
the resolution established a United Nations mechanism to monitor the 
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loading and any subsequent inspection of UN humanitarian consignments 
passing through the Syrian border crossings, in order to ensure that the 
consignments were humanitarian in nature. The Monitoring Mechanism is 
also required to notify the Syrian authorities that the consignments are 
humanitarian in nature. 
I believe that the Security Council took an important step to improve the 
humanitarian situation in Syria and to complement the obligations already 
provided for in IHL. However, it goes without saying that more needs to be 





In closing, I wish to note that the United Nations has been engaged 
extensively in IHL matters, and will always have an important role to play 
in this area in the future. My Office, the Office of Legal Affairs, has also 
been dealing with a variety of IHL matters, and the ICRC has, in particular, 
been an indispensable partner in addressing such issues. We also look 
forward to engaging with practitioners as well as the academia on IHL 
matters of common interest. 
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Let me start by reflecting that international law does include legal rules 
that determine the lawfulness of new weapons and new weapon 
technologies. Briefly, weapons that are of a nature to cause superfluous 
injury or unnecessary suffering, that is, injury or suffering for which there 
is no corresponding military purpose or benefit, are prohibited. Likewise, 
weapons that are inherently indiscriminate, that is, that cannot be directed 
at a specific military objective or the effects of which cannot be reasonably 
limited to a military objective, are also unlawful. The third group of rules 
addresses the environment. There is the prohibition in the 1976 UN 
Environmental Modification Convention on using, essentially, the 
environment as a weapon and the related, but fundamentally distinct, 
prohibition in Additional Protocol I (AP I), prohibiting weapons that may 
be expected to, or which are intended to, cause widespread, long-term and 
severe damage to the natural environment. For states not party to 
Additional Protocol I, this is generally recognised as a rule requiring that 
due regard be had to the natural environment as a civilian object when 
military operations are undertaken. There are then specific rules of the law 
prohibiting or limiting the lawful circumstances of use of particular kinds 
of weapons, such as chemical or biological weapons. The final headline 
aspect of the law of weapons that I want to emphasise later in my 
comments is the legal obligation of all states, complied with by too few of 
them, to conduct legal reviews of all new weapons. 
A rather fundamental issue concerns the definition of the word 
‘weapon’. I have revised my thinking and would suggest that a weapon will 
include an object, system or other capability that is used, intended or 
designed in order to cause injury or damage to an adverse party to an armed 
conflict. That interpretation is intended to be broad enough to encompass 
computer capabilities that are used, intended for use or designed to cause 
injury or damage. 
There are numerous controversies in the weapons law field and I will 
touch on some of them in these comments. For example, the very notion of 
cyber weapon is controversial. Incapacitating chemical agents, for instance, 
as a means of addressing theatre sieges and similar situations, raise 
concerns under the Chemical Weapons Convention. Synthetic biology and 
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the generation of viruses capable of interfering with human genetics are an 
obvious matter for worry. Enhancing human performance may, for 
example, involve external appliances such as exoskeletons, implants or the 
use of drugs. Degrading the performance of personnel belonging to the 
adverse party will also raise obvious legal issues. Then there is the 
development of ‘Harry Potter-esque’ invisibility cloaks to which reference 
will be made below, and all of this is, of course, is in addition to the well-
known controversies surrounding the development of automated and 
autonomous weapons.  
So, we have weapon review duties being inadequately implemented by 
states at the same time as technology in the weapons field is developing 
rapidly. There are evident dangers arising from such a situation which 
immediately causes one to wonder whether weapons law itself is a dynamic 
body of law. Noteworthy events in this regard have occurred over the last 6 
or 7 years. We have had new law in the form of the Kampala Resolution 
amending Rome Statute War Crimes provision in relation to non-
international armed conflicts by inserting new weapons-related crimes into 
article 8 of the Statute. In addition we have seen the adoption of the Arms 
Trade Treaty.  
In soft law terms, the HPCR Manual on the International Law applicable 
to Air and Missile Warfare has been issued. Likewise, the Tallinn Manual 
on the International Law relating to Cyber Warfare has been published, and 
Tallinn 2.0’s publication is expected towards the turn of this year. Under 
the aegis of the UN General Assembly, Groups of Governmental Experts 
(GGE) have been addressing Information and Communication 
Technologies; the reports of those groups dated 2010, 2013 and 2015 come 
within this wide notion of soft law, and remember that last month the next 
GGE was scheduled to convene. Finally, mention must be made of the 
publication last year of the US Department of Defence Law of War 
Manual. That document is not soft law as such, but its Weapons Chapter is 
of significance and requires mention. 
Where weapon reviews are concerned, as has been mentioned, too few 
states do them. However, more states are developing weapon review 
systems and, so far as the US at least is concerned, weapon reviews are 
seen as central to addressing the issues raised by Lethal Autonomous 
Weapon systems. Increasing the capacity of states to be able to undertake 
weapon reviews, for example by teaching courses like the one I teach at the 
Geneva Centre for Security Policy, is a necessary step in promoting 
compliance with the legal obligation. Similarly important in this regard is 
international engagement among states that may take the form, for 
example, of the Shrivenham meetings involving state officials to discuss 
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weapons law issues and the various Track 1, Track 1.5 and Track 2 
meetings on, for example, cyber issues. But there are general concerns 
about weapon reviews, which are often characterised as too rooted in self-
policing by states and as lacking in transparency. However, they seem to 
me to be the only realistic option. Fundamental state security considerations 
dictate that such processes must of necessity remain confidential. 
If we have seen that weapons law is dynamic the next question is how 
adaptable is it? In the last 15 years, the scope of the Conventional Weapons 
Convention has been expanded for ratifying states to apply to non-
international armed conflicts. Protocol V to that Convention, on Explosive 
Remnants of War, has been adopted. Declarations on mines other than anti-
personnel mines and on compliance, both under the aegis of CCW, were 
adopted. The Cluster Munitions Convention was adopted in 2008. Lethal 
autonomous weapons are being discussed by CCW states and there have 
been the GGE Reports on Information and Communications Technology to 
which I referred earlier. 
What are the issues today? The first issue is that there seems no 
likelihood for a general revision of the law. States seem to be reluctant for 
whatever reason to contemplate such a process in relation to this as to other 
aspects of the law of armed conflict. Hard law developments in weapons 
law seem to be ad hoc and to be driven by the agendas of NGOs, those 
agendas in turn being frequently either determined or heavily influenced by 
funding considerations. But then to be fair, soft law in the form of 
international manuals such as the Air and Missile Warfare Manual and the 
Tallinn Manual, are also dependent on funding being made available to 
enable the experts to meet, discuss, prepare their papers, conduct their 
research and so on. So, are these soft law texts addressing the gaps in hard 
law relating to weapons? That is a question we will address shortly. 
We have talked already of soft law and now ought to think a little about 
its significance. Let me raise some questions for you to consider this week. 
First, do states feel more comfortable with soft law? After all, it is just as 
contested as anyone participating in the International Manual and GGE 
processes will certainly confirm. Second, could it be that states feel able to 
participate in soft law processes and the weapon law regimes they may 
involve at a more acceptable pace? Third, is soft law the better way to 
address evolving weapons technology, for example, because of its inherent 
flexibility? Fourth, are states perhaps as likely to comply with soft law 
rules, particularly those soft law rules they have been involved in 
developing? But then, is soft law really flexible? Perhaps not.  
With these thoughts and questions in mind, let us recognise some 
realities. Soft law is not law as such. It is after all neither custom as such 
40 
nor does it have the character of treaties. So soft law texts do not provide 
the criteria on which to base a weapon review, although relevant Manuals 
may of course repeat those criteria. Also, with treaty law rules, there is the 
‘naming and shaming’ aspect in that the activities of states that are 
perceived as having breached their legal obligations may be cited, for 
example, by relevant NGOs, and states that have not yet chosen to be party 
to the treaty may be inspired to participate. Soft law does, however, have 
the capacity to signpost to states where development of the law is required. 
When considering these strands of thought, we should recognise that 
progress in this weapons law field will inevitably take time. There are 
difficult issues involved, so we should be patient while maintaining 
appropriate ambition. 
We should also consider carefully whether new hard law is necessarily 
required. In this regard and as an example, bear in mind that current 
autonomous weapon technology is such that an autonomous weapon system 
that is to be used to undertake offensive attack operations, i.e. that will seek 
out targets and decide whether and how to attack them, should fail a 
weapon review because current technology, so far as is known, is not 
capable of performing the evaluative decision-making that current targeting 
law, specifically article 57 of Additional Protocol I and its customary law 
equivalent, requires. And yet, in its 2012 Losing Humanity report, Human 
Rights Watch seeks a ban of such autonomous technologies. One might 
legitimately wonder how an explicit ban of such technology in any sense 
increases the unlawfulness that already applies and that is reflected in the 
likely failure of such systems to pass a weapon review. Wouldn’t it be 
better to devote our efforts to ensuring that existing law is properly applied, 
i.e. that weapon reviews are properly and universally undertaken? 
So, does soft law fill the gaps that exist in hard law? The simple answer 
is no. Gaps in hard law can only be filled by the adoption of additional hard 
law. But some soft law and other processes do show that states remain 
engaged in weapons law matters and the rapid developments in the 
technology that we have noted will ensure that that level of engagement 
will continue.  
We should at this point briefly mention ethical matters. Arguably, 
weapons law is where the relationship between ethics and international law 
is currently being played out and the treaty law that we have reflects how 
far states have been prepared to go to address identified and established 
humanitarian concerns. States have sought and continue to seek to strike a 
balance between military necessity and humanitarian concerns and 
maintaining that balance will be critical in ensuring the acceptability of 
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future law in this area and these ethical challenges are likely to be even 
sharper in the future. 
At this point we should consider where those future challenges seem 
likely to feature. Some 12 years ago, autonomous weapons and the 
challenge that concept represents was what many saw as ‘the whacky 
future’, whereas now it is the subject of increasingly mainstream research. 
One future technology to watch is the metamaterials I mentioned earlier. Is 
an invisibility cloak that renders a person or object invisible correctly 
classed as camouflage – would those who drafted article 37(2) of 
Additional Protocol I have been as content to include camouflage as an 
example of a lawful ruse without caveats had these ‘camouflage cloaks’ 
been known back in 1977? And if the weapon a soldier carries is rendered 
invisible by such technology, is he complying with the combatant’s 
obligation to ‘carry his arms openly’? If not, does the technology imperil 
the individual’s status as a combatant?  
We have mentioned human enhancement already, but consider the 
potentially even more troubling issues arising from neuromorphic 
engineering in which brain processes are synthesised. What are the 
implications of such developments for notions of a ‘brain-machine 
interface’? In short, at what point does a machine become a variant of a 
human and when does the human become part of a weapon system as 
opposed to the user of such a system? Even more fundamentally, is a 
contest exclusively between machines something that we wish to see? And 
if it were to occur, is it warfare in any sensible sense? In short, where do 
the boundaries of the acceptable in warfare lie? Does current law reflect 
those boundaries and if not, what new law is required to address the 
perceived inadequacies?  
The listener will now be considering what the implications of all this 
might be. You will have your own views. I offer the following. Weapons 
law is and must stay dynamic. The interaction between soft law and hard 
law should be clarified, and both of them have important roles to play in the 
development of weapons law. State to state consultations on weapons law 
issues arising, for example, from novel technologies are of great value and 
Track 1, Track 1.5 and Track 2 consultations and the Shrivenham 
discussions provide useful examples of such activity. Article 36 weapon 
reviews remain the vitally important method whereby states should ensure 
their continued compliance with weapons law rules, and training in 




The humanitarian perspective: 
from field to policy to law 
Peter HERBY 
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It is appropriate that this roundtable focuses on the area of international 
humanitarian law (IHL) that has developed most rapidly over the past 20 
years: the regulation of arms. Five important treaties have been negotiated 
since 1995: the CCW Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons, the 
strengthened version of its Protocol on landmines, the Convention on the 
Prohibition of Anti-personnel Mines, the Protocol on Explosive Remnants 
of War and most recently, the Convention on Cluster Munitions. However, 
these achievements provide no basis for complacency. New scientific and 
technical developments constantly challenge us all to defend fundamental 
norms and to keep the law relevant. These successes and the challenges 
ahead suggest that this is a field of human endeavour that deserves more 
attention, more expertise and more resources. Hopefully, this roundtable 
will help generate such elements. 
One of the most striking developments in this field over the past 20-25 
years has been the instrumental role of humanitarian, development, human 
rights and academic organizations, and of weapon victims themselves, in 
promoting the development and implementation of new IHL norms. The 
ICRC and International Movement of the Red Cross and Red Crescent have 
also played a more active and visible role than ever before.  
These organizations and individuals, in partnership with governments, 
have not only ensured the adoption of new IHL treaties but have also 
changed how norms in this field are made. They have introduced a “field-
based” and “evidence-based” approach. This approach interacts with, 
influences and sometimes contradicts approaches whose starting points are 
military requirements or desires, technological or industrial interests and 
abstract legal concepts. When successfully blended, these approaches can 
produce new norms. Yet even when treaties are not achieved, or not yet 
achieved, the field-based and evidence-based approaches can change the 
parameters within which political decision-making, military operations and 
technological evolution occur.  
What I mean by field-based is an approach built on the documented 
impacts of weapons already in use on civilians, their communities and 
livelihoods. By evidence-based I mean an understanding, based on 
scientific knowledge and real-world scenarios, of the foreseeable effects of 
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new weapons on the human body and on civilians and civilian 
infrastructure. 
 
So what types of evidence have been brought to the table by these 
actors?In relation to both landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) 
evidence has provided insights into the nature and scale of injuries and into 
the long-term impacts of weapons contamination on individual lives, social 
and economic development and the diversion of limited health resources. 
Field-based evidence of the devastating impact of anti-personnel 
landmines (AP), in particular, has been extensive. Consistent patterns have 
been revealed linking the nature of this weapon with specific results: the 
majority of victims are civilians, not combatants and more casualties occur 
after conflicts end than during hostilities. In addition, landmine victims 
require more surgical operations, longer hospital stays and more blood 
transfusions than other war-injured. They usually require life-long 
orthopedic care and need to learn new skills to achieve social and economic 
reintegration into their societies. A high percentage of victims die without 
receiving treatment.  
In a variety of contexts evidence revealed more civilian casualties from 
explosive remnants of war than from landmines. These included Kosovo 
where, in the year following the short 15-week conflict in 1999, two-thirds 
of the casualties resulted from ERW. Unexploded cluster munition 
submunitions caused half of the casualties in Laos and certain regions of 
Cambodia and Vietnam. The astonishingly high level of civilian casualties 
from ERW and, in particular, cluster submunitions, was ignored by all but a 
few small NGOs for more than a decade after the Indochina conflict. Yet 
high numbers of civilian casualties were entirely foreseeable. High failure 
rates of up to 38% were recorded even at the testing stage of certain of the 
most widely used submunitions. Aerial bombardment in Laos alone 
resulted in an estimated failure rate of up to 30% and some 80 million 
unexploded cluster submunitions. These are responsible for most of an 
estimated 20,000 casualties from explosive remnants of war since the end 
of hostilities in 1974. 
Such evidence and compelling testimony by scores of victims have 
produced lasting results. Such results include the treaties on AP mines, 
cluster munitions and ERW, sharp reductions in the use of AP mines and 
cluster munitions, long-term clearance efforts, more investment in the 
needs of victims and survivors and sustained funding for these efforts. 
Taking a long-term view, I think it is fair to say that an historic shift has 
occurred. From a legal and political perspective, the users of weapons that 
cause harm to civilians long after their use are no longer free to walk away 
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from the threats they have created. On the preventive side the 2006 CCW 
Review Conference also concluded that “the foreseeable effects of 
explosive remnants of war on civilian populations (are)…a factor to be 
considered in applying the international humanitarian law rules on 
proportionality in attack and precautions in attack”. 
It is also worth mentioning that another important non-IHL treaty, the 
Arms Trade Treaty, was a result of field-based documentation of the human 
costs of unregulated international arms transfers and of their implications 
for the respect for IHL, development and human rights. 
Evidence provided by ICRC, civil society organizations and research 
institutes has also been crucial in the development of policy, norms and 
new IHL rules on new weapon technologies. 
By the late 1980s a number of States were in the advanced stages of the 
development of blinding laser weapons or dual use systems that could 
attack both battlefield sensors and the human eye. Yet little attention had 
been given to the severity of blinding as an injury as compared to other war 
injuries from kinetic and explosive force. Nor had much thought been given 
to how the victims would be treated, to how societies could reintegrate 
large numbers of blinded combatants or civilians or to the implications of 
the proliferation and the inevitable use against one’s own forces. Four years 
of expert meetings hosted by the ICRC and the work of organizations such 
as Human Rights Watch, the World Blind Union and the Blinded Veterans 
Association of the US helped turn the tide. Diplomatic efforts led by 
Sweden produced an ever-increasing number of States that rejected 
blinding laser weapons as a matter of policy and set the stage for the 1995 
CCW Review Conference to negotiate Protocol IV prohibiting such 
weapons. It is worth noting that this weapon was prohibited based on its 
permanently disabling effects despite it being promoted as a “non-lethal” 
weapon. 
Evidence provided by scientists, academics and the ICRC has also 
helped to dampen interest in the use of highly toxic chemicals, sometimes 
called “incapacitating chemical agents”, as weapons for law enforcement. 
This is intended to prevent erosion of the Chemical Weapons Convention 
broad prohibition of the use of toxic chemical agents, whatever their nature, 
in warfare. Following the use of powerful anesthetic agents in the 2002 
Moscow theatre siege States were embarrassingly silent about the 
acceptability and implications for the CWC of the use of such chemical 
weapons. This silence was striking in light of the fact that the 18% lethality 
of their use in the Moscow siege was higher than that achieved by chemical 
weapons in WWI and the Iran-Iraq war. The chemicals employed also had 
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toxicity levels comparable to “classical” chemical warfare agents such as 
nerve agents. 
Expert documentation demonstrated the difficulty of keeping highly 
toxic chemicals out of warfare if accepted for “law enforcement”. It also 
highlighted the impossibility of quickly incapacitating large numbers of 
people without lethal effects and raised a range of ethical and IHL issues. 
These include the implications of employing medical personnel in the 
planning and conduct of an attack. Following consolidation of evidence at 
ICRC expert meetings in 2010 and 2012 and attempts by Switzerland and 
Australia to have this issue addressed by the OPCW’s Executive Council, 
State policy has begun to change. In early 2013 the ICRC called on States 
to ensure that the use of toxic chemicals for law enforcement was limited to 
traditional “riot control agents”. Since then, at least 13 States have 
confirmed a national position of only using riot control agents and 27 States 
have called for discussions among States Parties to begin in the OPCW’s 
Executive Council. 
Without going into detail, it is worth noting that a variety of 
humanitarian, IHL and ethical concerns about other new types of weapons 
have been put on the international agenda on the basis of evidence 
presented by the ICRC, NGOs and academics. Some of these will be 
addressed in upcoming sessions. The most notable include lethal 
autonomous weapon systems, cyber weapons and potential military 
applications of developments in the life sciences. The challenges of new 
technologies and scientific breakthroughs are daunting. 
 
The legal obligation to review the legality of weapons being developed 
or acquired is codified in Article 36 of Additional Protocol I that will be 
discussed in our next session. The ICRC has worked with States for many 
years to develop capacities and advance common understanding of how 
Article 36 should be implemented. One result of these efforts is a “Guide” 
to weapon review processes that was peer-reviewed by State experts 
engaged in such reviews. Yet today only a dozen or so countries appear to 
have any formally mandated mechanism requiring Article 36 reviews 
before weapons are developed or acquired. And those that do often don’t 
provide a consistent role for the engagement of the multidisciplinary 
expertise needed to conduct evidence-based evaluations of new 
technologies. 
One can only speculate as to how many lives might have been saved if 
more stringent weapon reviews were in place in the 1950s, 60s and 70s. 
Should cluster munitions with potential failure rates of 38% at the testing 
stage have been approved in light of their wide-area effects and foreseeable 
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long-term contamination? Should their use by an ever-increasing number of 
countries have continued for several decades in light of their demonstrated 
reliability problems? Should weapons as difficult to use discriminately as 
landmines have been defended for decades as conforming to IHL?  
What is not speculation is that new technologies now being considered 
for weaponization present complex challenges beyond any previously 
addressed. The application of autonomy to weapon systems, which seems 
to be leading relentlessly towards autonomous weapon systems, raises 
fundamental issues involving IHL rules on discrimination, proportionality 
and responsibility as well as a range of concerns related to human rights 
law, ethics, proliferation and the future of warfare. Many of these issues go 
far beyond the scope of Article 36. Potential hostile applications of 
biotechnology, advances in the life sciences, directed energy and 
nanotechnology, to name but a few, will challenge the public conscience 
and the regulatory capacity of States as never before. 
For decades since the invention of dynamite by Alfred Nobel, the 
primary injury mechanisms of weapons have been kinetic and explosive 
force. The impacts of these forces on the human body are well documented 
and predictable. But how well will future weapon reviewers understand 
computer programming, impacts of directed energy on the human 
organism, the environmental impacts of weapons employing 
nanotechnologies or the implications for human rights or IHL of law 
enforcement agents that can change human thought, behaviour or identity? 
How will such agents be tested on humans and reviewed on the basis of 
realistic real world scenarios? These are challenges that exist today and cry 
out for more evidence-based analysis and debate. 
Another field that cries out for the application of fundamental IHL rules 
to the evidence now available is nuclear weapons. The risk of nuclear 
weapon use through accident, escalation or intent appears to have increased 
in recent years. The organization Global Zero has documented some 320 
“military incidents” since February 2014 involving nuclear weapon States 
and those allied to such States in Europe, North America, South Asia and 
East Asia. Twenty-five were considered “high risk”. Former US Secretary 
of Defense, William Perry, estimates the risk of a nuclear catastrophe to be 
“greater than it was during the Cold War and rising”. 
States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons (NPT) formally recognized the “catastrophic humanitarian 
consequences” of nuclear weapons for the first time in 2010. Since then the 
first-ever intergovernmental conferences on these consequences have 
received new and uncontested evidence that goes far beyond what was 
previously known. The ICRC and United Nations agencies have 
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highlighted the absence of any adequate capacity or plans to assist victims 
of nuclear detonations at the international level. New means of estimating 
environmental impacts have demonstrated that even a limited exchange 
involving the detonation of 100 nuclear weapons would produce a cooling 
of global temperatures, the reduction of growing seasons in the northern 
hemisphere and a global famine in which over 1 billion people would 
perish. Doctors from Japanese Red Cross hospitals in Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki have cared for atomic bomb survivors since 1956. They continue 
to treat some 10,000 survivors per year and have witnessed rates of 
leukemia at rates 4-5 times that of the normal population. They are now 
conducting research into an expected increase in cancer among some 
200,000 ageing children of survivors. These are people who weren’t even 
directly exposed to atomic radiations but appear to be at risk due to genetic 
damage to their parents. 
Despite the finding of the International Court of Justice 20 years ago last 
month that the use of nuclear weapons is “generally contrary to” the rules 
of international humanitarian law and that “(t)here exists an obligation to 
pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to 
nuclear disarmament” no such negotiation has yet begun. Rather, reports 
indicate that nuclear weapon States are all now engaged in massive 
investments to modernize nuclear weapons. Such investments will take 
decades to justify, are likely to reduce the incentive for such States to 
eliminate the weapons and may make the use of such weapons more likely. 
A failure to draw the necessary legal conclusions about nuclear weapons, 
based on overwhelming evidence of their catastrophic humanitarian 
consequences, undermines confidence in some of the most fundamental 
rules of IHL on discrimination, proportionality and protection of the 
environment. It is long past the time to breach this “last frontier” in the 
field of IHL and weapons by applying the rules and the evidence to such 
weapons. As ICRC President Kellenberger stated in his landmark 2010 
speech: “We must never allow ourselves to become morally indifferent to 
the terrifying effects of a weapon that defies our common humanity, calls 
into question the most fundamental principles of international humanitarian 
law, and can threaten the continued existence of the human species.” 
It is clear that IHL rules on weapons are an indispensable framework for 
the protection of humanity from some of the worst applications of 
technology. States, the Red Cross and Crescent Movement, individual 
scientists and civil society have both the opportunity and responsibility to 
engage in profound legal, ethical and societal reflection on where, as the 
1863 St. Petersburg Declaration stated, "the necessities of war ought to 
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yield to the requirements of humanity". These issues are at the heart of IHL 
and at the core of the Red Cross Movement’s mission and raison d’être. 
It is also clear from the experience of the past two decades that we can 
and must base our discussions, decisions and norms on evidence. This is 
available in contexts where weapons are used, through scientific 
investigation and through analysis of real-world scenarios. Making policy 
or reviewing the legality of weapons under IHL without adequate evidence 
should not be considered acceptable professional practice. When there are 
too many unknowns we must choose prudence and precaution. The 
implications for humanity and the future of our planet of neglecting or 
ignoring an evidence-based approach can be just as grave as in the field of 
global warming. In that field, a global consensus appears to have been built 
and a certain level of mobilization has begun. We must do even better on 
arms and IHL. 
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process and procedures 
 
Marie VAN HOOFSTAT 
Legal Advisor, Ministry of Defence, Brussels 
 
Belgian perspective on the legal review of weapons 
 
As secretary for the Belgian legal Review Commission, I have 
conducted the legal reviews in the past four years. I have based my 
presentation on the experiences I have had, conducting those reviews. 
There might be issues that have never arisen during my time as secretary. I 
will, however, try to answer in as much detail as possible the following 
questions:  
1. What is the Belgian perspective on the scope of the obligation? That 
is: what weapons, means and methods of warfare are eligible for 
being reviewed? 
2. At what stage of development or acquisition is a Belgian legal 
review conducted? 
3. To ensure an effective review, what information is required? What 
type of information? Source? 
4. What expertise is required? Health, technical and environmental; 
Multidisciplinary approach. 
5. What is the process of the legal review? 
6. We were also asked to share our view on the need for or added value 
in transparency and information-sharing in weapons reviews and 
procedures linked with the question of resources and expertise at the 
national level and cooperation among States. 
7. The last question deals with the promotion of legal reviews: how 
should other States be encouraged to undertake weapons’ reviews? 
 
While answering these questions, I will highlight some of the challenges 
that the Belgian Review Commission has been faced with.  
As to the first question, the scope of the obligation, the Belgian legal 
Review Commission takes a broad view. Without going into too much 
detail on the meaning of the word “weapon” and “means of warfare”, it 
should suffice to say that the former can be generally defined as any object 
or device, including munitions or other pieces of equipment which are used 
to cause damage, and the latter as the umbrella for weapons and weapons 
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systems or platforms, also including munitions and other associated 
equipment. The Commission would review all types of such weapons and 
weapon systems whether lethal or non-lethal, anti-personnel anti-material.  
As to the meaning of the word “new” the Belgian Commission reviews 
all weapons that are not yet in the Belgian arsenal. The Commission does  
not only review technically new weapons but a legal review would also be 
conducted for any significant changes made to weapons or weapons 
systems which are already in the Belgian arsenal but who’s function is 
altered by a modification, for example, by equipping the weapon with an 
additional accessory.  
Theoretically the Commission is competent to review methods of 
warfare as well, but since the establishment of the Commission, the reviews 
that have been conducted have been limited to weapons or weapon systems. 
It is worth noting the case of military working dogs. The Belgian 
Commission has not (yet) conducted a review of military working dogs, but 
one could wonder whether they qualify as a means of warfare. Or are they 
to be considered as a weapon and should their use be evaluated as a method 
of warfare?  
A last point that I would like to make regarding the scope of the 
obligation is that the legal review will always require a statement on the 
intended use by the end-user. It is only this normal and intended use that 
will be reviewed. One could easily imagine a weapon being acquired for a 
specific and strict use in a law-enforcement situation. Hence, the review 
will be conducted for this limited scope.  
Turning to the second question, at what stage a legal review is 
conducted; country specific circumstances will probably vary quite 
extensively. To start with, Belgian defence does not study or develop new 
weapons. Since this conference does not cover government spending in 
defence related matters nor does it cover national policies on research and 
development, I will not go into much detail. It should suffice to remind the 
audience that Belgium, the Belgian armed forces and its defence budget are 
most modest in size.  
Before turning to the acquisition process, I should point out a certain 
lapsus in the system, namely the lending of material. In international 
coalitions, sometimes – or often – weapons or munitions are commonly 
used. In the past four years I have been aware of this practice, yet for none 
of these cases a legal review was conducted.  
The legal reviews I have seen have thus been limited to situations of 
acquisition. Within the Belgian Armed Forces there is no single streamlined 
acquisition process. It is probably needless to say, but this is one of the 
challenges the Belgian Commission faces. Because different services on a 
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variety of levels are competent to instigate an acquisition, the legal Review 
Commission would need to be known all across these services, quod non. 
In short, one of the challenges the Commission is faced with, is the 
knowledge of its existence.  
If, however, all goes well and the advice of the Commission is sought, 
the question remains as to when the Commission will start conducting its 
review. In theory, the Belgian acquisition process starts with a statement of 
requirement. To get the Commission involved at this very early stage is 
considered not to be efficient as many of these statements will never result 
in an acquisition and the workload of the Commission would rise to an 
unrealistic level. Nevertheless, one could also argue that getting involved at 
this very early stage has its advantages too, that is, stopping the process of 
acquiring a weapon that would not pass a legal review. Once the statement 
of requirements is validated and hence transmitted to the competent 
administrator, a document stating the key-user-requirements (KUR) will be 
developed. This “KUR” is the reference document for the subsequent 
public tender. This is the phase where ideally the legal review Commission 
is consulted. We now know for what intended use which type of weapon or 
weapon system is going to be acquired. The Commission can start working.  
This brings us to the third question; what information is required to 
conduct a review? At the stage of starting the public tender, detailed 
information as to the very particular characteristics of the weapon or 
weapon system that will eventually be acquired is not yet available. The 
Commission can start its work by reviewing the intended use, but cannot at 
this point conduct a proper review. The Commission will follow-up on the 
awarding of the contract and will continue its work once the contract has 
been awarded. At that stage very specific information should be sought as 
to the working, including failure rates and the effects of the weapon. On the 
one hand, the supplier will provide information, but this is not the only type 
of information the Commission should rely on; the Commission should 
make sure that all available data are correct and independent. When 
resources are available, independent tests will be requested. However, 
given some of the issues already mentioned, budgetary constraints might 
preclude these tests. The Commission is, therefore, often forced to rely on 
the supplier’s information. The Commission will attempt to have critical 
expertise amongst its members to detect any flaws in this information and 
will undertake to request information from other countries that dispose of 
the same weapon or weapon system and might have done or are having 
independent testing done. This is a second challenge the Belgian 
Commission is faced with: disposing of reliable and independent 
information.  
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Having established what information is desired, we will turn to the 
fourth question: the expertise that is needed in the Commission. First of all, 
technical expertise is needed to explain to the Commission how the weapon 
or weapon system works. An understanding of the technical details is of 
great importance to be able to conduct a comprehensive review. Secondly, 
considering the norms of international law that have to be reviewed, 
corresponding expertise is needed. If the weapon under review has an 
environmental impact, evidently environmental experts will need to be 
present in the Commission. This point of view explains the changing 
composition of the Belgian Commission. The technical experts are usually 
the administrators who manage the acquisition. Other experts will depend 
on the issues the legal review will have to tackle. Evidently these types of 
experts are non-permanent in the Commission. Permanent members of the 
Commission are the president and the secretary, both legal advisors. 
Additional permanent members are legal advisors specialized in operational 
law working in the operations and training department, as well as a doctor 
and a representative from the strategy department responsible for all 
matters relating to disarmament and weapons law.  
The fifth question is the time to recapitulate and tackle all remaining 
open-issues by describing the Belgian legal review process. I will answer 
by running through the more or less standardised procedure.  
The starting point of a legal review has already been discussed in the 
second question. Ideally, the advice of the Commission is sought once there 
is some degree of certainty that there will be an acquisition, but before the 
contract has been awarded. However, there are quite a few other scenarios 
that happen on a regular basis. Sometimes the informal advice of the 
Commission is sought even before a statement of requirement has been 
made. This usually comes from units who have a habit of working with a 
legal advisor. They will question the legality of a weapon before they even 
consider developing a statement of requirement. In these cases, the 
Commission will not provide a formal legal advice but the president or 
secretary will informally answer directly to the unit.  
Another scenario that will not end in a full and formal advice is the 
situation where a weapon or piece of equipment is brought before the 
Commission which wouldn’t qualify as “new” in the Belgian arsenal. As 
already mentioned earlier when discussing the scope of the obligation, the 
Belgian Commission will preliminary decide on whether a weapon or piece 
of equipment constitutes a significant change to an already existing 
capability. Practically speaking this means that a weapon which functions 
in the same way and has the same effects as one already in the Belgian 
arsenal, will not be reviewed again. However, when an additional piece of 
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equipment is added to a weapon, thereby altering its function, it will be 
reviewed.  
Once it has been established that a formal review will be conducted, the 
Commission will be convened by the secretary. At that point the 
composition of the Commission for that specific legal review will be 
determined by the president and the secretary. The permanent members 
have already been mentioned earlier. The non-permanent members are the 
ones who will, each in their area of expertise, brief the permanent members. 
For evident reasons the first briefing will be the technical briefing by the 
administrator, if needed assisted by another technical expert. They will be 
informed beforehand by the secretary on the content and standards of the 
information they should provide. They will explain how the weapon works, 
how it can be used and what its effects are. Moreover, the information upon 
which they provide this information should not solely rely on the 
manufacturer.  
If there are any other concerns, such as environmental concerns, an 
expert will be invited to the Commission. One could argue that since the 
doctor is a permanent member of the Commission to tackle any possible 
health issues, the same should apply for an environmental expert. However, 
since the establishment of the Belgian Commission the former has been 
needed in all cases whereas the latter has not.  
Once all briefings have been given, the secretary will start drafting the 
formal review in first instance by checking the sources of all information 
that has been made available. If need be, additional information will be 
requested. However, as already mentioned as one of the challenges, this 
might not always be possible, either because own testing might not be 
possible for budgetary reasons or sharing of information from other 
countries is not possible for security reasons.  
The next step is the actual legal part of the review; the advice will 
answer the following questions for the normal or expected and intended use 
of the weapon:  
1. Is the weapon indiscriminate in nature? It is important to note here 
that the Commission will not get into the law of targeting, which 
should be separated from this question as a purely weapons-law 
matter. Therefore, the question will be whether the weapon can be 
directed against an individual military objective; that is, can the 
weapon distinguish between civil and military targets? The normal 
and intended use will be a major factor in the answer to this question. 
It might not come as a surprise, but the Belgian legal Review 
Commission has, from a weapons-law perspective, never 
experienced much difficulty answering this first question. A weapon 
56 
would need to be entirely incapable of being directed for it to be 
considered as indiscriminate in its nature. If not entirely incapable of 
being directed, it will be the normal and intended use that will 
determine the legality of the weapon under this rule.  
2. Is the weapon of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary 
suffering? This is the question that usually takes up most of the time 
to answer. To start with, I should say that suffering and pain can be 
lawful if it is proportionate with the military necessity. The question 
that needs to be answered is whether other comparable weapons exist 
that would be able to accomplish the military purpose with lesser 
injuries of suffering? It is mainly for this question that the doctor is a 
permanent member of the Commission. However, judging the degree 
of pain or suffering is sometimes an almost insurmountable task even 
for a doctor. 
3. Is the weapon expected or intended to cause widespread, long-term 
and severe damage to the natural environment? Quite a few 
controversies exist regarding the subject of weapons and the 
environment. It should suffice to say that Belgium is party to both 
ENMOD and AP I to be able to assess the obligations that will be 
reviewed. The weapon must not employ environmental modification 
techniques and it may not cause widespread, long-term and severe 
damage to the natural environment. During my time as secretary, 
there has been no review where the need of an environmental expert 
has been necessary to evaluate these obligations. 
4. Is there any specific legislation prohibiting or restricting the use of 
the weapon? The last question the review will answer is whether 
there is any specific legislation that prohibits Belgium from 
acquiring the weapon. Both obligations under international as well as 
national law will be evaluated at this stage. 
 
With all of the above questions answered, the secretary will write the 
legal review. The weapon will either be prohibited, lawful or lawful but 
with certain restrictions. This is how the Belgian Commission interprets the 
‘in all or some circumstances’ of the Article 36 obligation. An example that 
has already been given in a generic way at the beginning of my presentation 
could be hollow-point or dum-dum bullets. Whereas certain treaty 
obligations exist in situations of armed conflict, that might be the case in a 
law-enforcement setting.  
This document will be reviewed by all permanent members of the 
Commission. They can make remarks or ask additional questions. If 
needed, the secretary will convene the Commission again. When there are 
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no further remarks, the document will finally be put under silence 
procedure and be unanimously adopted. The review will then be sent to the 
CHOD for signature. However, the review remains advice guideline for the 
CHOD and is not a decision on whether or not to acquire the weapon.  
A final note regarding the procedure is that the reviews are not publicly 
available.  
To round up I will shortly comment on the two remaining questions:  
1. Is there a need for or added value in transparency and information-
sharing in weapons reviews and procedures? Yes, for sure there is an 
added value in transparency and information sharing, especially for 
the smaller players. Resources and expertise at the national level are 
often limited and cooperation among States could soften this 
weakness. However, it is understandable for a number of reasons 
why States would not be willing to share.  
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This panel was given effectively a set of ten questions which I shall 
work through and which will provide the UK legal position on the review 
of weapons and methods and means, and of course, give you a little bit of 
additional information. 
Some background is always helpful. My office conducts weapons 
reviews on weapons and methods and means of warfare that are going to be 
used in armed conflict. Historically, there has not been too much interest in 
weapons reviews but that has been changing certainly in the past seven or 
eight years. I judge that that is perfectly understandable and proper that 
there is increasing interest. The bottom line of what we are looking at is; 
Can the weapon being considered be used lawfully? All weapons, of 
course, can be used illegally. 
I sense the increased interest in what we do is because of increased 
general scrutiny of what is done by governments, which is an absolutely 
legitimate concern, and particularly interest in new weapons and more 
sophisticated weapons and this comes about partly as there are more 
specialist pressure groups, which is also a good thing so that we are 
challenged and looked at. Accountability is absolutely a good thing – I 
would say, of course, that there should be realistic limits of what should be 
in the public arena as well!  
Who do we conduct the weapons review for? Well, it is for the United 
Kingdom and Commanders, service personnel and the public want to know 
their tools are lawful. They are conducted at the Development, Concepts 
and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) at the Defence Academy. We have a tri-
service legal office, one Army, one Royal Navy, and one Royal Air Force. 
DCDC is a Ministry of Defence (MOD) think tank where we look at 
strategic thinking on the global future developments and the possible future 
operating concept. 
A little bit about the scope of the obligation. Well, I have just hinted at 
what some of the other functions of the DCDC are. Of course, as a legal 
branch we also look at the UK’s doctrine and review it legally. Clearly 
Article 36 is particularly important if you are a signatory to AP I and, of 
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course, you might well do more than what is set out in Article 36, in my 
view very clearly, basically and succinctly. Bill Boothby in his slides and 
also the previous speaker absolutely set out the position and I was delighted 
when Bill was saying that my notes pretty much mirrored what he said, 
that’s probably because I copied the list from him when he taught me! But 
we have to consider what the normal use of a weapon is: whether it is of a 
nature to cause superfluous injury; whether it is likely to cause damage to 
the natural environment, and whether or not it is inherently indiscriminate. 
We have got to consider specific treaty or custom laws, and finally, we 
would also look at the future development of the law. There is no point 
developing weapons if it is fairly obvious that in the next few years they are 
likely to be illegal. So, we would certainly have that in mind. 
So what are we reviewing? Obviously weapons and Bill gave a 
definition of weapons, so there is no need to repeat that. But, as I said, it is 
means and methods of warfare as well so certainly we look at UK doctrine. 
It is pretty obvious, or it should be pretty obvious that we are interested in 
platforms, i.e. aircraft, submarines, ships because these days they tend to be 
pretty integrated with weapons systems and they will communicate with 
weapons systems. Perhaps in years gone by there would not have been so 
much interest but platforms are certainly something we are always looking 
at. 
What are the other things we look at? Well, certainly I would highlight 
cyber tools. We have certainly got to be aware of the latest developments 
and how easy it is to modify some of them.Part of our job is also to educate 
people how, when they do something, there might be a serious legal 
implication and we have to ensure that that is communicated to everyone in 
the Armed Forces. Of course, we are interested in unmanned, remote, 
autonomous and automatic weapons and we have a process called the 
Operational Law Customary Executive Board where the British Army, the 
Royal Navy, the Royal Air Force and Defence Academy get together and 
for the past couple of years have looked at the Law of Armed Conflict 
training and then reported to the Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff on how 
we are conducting our training. We, as a group, consider how we can make 
improvements to the training of operational law for the entire Ministry of 
Defence. 
There is one other thing under this heading I will just mention. We do 
conduct something that we call Non-Reviews. We encourage people to ask 
the question as to whether or not a particular item needs a legal review. 
Sometimes it might be very straightforward that it simply does not need a 
legal review. If there is any doubt in our mind we analyse it, we consider it 
and then we write effectively a non-legal review and we file it in exactly 
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the same way as we would do if it were a legal review explaining why, as a 
matter of law, we conclude it does not need a legal review. 
The next question I have on my list is at what stage do we consider 
weapons and weapons reviews? Well, for a couple of years now the UK has 
actually published the process that we follow – it is also outlined in two and 
a half pages on the DCDC website. The second page explains that we have 
effectively at least a three-stage process. Obviously it is not always as 
straightforward, as we might be involved at numerous times in the 
development of certain weapons. But we certainly give formal legal advice 
when there is a decision to commit funds in the development of something 
and we call that: initial gate. We then give another formal legal review 
when there is a full commitment to the procurement of a system and then 
we finally give formal legal advice when the finalized equipment enters 
into service. 
One question people ask me, which I general do not answer is: How 
many times do you write a legal review where it says that something is 
illegal? If you actually think about it, it should be exceedingly rare. You 
have done something seriously wrong if at the last stage, having spent a 
few hundred million pounds, you are deciding that something is illegal. 
Think about it – you are involved in the development, you are advising on 
the legality, it would be very odd if late in the day you suddenly decide that 
something is completely illegal. Of course, the law might have changed, or 
test results might have come out but I thought I might just make that point. 
Ensuring an effective review is another heading I have got. As I said, we 
give three formal stages of legal advice that’s not to say there could not be 
other communications as there invariable is. There is no set committee, 
there are multiple meetings and we modify our process depending on what 
system we are reviewing. We also give legal advice when there are urgent 
operational requirements. Particularly in a conflict people modify weapons 
officially to change them and adapt them to the situation on the battlefield. 
It is absolutely right that those have a proper legal review and it might be 
that you get summoned to the Ministry of Defence to be involved in 
something pretty much immediately or the next day. 
So, what else do we do to ensure an effective review? Well, the most 
important thing I guess is that absolutely full disclosure is necessary and 
our legal advice list is absolutely everything that has been disclosed to us. 
We send a draft of our initial advice out and we ask people to confirm that 
that is absolutely all the disclosure that could be relevant. In other words, 
the review is undertaken by a process of co-operation and dialogue. 
Obviously, there are other methods to ensure an effective review. There is 
testing, modeling, we might see what information other countries have 
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including their data, the manufacturer’s data. As I am a bit cynical I am 
interested in seeing what a manufacturer might think of the capabilities, and 
being a bit cynical and having my signature at the end of the advice, I’ll 
want to ensure that we have our own tests rather than just the 
manufacturer’s, or a country perhaps trying to sell us something! 
One of the earlier speakers was talking about the technical aspects of 
weapons. Do the lawyers have to understand every single technical detail? 
Do you have to be a geek on all electronics? I think the answer is no, but 
you certainly have to have a good working knowledge and you might have 
to meet with the geeks and the real experts and ask them to explain things 
and then you might have to explain to them your understanding, and get 
them to confirm it is correct. You have a lot of specialists, in fact, I would 
say that in the UK we have unlimited access to the specialists and I 
certainly would not be giving legal advice unless I was very happy that I 
understood and that I had everything explained to me that I wanted. 
There is something we introduced fairly recently to our process: There 
would always have been a peer review if there were three of you in the 
office. We are absolutely open when discussing things. But we now have 
two lawyers sign off each legal advice. Once a legal advice is prepared the 
author lawyer will go and speak to one of the others, explain what it is, 
produce the documents and go through it. It is a bit of belt and braces and it 
certainly does no harm. 
So, what information is needed about the weapon? Well, a business case 
is probably a good place to start the statement of requirement. I would 
certainly be looking into what it is designed to do and I would certainly be 
looking at the test data, and if I am not happy with the test data you have 
got to ask for more tests and data. You are certainly not going to rely on 
other people’s test data. Your country’s own independent and robust testing 
may be essential. You would tailor your advice to whatever it is you are 
looking at. 
Another question that has been posed to this panel is what expertise is 
required? As I said, I don’t think I have got to be an expert in computer 
programming or nanotechnology but I’ve got to understand some of those 
things in a certain degree of detail. Without doubt, legal reviews are getting 
more complex so we absolutely have to update our training of the people 
conducting the legal reviews to make sure that they are capable of doing 
them. And I don’t think that that is anything unusual in that for example the 
Tallinn Manual was a classic example where you are dealing with a new 
area, cyber, and a group of people get together, thrash it out and work out 
what the law is and how it should be considered.  
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So, we do not have to be experts in every single area but we do need 
access to the experts. We certainly have to be legally qualified - we have 
professional practicing certificates - and we are members of the British Bar 
or Solicitors’ profession. We are, therefore, bound by professional conduct 
rules and discipline rules of our professions. We tend to be fairly senior - 
one full Colonel and then there are two SO1s, one from the Royal Navy, 
and one from the Royal Air Force. So, there are a total of three lawyers, 
one from each of the services. From the list of experts, scientists, doctors, 
actually specialist military operators and other experts we decide who we 
want to hear from and engage with the project team for some while. 
It is worth highlighting that in this day and age where everything gets 
more complex, there are courses which you can do. Bill Boothby runs one 
which I have attended. We also conduct in-house training. Importantly 
what the UK system has is experienced military officers who have 
operational experience and importantly lawyers who are specialists in the 
law of armed conflict, have some expertise in human rights law. These 
days, I am delighted to say, there are some pretty good publications. I am 
very reluctant to plug Bill Boothby’s book but I have to. It is easy to read 
and I would regard it to be pretty much the bible on this subject and it’s 
absolutely comprehensive. So, we have a few copies of this and the 
important ICRC guide in the office as well as other books and articles. It 
has just been updated and I think that anyone commenting on weapons 
reviews and how they can be conducted need to have read the book from 
front to back. 
We have “reach back”, in the sense that we have officers who have done 
my job in the past e.g. Bill Boothby, Charles Garraway, who have always 
been exceedingly helpful in answering any of our questions. There are 
often outside experts who come from other countries and importantly we 
speak with other nations – more of that in a minute.  
The need for a multi-disciplinary approach is another question. In 
contrast with the previous speaker, we don’t have a commission. I have just 
outlined the process we have. We do not have a committee. The lawyers 
lead how the advice is conducted in each particular case. I don’t think it’s 
surprising that one size does not fit all. Certain nations like my own 
develop fairly sophisticated weapons, some other nations do not have 
terribly sophisticated weapons and buy them from other States. We have 
different legal systems and we interpret the law perhaps slightly differently. 
What you do need is space and time for your experts to discuss and engage 
and visit those who are developing the weapons and, therefore, to have a 
very good and open relationship over months or indeed perhaps years and 
many years as that happens. I think that the suggestion by some that some 
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States do not take this legal obligation seriously is quite wrong, some do 
others do not. But of course many States do not conduct legal reviews! In 
the UK there are evolving and fairly sophisticated processes. 
So, on the issue of process and transparency and information-sharing in 
weapons reviews and procedures, as I said, the process is a matter for 
individual States, that is what the States signed up for.Importantly, States 
should be willing, in fact, I think there is an obligation for States to discuss 
with others their process. But we have to be realistic. Many of the things I 
am dealing with are highly classified, they are called state secrets! I am not 
going to be discussing them here or anywhere else for that matter and I do 
not think it is remotely realistic that they should be shared or stored on an 
international data base or there should be an “independent” review of 
weapons. I think that is just failing to understand what we really do. There 
can absolutely be transparency on the process. As I said fairly recently, as 
people started take more interest in what we do, DCDC have started 
outlining our process publicly. 
The next question we were posed is the question of resources and 
expertise at the national level. Well, I have already said something about 
expertise. Regarding the issue of resources – I have not experienced any 
time in my current job where we have not been allowed to do something, 
whether it is to have a test or to have the time to look at something but of 
course that is one to watch when lots of countries are having cuts to their 
military and there is talk about civilianization of certain posts. As I have 
said, my personal view is that you perhaps need to have been a lawyer in 
the services for twenty years to be able to conduct a weapons review to an 
appropriate standard. But do not forget, as I have said, weapons are 
certainly getting much more complex with automation and the rest. I do not 
have any concerns for the UK as yet. And again, last but not least, on that 
topic of resources and expertise, one other thing we do in the UK is that if 
any of the three lawyers who conduct their reviews at the DCDC have a 
concern or want to debate elsewhere they can go to the head of the civilian 
legal adviser service at the Ministry of Defence and discuss any concerns 
with them. 
I just want to say one thing on the co-operation among States and best 
practices in promoting legal services and how to encourage others. Just 
over a year ago a very able colleague of mine, Commander Kara Chadwick 
RN, had the bright idea that there should be a meeting of States that 
conduct (or do not conduct, but would like to) legal reviews so we could 
learn from each other. I agreed that that was a very good idea. I was slightly 
surprised that it did not appear to have happened in the past. Last year we 
held a Weapons Review Forum at Shrivenham. It is principally for States. 
64 
Why? Because we are the practitioners! We are, dare I say, the current 
experts in each country that actually do the job. We are the people who 
know the nature of our own country’s weapons, those that are being 
developed and have been in development for years. We are not watching 
Hollywood films and speculating we know what is in the pipeline and what 
it is we are likely to be requiring a final review later. And I judge that is 
rather important that it is primarily for States. That is not to say we do not 
invite others whose views we want to hear as we want to consider and 
interrogate our procedures and actually learn. So, we do invite other people. 
That good idea coming from Commander Chadwick is being followed up. 
This year we are going to host another weapons review forum at 
Shrivenham and we are just in the process of finalizing that. So, I think that 
is certainly particularly important. I do not know how many years it will go 
on for. That is a matter for the States. Of course, the International 
Committee of the Red Cross and others are invited to attend certain aspects 
of that debate, conversation and dialogue. 
Lastly, I have just added my own title to the list of matters for this 
panel: Other issues, concerns and comments. Record-keeping is particularly 
important together with ensuring that everyone in the UK Ministry of 
Defence understands the requirement of legal reviews and that everything 
is reviewed that should be. There is no point just lawyers deciding they 
should conduct weapons reviews unless the people developing them alert 
us that they are developing something and come and engage with us. 
Are there other issues, concerns or comments? Well, cyber tools are 
always of interest and will continue to be. They can be developed quickly, 
they can be modified quickly and you have got to make sure that your 
process and your education of people is such that it can be dealt with. We 
certainly need States to engage. I certainly think that we have got to engage 
in debate with people who have concerns. Perhaps we don’t want to close 
the door on certain defensive and logistics technologies that could be rather 
useful and aren’t necessarily controversial if you are looking at high levels 
of automation/autonomy. So, I think we have to look at the implication of 
banning things or considering them and engage in a slow, measured and 
constructive debate so we understand exactly what we are talking about. 
Again, I would ask people to consider the environment of the weapons 
you are looking at. If you are looking in the cyber environment I think you 
can expect that highly automated perhaps even autonomous systems will be 
an area which will come first because of the need for instant responses. So, 
I think we certainly have got to consider that. 
My last comments concern statistics. Statistics are not produced or 
published on how many weapons reviews are produced. As I said earlier, 
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systems would have failed in a country if you had too many weapons 
reviews that at the final hurdle said that something was illegal - because the 
lawyer should be involved during the research, development stages and 
before the commitment of large sums of money. 
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Legal reviews of new weapons: 
process and procedures 
Bakhtiyar TUZMUKHAMEDOV 
Vice-President, Russian Association of International Law, Moscow 
Russia and Article 36: review prototypes and incentives for 
compliance 
 
Our host and formerly my fellow Judge, Professor Fausto Pocar, first 
suggested that I join this panel last January. My initial cautious response 
was that the suggested theme was rather specific of which I had mostly 
general knowledge. However, I undertook to explore current Russian 
legislation and practices that might be of relevance and interest. 
My preliminary research of applicable legislation and discussions with 
knowledgeable persons, alas, did not bring any meaningful results. Of 
course, there is legislation regulating requests by military to industries 
regarding prospective defense systems, or legislation providing for military 
representatives assigned to industries to verify and certify products. 
However, those laws do not specifically refer to anything that would echo 
the requirements of Article 36.  
Military manuals discuss the use of weapons and their choice in battle 
by a commander, not their development. I would not be in a position to go 
beyond available documentary sources and discuss "Russian practice in the 
field of review of weapons" if there were no available indications as to 
what this practice is like. Of course, there are export controls, but they do 
not exactly fall within the purview of Article 36. 
I should add that I could find almost no traces of substantive analysis of 
Article 36 in Russian – or Soviet, for that matter, - academic sources, 
including standard texts used at training of civilian and military lawyers. A 
rare exception is a brief discussion of development of new weapons from 
the Resolution 1540 perspective. 
Before moving any further, I should say that the Russian Federal Law 
“On State Secret” provides for classification of technical data and tactical 
capabilities of weapon systems and related military materiel, information 
related to research and development of new systems and upgrades of 
existing systems, including data produced during their testingand 
prospective ways of their employment. Assuming that evaluation of a 
prospective or existing weapon, means or methods of warfare within the 
meaning of Article 36 is part of those processes, its course and outcome 
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shall be classified. Russian law provides for three levels of classification – 
secret, comprehensively secret, and the highest – of particular importance. 
An uninitiated observer may only guess how sensitive information related 
to a suppositious Article 36 review may be deemed by a classifying 
authority. However, even an unintentional and unaggravated disclosure of a 
state secret is a criminal offense. It is punishable, under the Russian 
Criminal Code, by deprivation of liberty ranging from four months to four 
years. I assume that my remarks should conclude at this junction, or else I 
run the risk of facing criminal charges upon my return to Moscow. 
And yet let me cautiously walk through that booby-trap-infested terra 
incognita. I shall be guided by available open documentary sources, 
however relevant, and advice I received from several interlocutors. The 
latter included officials from government departments, executives from 
industry and retired military officers. Needless to say, they were talking to 
me strictly unofficially, and I should take all responsibility for any 
accidental misinterpretation of what I have learned from them. 
The Soviet Union ratified the first two Protocols Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions in 1989. The law on ratification requested the 
executive branch to draft amendments to national legislation “reflecting the 
Soviet Union’s participation in the Protocols” (para. 2). Amendments 
should have been introduced to the legislature within six months of the date 
of ratification. Of course, Article 36 does not specifically require that 
national laws be amended to provide for legal review of new weapons. 
However, even that general provision of the ratifying resolution had not 
been executed, at least not to my knowledge. 
That failure was criticized six years later by the Russian Constitutional 
Court in a seminal case in which the Court ruled on the constitutionality of 
the use of force in Chechnya. I will not reveal any tightly kept secret if I tell 
you that the Court during deliberations had been contemplating an obiter 
dictum entirely dealing with IHL. For a variety of reasons a detailed 
discussion of IHL had not been included into the judgment. However, the 
Court reprimanded the legislator for failure to ensure that legislation 
regulating the use of Armed Forces took due account of provisions of 
applicable rules of IHL, and reiterated that the lacunae should be covered. 
Apparently since the Court was confronted with a situation of a non-
international armed conflict, it focused on Protocol II, but its conclusions 
went beyond it. 
Let me digress briefly. There has been a debate in the Russian and 
international legal communities about applicability of IHL to events in the 
North Caucasus in mid-90s and over the turn of the century or willingness 
of Russian authorities to recognize it. I, for one, can only say that all 
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branches of government at various times from 1994 to 2004 made 
statements that described the events as a non-international armed conflict in 
the meaning of Additional Protocol II and accepted the applicability of 
IHL. 
The legislator was too slow to respond to instructions both of the Soviet 
legislature and, following the demise of the Soviet Union, of the Russian 
Constitutional Court. But was the military, by way of manuals and 
guidelines, promulgated by orders of the Minister of Defense, directed 
service personnel to study, apply, and abide by the Conventions and 
Protocols? Those were, firstly, the Guidelines on Application of Norms of 
IHL by the Armed Forces of the USSR, and later the Manual on IHL for 
the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Both are well-drafted 
documents, both are in force, but in terms of means or methods of warfare, 
both are confined to Article 35 and instruct the commander on the 
battlefield regarding restriction on the choice of weapons and mode of their 
employment. The Service and Disciplinary regulations that were 
promulgated by the President in 2007 and have the status of enforceable 
law are less specific, though they make several references to IHL. 
A search for any documentary traces of weapons review might begin 
with the Federal Law “On State Defense Procurement”. Firstly, it 
reproduces a constitutional provision on the prevalence of an applicable 
international treaty in case of a conflict with the law. But this reference is 
too general to imply that it includes Article 36 review. Secondly, until 
amended, it provided for the establishment of the Federal Defense 
Procurement Supervision Service. The name might suggest that this could 
have been a natural venue for weapons review. However, it was dissolved 
as of 1 January 2015, along with the Federal Defense Contracts Agency. 
Functions of both institutions have been distributed among several 
government departments, including the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of 
Trade and Industries, Federal Security Service and others. Even if one were 
to assume that a centralized weapons review board could or might have 
been established under the original version of the Federal Law: “On State 
Defense Procurement”, it no longer exists under the authority of the 
amended law. 
A seemingly apparent venue for Article 36 review could be the Ministry 
of Defense. Looking at the structure of the Ministry, as it appears on its 
public website, and the description of the functions of its divisions, one 
may assume that requests for weapons and other military materiel develop 
within arms and services and then mature in the Main Armaments 
Directorate. The process should also involve the Main Operations 
Directorate and the Directorate of Military Representatives. The first entity 
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is the principal military planner. The second one deploys uniformed 
officers to industries for on-site quality control and inspection of procured 
items prior to their delivery. Other suspects could be the Legal Department 
with its international legal component, and the International Treaty 
Directorate within the Main Directorate of International Military 
Cooperation. One might guess that the review process could be distributed 
between those divisions of the Ministry and the General Staff and yet that 
hypothesis does not seem to withstand the empirical test. My interlocutors 
could not confirm that any special and focused Article 36 review was 
conducted within the Ministry of Defense. Neither could I find convincing 
evidence that Legal or Arms Control departments of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs are currently involved in Article 36 review. 
That brings me to a pivotal question: are there any institutions or 
procedures relative to the review of newly developed, produced or procured 
weapons? The answer is positive. 
The Federal Law “On Arms” of 1996 as amended, defines three 
categories of individual arms, namely, civilian, service, and combat. As to 
development, modification and deployment of combat arms, the law refers 
to procedures and protocols established by the Government. Those were not 
immediately available. 
As to civilian and service arms, the law is fairly detailed in describing 
them. Moreover, there are regulations at the Government departments level 
that provide for weapons certification and may restrict explosive energy of 
propellant, velocity of projectile, force of impact and other characteristics. 
In particular, there are the Ministry of Health regulations on permissible 
effects on a human body of civilian self-defense arms. Still more relevant 
may be the joint order of the Federal Security Service, the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs, and the Ministry of Healthcare setting up an Inter-agency 
Expert Commission on New Arms and Special Means. As a footnote: 
“special means” denotes non-lethal arms, ammunitions and related 
adjuncts. 
On balance, it may be assumed that there exist legislative and 
institutional frameworks that may be adapted or used as models or 
prototypes for a prospective Article 36 review. 
I have one final remark. It is a fact of common knowledge that Russia 
ranks second as arms exporter. As two of my interlocutors, both retired 
general officers, one of them a senior executive in the defense industry, told 
me that when a weapon system, other than nuclear and strategic or covered 
by the Missile technology control regime (MTCR) and other restrictive 
regimes, is being developed its export potential is most often borne in 
mind. My friend in the industry whose main job is to promote the product 
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internationally, said that the last thing he would need is to run the risk of 
compromising the product that does not comply with applicable 
international rules, and embarrassing the exporter and an importer. Being a 
fluent English-speaker, he used an English word “our watchdog” to 
describe the Federal Service for Military Technical Cooperation, the 
agency that coordinates and oversees foreign defense transactions. Even in 
the absence of an institutionalized Article 36 review, there is a strong 
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Introduction  
 
As rapid advances continue to be made in new and emerging 
technologies of warfare, notably those relying on information technology 
and robotics, it is important to ensure informed discussions of the many and 
often complex challenges raised by these new developments. Although new 
technologies of warfare, such as autonomous weapons systems1, are not 
specifically regulated by international humanitarian law treaties, their 
development and employment in armed conflict does not occur in a legal 
vacuum. As with all weapon systems, they must be capable of being used in 
compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL), and in particular its 
rules on the conduct of hostilities. The responsibility for ensuring this rests, 
first and foremost, with each State that is developing these new 
technologies of warfare. 
In accordance with Article 36 of Additional Protocol I, each State Party 
is required to determine whether the employment of a new weapon, means 
or method of warfare that it studies, develops, acquires or adopts would, in 
some or all circumstances, be prohibited by international law. Legal 
reviews of new weapons, including new technologies of warfare, are a 
critical measure for States to ensure respect for IHL. The law anticipated to 
a certain extent advances in weapons’ technology and the development of 
new means and methods of waging war and Article 36 is clear evidence of 
that anticipation.  
                                                     
1 The ICRC has defined autonomous weapon systems as: “Any weapon system with 
autonomy in its critical functions. That is, a weapon system that can select (i.e. search for or 
detect, identify, track, select) and attack (i.e. use force against, neutralize, damage or 
destroy) targets without human intervention.” ICRC (2014) Autonomous weapon systems 
technical, military, legal and humanitarian aspects, Report of an Expert Meeting held 26-28 
March 2014 (published November 2014), www.icrc.org/en/download/file/1707/4221-002-
autonomous-weapons-systems-full-report.pdf; ICRC (2015) International humanitarian law 
and the challenges of contemporary armed conflicts, Report to the 32nd International 
Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent held 8-10 December 2015 (published 
October 2015), pp. 44-47, www.icrc.org/en/download/file/15061/32ic-report-on-ihl-and-
challenges-of-armed-conflicts.pdf; See also ICRC (2016), Autonomous weapon systems: 
Implications of increasing autonomy in the critical functions of weapons, Report of an 
Expert Meeting held in March 2016. 
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The present paper will address only a selection of some of the key legal 
and policy questions associated with weapons reviews in light of the 
current debate on autonomous weapon systems. The paper will first discuss 
the importance of conducting legal reviews. It will then examine the legal 
review’s scope and functional aspects, as well as some of the specific 
challenges posed by autonomous weapon systems. 
 
 
1. Why is conducting legal reviews important? 
 
Setting or improving legal reviews procedures is important for a number 
of reasons. First, most of the States Parties to the CCW are party to 
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions. This means that they are 
legally required to comply with the requirements of Article 36 to that 
Protocol. It is arguable that a duty to conduct weapons reviews is also 
derived from the general obligation under Common Article 1 to the four 
Geneva Conventions to ensure respect for IHL. This obligation would 
require High Contracting Parties to ensure that their new weapon, means or 
method of warfare can be used in accordance with IHL.2 It is self-evident 
that proceeding to such a review contributes to ensuring that a State’s 
armed forces are capable of conducting hostilities in accordance with its 
international obligations. With regard to customary international 
humanitarian law, the current available evidence makes it unclear as to 
whether the obligation to conduct legal reviews of weapons, means and 
method of warfare is of a customary law nature.3 
On the question of how well the commitments under Article 36 are 
being implemented, it is fair to say that despite this legal requirement and 
the large number of States that develop or acquire new weapon systems 
every year, only a small number are known to have formal mechanisms in 
place to carry out legal reviews of new weapons. Further efforts are, 
therefore, needed to implement this obligation by States. One of the reasons 
for poor implementation may be that some States assume that when they 
acquire certain weapons they can safely rely either on the manufacturers’ 
testing or on the reviews conducted by States from which they are 
procuring the weapons. This is disputable, since obligations under 
international law differ between States and even when they are subject to 
                                                     
2 I. Daoust, R. Coupland and R. Ishoey, ‘New wars, new weapons? The obligation of 
States to assess the legality of means and methods of warfare’, IRRC 2002 Vol. 84 No. 846 
p. 352. 
3 Some argue that it is customary, see W.H: Boothby, Weapons and the Law of Armed 
Conflict, OUP, 2009, pp. 341-42. 
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the same obligations, there are often differences in interpretation and 
implementation. Hence, the importance for States to conduct their own 
weapons review.  
Secondly, and related to the previous point, reviewing the legality of 
new weapons also makes good policy sense. It is in each State’s interest, 
regardless of whether it is party to Additional Protocol I, to assess the 
lawfulness of its new weapons in order to ensure that it is able to comply 
with its international legal obligations during armed conflicts and that new 
weapons are not employed prematurely under conditions in which respect 
for IHL cannot be guaranteed. This can be especially important in light of 
rapid development of new weapons technologies and it would give the 
opportunity to the State to develop its own national expertise in law and 
weapons. 
Third, promoting, wherever possible, exchange of information and 
transparency in relation to weapons review mechanisms and procedures can 
enhance confidence and trust among States, confidence-building being 
among one of the purpose of the CCW.4 Moreover, in light of Article 84 of 
Additional Protocol I, it can be submitted that there is a requirement for 
States to share among each other their review procedures to build 
confidence that new weapons comply with the existing law.5 
Different views have been expressed on the adequacy of legal reviews 
of new weapons for ensuring IHL compliance of autonomous weapon 
systems, especially given the apparent low level of implementation among 
States, and the possibility of inconsistent outcomes of national legal 
reviews. One can say that this is not different from other rules of 
international law; the challenge remains national implementation. This is 
why States gather regularly in multilateral forums like the CCW to share 
their views and practice on how they interpret and implement their 
international obligations. It is indeed an opportunity for States to share their 
experiences on legal reviews in order to create confidence that the unique 
questions and challenges raised by autonomy in weapons systems are also 
dealt with at the domestic level. The CCW could be an appropriate forum 
to share and learn good practice between States and see how other States 
implement their obligations.  
                                                     
4 The Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional 
Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate 
Effects as amended on 21 December 2001(CCW), Sixth preambular paragraph. 
5 Article 84 states that “The High Contracting Parties shall communicate to one another, 
as soon as possible, through the depositary and, as appropriate, through the Protecting 
Powers, their official translations of this Protocol, as well as the laws and regulations which 
they may adopt to ensure its application.” 
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In addition, it is submitted that the question is not so much whether 
national legal reviews are sufficient or not to deal with new technologies of 
warfare such as autonomous weapon systems. The need to conduct legal 
reviews is a legal obligation and remains a critical means for States to 
ensure respect for IHL regarding any types of weapons. Having said that, it 
is fair to say that legal reviews do not provide all the answers and efforts to 
strengthen national review procedures should be seen as complementary 
and mutually reinforcing of multilateral discussions on autonomous 
weapon systems.  
On the question of transparency, it is true that there is little published 
information available about States’ weapon procurement and review 
processes for a number of reasons: commercial, military and national 
security concerns, since such reviews often deal with classified material 
relating to the performance and use of weapons. However, States are 
encouraged to share information, to the extent possible, on their legal 
reviews mechanisms, i.e. on their procedure to review new weapons. On 
the one hand, disclosing the process can be seen as a way to show state 
commitment to legal compliance and set the example of what responsible 
militaries do, and on the other, this could foster the development of 
common standards or best practices for weapons review in the longer run. 
 
 
2. What is the scope of the review and how should it be done?  
 
The ICRC has consistently promoted over the years the importance of 
conducting legal reviews of new weapons. In 2006, in order to provide a 
tool to assist States in establishing weapons review mechanisms, the ICRC 
drew up A Guide to the Legal Review of New Weapons, Means and 
Methods of Warfare, which it prepared in consultation with close to thirty 
military and international law experts, including government experts.6 The 
Guide aims to assist States in establishing or improving national procedures 
to determine the legality of new weapons being developed or acquired. The 
Guide also provides the ICRC’s interpretation of what is required and its 
recommendations of what a review mechanism should look like, based 
notably on the ICRC Commentary to Article 36 and existing practice of 
States.7  
                                                     
6 ICRC, A Guide to the Legal Review of New Weapons, Means and Methods of Warfare 
Measures to Implement Article 36 of Additional Protocol I of 1977, 2006, available at: 
www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/publication/p0902.htm. 
7 At the time of writing, the ICRC is gathering new information from actual practice in 
order to update this Guide. 
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This Guide highlights both the issues of substance and those of 
procedure to be considered in establishing a legal review mechanism. 
However, Article 36 does not prescribe a method or format for weapons 
reviews. States are left with a wide margin of appreciation in the domestic 
implementation of this rule.  
The legal review should apply to weapons in the widest sense as well as 
the ways in which they are used, bearing in mind that a means of warfare 
cannot be assessed in isolation from its expected method of use. Thus, the 
legality of a weapon does not depend solely on its design or intended 
purpose, but also on the manner in which it is expected to be used on the 
battlefield. According to the ICRC Guide, a weapon used in one manner 
may pass the Article 36 test, but may fail it when used in another manner. 
This is why Article 36 requires a State "to determine whether its 
employment would, in some or all circumstances, be prohibited" by 
international law.8  
The existing law that determines the legality of new weapons 
technology includes:  
 Specific rules of international law prohibiting or restricting the use of 
specific weapons (e.g. BWC, CCW, landmines, cluster munitions) 
 General rules of IHL applicable to the use of weapon, including:  
-  whether the weapon is of a nature to cause superfluous injury 
or unnecessary suffering;  
-  whether the weapon is likely to have indiscriminate effect;  
-  whether the weapon is expected to cause widespread, long-
term and severe damage to the natural environment; 
-  whether the weapon is likely to be affected by future 
developments in the law;  
-  prohibitions or restrictions based on the principles of humanity 
and the dictates of public conscience.9 
 
The assessment of a weapon in light of the relevant rules will require an 
examination of all relevant empirical information pertaining to the weapon, 
such as its technical description and actual performance and its effects on 
health and the environment. This is the rationale for the involvement of 
experts of various disciplines in the review process. Multidisciplinary 
expertise is important to understanding how the weapon functions, its 
                                                     
8 ICRC Guide, p. 10. 
9 For a detailed list of rules to be applied to new weapons, means and methods of 
warfare, see ibid., pp. 10-17. 
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capabilities and its limitations and, more generally, to understand the 
technology itself.10  
New weapons, means and method of warfare include weapons in the 
broadest sense and ways in which weapons are used. According to the 
ICRC Guide, it would cover: 
 weapons of all types - be they anti-personnel or anti-materiel, 
“lethal”, “non-lethal” or “less lethal” - and weapons systems; 
 the ways in which these weapons are to be used pursuant to military 
doctrine, tactics, rules of engagement, operating procedures and 
countermeasures; 
 all weapons to be acquired, be they procured further to research and 
development on the basis of military specifications, or purchased 
“off-the -shelf”; 
 a weapon which the State is intending to acquire for the first time, 
without necessarily being “new” in a technical sense; 
 an existing weapon that is modified in a way that alters its function, 
or  
 a weapon that has already passed a legal review but that is 
subsequently modified; 
 novel uses of existing capabilities or equipment; 
 an existing weapon where a State has joined a new international 
treaty which may affect the legality of the weapon.11 
 
Concerning the functional aspects of the review mechanisms, the ICRC 
Guide provides a number of elements on how, for instance, the mechanism 
should be established or what should be the structure and composition of 
the mechanism. At the minimum, there should be a formal standing 
mechanism or procedures ready to carry out reviews. It should be 
mandatory and take place in a systematic way. It is key that the review 
process begins at the earliest possible stage of the procurement process 
(study, development, acquisition, adoption) and that it applies a 
multidisciplinary approach.12  
 
 
                                                     
10 A. Backstrom and I. Henderson, ‘New capabilities in warfare: an overview of 
contemporary technological developments and the associated legal and engineering issues in 
Article 36 weapons reviews’, IRRC, No. 886, 2012.  
11 Ibid., pp. 9-10. 
12 Ibid., pp. 20-28. 
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3. What are the specific challenges posed by autonomous weapon 
systems? 
 
Weapons reviews face certain practical challenges regarding the 
assessment of whether an autonomous weapon system will perform as 
anticipated in the intended or expected circumstances of use.13 Taking 
human beings out of the critical function of selecting and attacking targets 
raises important questions, including how “targeting rules” (e.g. the rules of 
proportionality and precautions in attack) can be considered at the weapons 
review stage, and before the weapon system has been deployed. Thus, 
where it is the weapon that takes on the targeting functions, the legal 
review would demand a very high level of confidence that the weapon is 
capable of carrying out those functions in compliance with IHL. The 
decision to deploy and use a particular weapon by the commander or 
operator can be based on constraints or parameters concerning its use, 
which are developed in the weapons review. Those are generally integrated 
into the military instructions or guidelines, for instance, to limit the use to a 
specific environment or situation. 
Key questions include whether the weapon system would function in a 
way that respects the obligation to distinguish military objectives from 
civilian objects, combatants from civilians, and active combatants from 
persons hors de combat. Another question is whether a weapon system 
would function in a way that respects the obligation to weigh up the many 
contextual factors and variables to determine whether the attack may be 
expected to cause incidental civilian casualties and damage to civilian 
objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to 
the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated, as required by the 
rule of proportionality. A further question is whether the weapon system 
could function in a way that respects the obligation to cancel or suspend an 
attack if it becomes apparent that the target is not a military objective or is 
subject to special protection, or that the attack may be expected to violate 
the rule of proportionality, as required by the rules on precautions in attack. 
For autonomous weapon systems intended for use in contexts where 
they are likely to encounter protected persons or objects, there are serious 
doubts as to whether they would function in a way that respects the 
obligation to carry out the complex, context-dependent assessments 
required by the IHL rules of distinction, proportionality and precautions in 
                                                     
13 See generally, ICRC, Expert Meeting on Autonomous weapon systems: Implications 
of increasing autonomy in the critical functions of weapons, Background paper, March 
2016.  
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attack. These are inherently qualitative assessments in which unique human 
reasoning and judgment will continue to be required. 
The above challenges for IHL compliance will need to be carefully 
considered by States when carrying out legal reviews of any autonomous 
weapon system they develop or acquire. As with all weapons, the 
lawfulness of a weapon with autonomy in its critical functions depends on 
its specific characteristics, and whether, given those characteristics, it can 
be employed in conformity with the rules of IHL in all of the circumstances 
in which it is intended and expected to be used. The ability to carry out 
such a review entails fully understanding the weapon’s capabilities and 
foreseeing its effects, notably through testing. Yet foreseeing such effects 
may become increasingly difficult if autonomous weapon systems were to 
become more complex or to be given more freedom of action in their 
operations and, therefore, become less predictable. 
Predictability about the operation of an autonomous weapon system in 
the context in which it is to be used must be sufficiently high to allow an 
accurate legal review. Indeed, deploying a weapon system whose effects 
are wholly or partially unpredictable would create a significant risk that 
IHL will not be respected. The risks may be too high to allow use of the 
weapon, or else mitigating the risks may require limiting or even obviating 
the weapons’ autonomy.  
An additional challenge for reviewing the legality of an autonomous 
weapon system is the absence of standard methods and protocols for testing 
and evaluation to assess the performance of these weapons, and the 
possible risks associated with their use. Questions arise regardingthe 
reliability (e.g. risk of malfunction or vulnerability to cyber-attack) and 
predictability of the weapon tested; the level of reliability and predictability 
considered to be necessary. The legal review procedure faces these and 
other practical challenges to assess whether an autonomous weapon system 
will perform as anticipated in the intended or expected circumstances of 
use. It is hoped that States and military experts will address some of these 





The recognition by States of the importance of reviewing new weapons 
to ensure their compatibility with international law in the CCW discussions 
on autonomous weapon systems is a positive outcome. This should be seen 
as a complementary aspect of other debated questions such as human 
control and consideration of human-machine interaction, which may 
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provide a useful baseline from which common understandings can be 
developed among States. 
The Fifth Review Conference of the CCW (12-16 December 2016) is an 
important moment for States Parties to examine the status and operation of 
the Convention and its Protocols, to assess developments that have 
occurred in the use of weapons and weapons technology and to consider 
enhancing the protections of international humanitarian law for the benefit 
of civilians and combatants. Already in 2006, the Third Review Conference 
of the CCW urged States that do not already do so to conduct legal reviews 
of new weapons, means or methods of warfare.14 The Fifth Review 
Conference, as well as future discussions on autonomous weapon system, 
presents another opportunity for States to consider the importance of 
carrying out timely legal reviews of newly-developed or acquired weapons. 
 
                                                     
14 In paragraph 17, States solemnly declared "Their determination to urge States which 
do not already do so to conduct reviews to determine whether any new weapon, means or 
methods of warfare would be prohibited under international humanitarian law or other rules 
of international law applicable to them." Final document of the Third CCW Review 
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Judge Advocate General, Canadian Armed Forces, Ottawa 
 
About reviews of Article 36 of Geneva Additional Protocol I on the use 
of new weapons, do they do anything in practice to prevent superfluous 
injuries and unnecessary suffering? How do you assess this at the 
weapons review stage?  
I can confirm proudly and openly that Canada fully complies with 
Article 36. We are parties to AP I and AP II and we have had a weapons 
review process for a number of years. We have also made a formal pledge 
to the ICRC to formalize our weapons review process. Regrettably, we 
haven’t got to that point yet but that doesn’t mean we do not have one. In 
terms of the process of looking at superfluous injuries, unnecessary 
suffering and indiscriminate effects, they are very vague but useful terms 
for those who are conducting weapons review regarding what we actually 
have to look at in certain areas and what the legal analysis that has to be 
done is. 
As far as unnecessary suffering and superfluous injuries, those are going 
to be focused on the test of the effects of the weapon or the ammunition to 
be used on humans and/or properties. We also have a broad interpretation 
of what a weapon is and what needs to get reviewed. That includes what 
normally causes death or injury to humans, destruction or damage of 
property, and also lethal and non-lethal weapons. From an injury and 
suffering perspective, our focus is really going to be on what is the effect 
on a human and in that regard, as legal advisor, I have the ability to reach 
out to a number of other experts, primarily in the case of superfluous injury. 
Concerning unnecessary suffering we would be talking to our medical 
experts to get a sense from them, keeping in mind that the test that we 
would be using is a civil standard test. We are not looking to prove beyond 
all reasonable doubt that the weapon does not cause unnecessary suffering 
or superfluous injury. It is essentially a civil test to see how this weapon 
will be used and what its normal intended use is going to be. It is not a test 
for every possible scenario in which the weapon could be used or more 
likely misused by Canadian troops in that regard.  
So, we are looking very closely at the balance on a reasonable 
foreseeable ability test. Is there a military advantage to develop such 
weapon or ammunition? Does that advantage outweigh or not outweigh the 
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effects, death or injury to the humans in that case? In one sense that seems 
a very simple and straightforward approach, certainly from a legal analysis, 
but as you can imagine there is a lot of debate even amongst our own 
medical experts. But, again, the decision-maker is not going to be solely 
ruled by what the medical effects are. It is still going to be balanced against 
the military necessity of using the ammunition and the military advantage 
that is reasonably foreseeable for commanders at all stages of an operation, 
from tactical to strategic.  
Talking about the aspects of indiscriminate effects, we have to be 
careful from a legal analysis that this concept is more related to the one of 
targeting than the actual effect of a weapon. It is very hard to think of a 
weapon that is intentionally designed to be indiscriminate. A possible 
exception could be the V1 or the V2 rockets from Germany in World War 
II. The real targeting concept is to protect civilians and civilian property in 
all circumstances. Even if the target is a legitimate military objective we 
have to look at proportionality, collateral damage, the effect of the valid 
military attack and an assessment of what is going to be the unintended or 
incidental loss of civilian lives in those circumstances. Those are really 
targeting principles, but they are not completely separate from our analysis 
under Article 36 of what an indiscriminate effect would be. 
 
Would you think that a little bit more attention to the kinds of medical 
criteria you have mentioned could be drawn up as criteria or 
principles or things to look at by every State? 
Picking up on Richard’s comments, I think you might have been 
referring to the ICRC SIrUS (Serious Injury or Unnecessary Suffering) 
Project on serious injury and unnecessary suffering in the late 1990s. I can 
certainly say from a Canadian perspective that, while we ultimately 
disagreed with the project because we didn’t feel it paid sufficient attention 
to the military necessity balance issue that Richard was just talking about, 
we appreciated the medical aspects, the types of percentages for wounding 
and the mortality rates that were produced which was the underlying 
purpose of the SIrUS Project. Indeed, the purpose of SIrUS was to try to 
achieve an objective test that all States and all persons could look to and 
say “now we have a better idea of what superfluous injury and unnecessary 
suffering really means”. So I would say that there was a lot of value in the 
type of medical approaches and data that you could have extracted from 
SIrUS and we would still incorporate today and I would certainly 
encourage other States to do that but keeping in mind that no matter what 
your determination is from that objective medical perspective, if you want 
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to phrase it that way, it still has to be balanced against the military necessity 
piece, as it can’t be determined on its own. 
 
Where does the proportionality test concerning unnecessary suffering 
come from? 
We focus on necessary and unnecessary for superfluous suffering. The 
aspect of proportionality is more of a targeting concept of how the weapon 
is actually employed in the battle space as opposed to determining whether 
it is necessary or unnecessary suffering upfront. That doesn’t mean that 
they are totally disconnected. It is theoretically possible to develop a 
weapon that is completely indiscriminate and that would factor in very 
much into its ability to cause unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury. 
The concept of proportionality for us is more in the area of targeting and 
the employment of the weapon. 
 
How can prohibition on widespread long-term and severe 
environmental damage possibly be assessed at the weapons review 
process? 
Canada is a party so we do comply with Article 35 and also the 
ENMOD (Environmental Modification) Convention. I think it is extremely 
difficult, especially for fairly modest resourced nations like Canada 
although it is a G7 and G20 country. But in terms of weapon development 
we are generally not in that business so our reviews would take place of 
weapons and platforms developed by other States and manufacturers. We 
definitely do include the Article 35 and ENMOD tests in our Article 36 
review process. How do you do that? It is a challenge; again we have to 
rely, as the legal advisor, almost exclusively on environmental experts, 
engineering experts. We do our best to get their knowledge, which doesn’t 
stop at the doorway of the Canadian armed forces and the Department of 
Defense but goes beyond to the wider academic community as well, 
looking for information to the extent that we can work with our research 
and development scientists. We do our best not only in the environment but 
in all areas to try to use computer modeling to see what those effects would 
be.  
Having said that,  the threshold for violating Article 35 from a Canadian 
perspective  would seem extremely high when you look at the language in 
terms of the damage that maybe intended or expected to cause widespread 
long term and severe damage to the natural environment. We are dealing 
with the environment which in itself is under constant review and updating. 
So, in our moment in time, much like the commander in the battlefield, the 
decision would have to be judged from the existing information at that 
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time, not post facto. Having said that, the post facto information can cause 
us to go back to review our position, but at the time the decision is made we 
do our very best to collect all that very complex data on the effects on the 
environment, and then how do we match that through a legal analysis with 
the language of Article 35 or the language of the Environmental 
Modification Convention (ENMOD). ENMOD for us is a bit easier to 
determine because it actually requires the deliberate manipulation of the 
environment to achieve a military effect. I’m not sure any State has that 
capability, so we are really back to the Article 35 piece. From our 
perspective, when you look at experience both from the technical data on 
damage to the environment and practical effects of instances, it is hard to 
look at recent scenarios where environment had that impact done on it. In 
the first Iraq war, when the Iraqis were withdrawing from Kuwait and 
lighting all the oil fields on fire, there was an immediate reaction that this 
was a clear violation. But when you talk to scientists of the day, there’s not 
that much long term widespread damage to the environment even though it 
looks extremely bad when the oil fields are burning on a daily basis. 
 
Is the employment of the term “military advantage” confused with 
“military necessity”? 
From a Canadian perspective the term military advantage, that’s in your 
discrimination analysis, it is a targeting term, so it is the military advantage 
to be gained either at the time or at a later part of the conflict balanced 
against the incidental loss of civilian life or property. Military necessity 
does nicely enfold advantage – it’s hard to think of an advantage that 
wouldn’t be necessary. Necessary gives the impression that in that 
particular moment it is necessary, but from a commander’s perspective it is 
necessary for the longer campaign not necessarily in the tactical attack in 
that very moment. So, I don’t think from a military commander’s or legal 
perspective that the terms are that far apart, but I do acknowledge they are 
different terms as you look at both when you are looking at the point. I 
think the military necessity term for us is used more often in the analysis of 
superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering, hence the word necessary 
suffering related to the necessary military aspect of having the weapon. 
 
In relation to new technology, and specifically autonomous systems, 
how can you know and assess in relation to what you don’t know is 
going to happen? 
In Canada’s perspective, if we deal with specific Article 36 process, 
which is in place, the law exists, there are processes. It is never easy as 
potential weapons become more complex. Then the challenge becomes 
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harder. But saying the challenge is harder doesn’t mean you stop your 
process, it doesn’t mean the weapon is prohibited. When we talk about 
trying to know the unknown, that’s why you have the test, that’s why the 
law exists so that States are forced into finding out as best they can and 
again it is not a standard of certainty, it’s a balance of probability 
essentially that this weapon will be predictable and act in the intended and 
normal way that it was designed to be used. So, from that perspective, 
where I think some of the mixing of the issue comes in and switching to the 
concept of disarmament or arms control issues, you’re still talking about 
the same issues in terms of morality and ethics, but that’s a far different 
process. You can have prohibitions for other reasons on weapons that 
would easily pass the Article 36 review. They are related but separate 
concepts to keep in mind. And again going back to that question of 
knowing the unknown, well, all of our nations put deadly weapons in the 
hands of very young men and women and send them to tough 
circumstances. I cannot possibly predict what each and every one of those 
soldiers will do in every circumstance. We do our best to predict through 
training and reaffirming and more training. The same applies when you are 
developing or looking at taking on new weapons systems as well.  
And the last point which encompasses the whole broad sense of 
weapons and new technologies, is that the discussion that must take place 
about morality, ethics and policies. From a Canadian perspective it’s not 
devoid but it is not the purpose of Article 36. It is a legal review. We run a 
parallel process for all of our weapons being a policy review. So the 
Assistant Deputy Minister of Policy engages both inside the department 
and outside of it to determine, even if the weapon being reviewed is 
approved from a legal perspective, whether Canada, from a policy 
perspective, wants to use or acquire the use of such a weapon system? 
Again this is related to Article 36 but it’s a separate process from a 
Canadian perspective. The process applies to any weapon system. We 
focused on what might be determined as the “sexy weapon system” of 
LAWS (Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems) or “killer robots” in the 
vernacular and cyber. Frankly, I’m far more concerned about developments 
and military uses of nanotechnology than LAWS because you can’t see 
nanotechnology. 
 
It has often been said today that all of these reviews must be evidence 
based. One of the difficulties about not being able to have perhaps 
more transparency, because of all of the commercial and state secrecy 
about, is that it isn’t usually possible to track down whether 
88 
governments are using best evidence. Can you say something about 
that? Where do you get your evidence from? 
Everywhere. It’s not a restrictive process where we say this is the only 
source of evidence, particularly in the modern world where there’s a wealth 
of information not always reliable but at least you can find out about it, 
literally just on the world-wide web, for example. So, we do work very 
hard to do so. In the same way, to give a broad interpretation to weapons 
review, we look to a broad number of sources to confirm the credibility and 
reliability of the test that we are using.  
I’m not here to give in any way, shape or form the impression that it is 
an easy process. It is not. But it’s one that I think certainly Canada and 
other States who have signed up, agree and believe in; the United States, 
even if they have not signed up, still follow the practice and that is a key 
point. I think Article 36 like many aspects of Geneva Conventions and the 
Protocols all work to help create norms and state practice, particularly 
concerning States that are heavily into war fighting, and development of 
weapons systems. So, to have an actual legal review  before the weapon is 
used and employed is really an unquestioned advantage to my mind and 
results in a presumption of legality that all States should strive for.  
Having said that, I think we all agree that given the small amount of 
States who have publicly stated that they have processes that they actually 
use, it is not a good story. So there needs to be more encouragement not 
only from NGOs and the international civil community but from States and 
military to military relationship with allies and others to encourage taking 
up those causes. But we have to be realistic because a number of those 
States are the same States that have the same challenges that we are all still 
concerned about namely, how they consider targeting; how they treat 
detainees in conflicts. So, there’s only so much you can realistically take on 
and try to influence. But again, that doesn’t mean you stop all together, you 
keep trying and do your best. So, I think in the Canadian perspective on this 
is that there is a valid purpose to Article 36 and I agree fully with Richard 
Moyes. It’s not viewed and never was viewed frankly designed to be the all 
source fix for the challenges that we’ve talked about all day today. But 
there are other mechanisms. Again, I agree with Moyes and other speakers 
who spoke of the value of engagement with NGOs and civil society who 
can hold States accountable despite the challenges of transparency and lack 
of information. I think that the proof is in the proverbial pudding with the 
number of recent treaties that were drawn up which again from my 
perspective are not really about an Article 36 concern. They are really 
concerned about arms control and disarmament which is another effective 
and valuable tool in the toolbox of regulating violence. My fear is that if 
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you get too cynical and say “let’s walk away from Article 36 Review” then 
I think it would be a slippery slope and we would be back down to the 
unlimited warfare approach particularly where States who haven’t signed 
Article 36 are concerned. I think there’s a danger of encouraging the sense 
that war is unlimited when clearly it’s not. 
 
Imagine two weapons come up for review: one of them can be used at 
close range but definitely not at  long range because at  longer range it 
causes injuries that are definitely superfluous, while the other weapon 
can be used in the open air but not in confined spaces. When carrying 
out a weapons review do you simply say “we know it is intended and 
designed for that so that’s enough we’ll just say it’s lawful” or do you 
say “it’s lawful for use only as intended by the manufacturer” or do 
you actually say “you must not use this at longer range and you must 
not use this in confined spaces”? Cathcart referred to the fact that you 
can’t predict what people do in the field, but you can as sure as hell 
shape it! If something is lawful in some circumstances and unlawful in 
others, do you actually issue a specific health warning: “do not do the 
following”, because otherwise, I think that makes weapons reviews 
much less effective. 
Are you aware of any weapon that has been modified or abandoned 
as a result of weapons reviews? If not, isn’t it a sort of  mild deterrent 
for manufacturers who know when coming up with an idea you’ve got 
to talk the talk and make sure that that is not intrinsically unlawful? 
So it’s a small barrier for manufacturers to get over it. That doesn’t 
mean it’s useless but it just means it has got a deterrent effect rather 
than any other effect. 
On the first question, yes, absolutely, we can certainly shape our 
soldiers, sailors and air persons out there, and we do. My point there being 
that if we are talking compared to a robotic system and you don’t know 
until you start working that system if it’s going to be a disastrous approach 
which we would never approve or some have argued that you get a better 
result controlling robots than humans in those circumstances. And we do 
control the use of force and in that regard the types of weapons in the use of 
force primarily through rules of engagement that are issued for each and 
every mission that we operate whether it’s armed conflict, peace support or 
even domestic operations at home. There are rules of engagement that 
certainly address specific weapons and how to use them and when not to 
use them. A common example for most modern militaries is our military 
police officers deployed with our troops primarily for the purpose of 
enforcing discipline. They normally have policing weapons and expanding 
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hollow point bullets, but when we send them to a war zone we give them 
specific instructions when to separate that ammunition, when they are only 
going to be using it in context of enforcing our own discipline versus going 
out and doing operations and engaging in the armed conflict.  
Another example that we had in the past was called long-range acoustic 
device (LRAD), like a big speaker that my parents used to hate in the 
seventies when I played my rock and roll Rolling Stones, but this is even 
bigger, the kind you would mount on a vessel or an aircraft or an armored 
vehicle. Its designed intended use by those originally looking at it was to be 
able to hail at long distances particularly on maritime interdiction 
operations or counter piracy operations. But the LRAD also has the 
capability, if you are close enough, to blow ear drums for example so you 
would look very close and say you can’t use it for the purpose of a use of 
force, for example, but you can use it for hailing. So I absolutely agree that 
it’s necessary and we do that through that process.  
And as Michael Meier indicated and others have said earlier as well, we 
have to be very flexible and adaptive during operations so that if the troops, 
and believe me, those who know the troops are very inventive, if they come 
up with a standard weapon that they want to use in a different way, they are 
clearly prohibited from doing that until they get the authorization from the 
chain of command which requires the Article 36 review. But that can be 
done; it’s not uncommon because most of those types of adaptations are not 
particularly complex in our experience. Regarding the question as to 
whether a weapon system has ever been rejected, well, again you have the 
same approach. If you’re so engaged in the whole process of developing 
and procurement that from a legal perspective unless we’re somehow 
completely walled off from any review whatsoever, we would be working 
with the operators and the procurement officers to say “if it doesn’t meet 
the standards today this is what you need to do to meet those standards, if 
you can do that”. So, really, your goal is never to get to the point of 
rejecting a weapon, it’s not necessary to go out and say: “I love every 
weapon I see” but you work with them from a legal perspective and then 
say this is what the law requires of you. 
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About reviews of Article 36 of Geneva Additional Protocol I on the use 
of new weapons, do they do anything in practice to prevent superfluous 
injuries and unnecessary suffering? How do you assess this at the 
weapons review stage?  
The United States (US) is not a party to Additional Protocol I (AP I) 
and, therefore, there is no a legal obligation pursuant to the Protocol to 
conduct a weapons reviews. Nevertheless, we have been doing weapons 
reviews since 1974 for weapons, weapon systems and ammunition. A legal 
review is required by the Judge Advocate General of the proponent’s 
service. So each individual service has an attorney who is doing the 
weapons reviews. We believe the US weapons reviews are consistent with 
what is in AP I as well and we have implemented all our policy 
requirements through our Department of Defense regulations. Each of the 
services has its own regulations on how the weapons review is going to be 
conducted.  
Certainly, for the Army, in determining whether a particular weapon or 
ammunition is going to be legal, we give appropriate consideration to the 
legitimate military purpose of the ammunition, the military necessity for the 
weapon and then the humanitarian interest in protecting the victims of 
armed conflicts. For combatants this is the prohibition against the infliction 
of unnecessary suffering and superfluous injury, and for civilians the 
interest is protected by the prohibition against the employment of 
indiscriminate methods and means of warfare.  
The United States is not a party to any treaty that defines what 
unnecessary suffering is, but we acknowledge that there is suffering to 
combatants and it is lawful and expected and may include severe injury or 
loss of life. Though there is no agreed definition, one of my predecessors, 
Hayes Parks, came up with a kind of guide in the 1990s that we still use 
today. I would like to read it out now: 
 
A weapon or munition would be deemed to cause unnecessary suffering only if 
it inevitably or in its normal use has a particular effect and the injury caused is 
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considered by governments as disproportionate to the military necessity for it, 
that is, the military advantage to be gained from its use. This balancing test 
cannot be conducted in isolation. A weapon’s or munition’s effect must be 
weighed in light of comparable, lawful weapons or munitions in use on the 
modern battlefield. A weapon is not unlawful merely because it causes severe 
suffering or injury. The appropriate determination is whether a weapon’s or 
munition’s employment for its normal or expected use would be prohibited 
under some or all circumstances. The criteria as to whether the employment of 
a weapon for its normal or expected use inevitably would cause injury or 
suffering manifestly disproportionate to its military effectiveness. 
 
So, therefore, it is essential that the reasonably anticipated effects of the 
weapon or munition are evaluated in the context of lawful weapons on the 
battlefield.  
We do not take the view that we are required to foresee all possible uses 
or misuses of a weapon because it might be misused in ways that might be 
prohibited. As Major General Cathcart pointed out, the laws of targeting 
should be addressed at the time the weapon is employed to be determined 
by the on-scene commander. I think when we talk about the military 
necessity piece and unnecessary suffering we look at this in context of the 
weapon’s use. We are currently looking at new ammunitions and procuring 
a new hand gun system. When the developers come to us with respect to 
the need for new ammunition for this system, the question we ask is: why? 
What is the military necessity for the new system? One of the arguments is 
that it needs a higher probability of incapacitation than existing 
ammunition, so you have a military necessity for the new munition. When 
you begin testing the actual ammunition you look at things like bullet 
weight, the mass of the bullet, the range to the target, the velocity upon 
impact, where the bullet would strike the body, the attack angle, how far 
the bullet would penetrate the body, tissue disruption. So, those are the 
things you would test and evaluate and look at the military necessity for 
that system and then whether it would cause unnecessary suffering. 
 
Where does the proportionality test concerning unnecessary suffering 
come from? 
We look at this as an application of the principle of humanity in the 
context of weapons. Again, international humanitarian law (IHL) principles 
prohibit weapons designed to increase the injury or suffering of persons 
that go beyond what is justified by military necessity. Again we look at 
whether the suffering caused by the weapon provides no military advantage 
or is otherwise clearly disproportionate to the military advantage 
reasonably expected by the use of the weapon. I understand the concern 
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about the balancing piece, but I think that is how you have to describe it. 
You have to look at what is the military necessity of the weapon, and then 
weigh that against whether it is disproportionate to the military advantage 
to be gained. That is the test that we use in the United States. Accordingly, 
I think it does involve a little bit of balance. 
 
How can prohibition on widespread long-term and severe 
environmental damage possibly be assessed at the weapons review 
process? 
Our legal review of weapons addresses three questions: whether the 
weapon’s intended use in armed conflict is calculated to cause unnecessary 
suffering; whether the weapon can be controlled in a manner that can 
discriminate between civilian and military targets; and, whether there is a 
specific treaty or law that prohibits its use. Certainly the United States is 
not a party to AP I, which addresses damage to the environment and we do 
not agree with those specific principles in API. However, in the third 
question, we talk about whether there is any specific treaty or law that 
prohibits its use. We are a party to the ENMOD Convention so we would 
consider any restrictions under that Convention that would apply to a 
weapon. But, we also look to see whether or not the provisions would be 
prohibited only if they were clearly excessive in relation to the country 
directed to the military advantage anticipated. We do not consider though 
Article 35 or Article 55 on the protection of the environment as part of our 
weapons review process. 
 
How does one address the whole question of weapons review in relation 
to new technologies of various kinds with particular reference to laws 
on lethal autonomous weapons? 
The lethal autonomous weapons system in the United States has been 
discussed extensively over the last three years in the Convention on Certain 
Conventional Weapons (CCW). I was privileged to be the head of the US 
delegation for the last three years working on this issue. In the United 
States, we have a directive on autonomous weapon systems which we have 
used as a guide on how these systems should be developed. So looking at 
this, the review of an acquisition or procurement of a weapon for 
consistency with the US international humanitarian law (IHL) obligations, 
again we should consider the three questions I talked about earlier. If a 
weapon is not prohibited then we should consider whether there are the 
legal restrictions on the weapon’s specific use and if those specific 
restrictions apply then the concept of employment of the weapon should be 
reviewed for consistency with those restrictions.  
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For lethal autonomous weapon systems obviously this goes back to our 
defense acquisition process, which looks at the weapon system holistically 
to ensure that weapons we develop are safe, predictable and can be used in 
compliance with IHL. It considers the entire life cycle of the weapon, 
which we divide into five phases. These phases consider the requirement 
for the weapon systems so should we decide to develop a lethal 
autonomous weapons system we would look for the requirement of the 
system. Then we would look at the analysis and evaluation of the 
technology performance, engineering and manufacturing. Then we would 
look at the production and operation and support. Safety is considered 
throughout each of the five phases of the acquisition system. Weapons that 
have critical safety functions in any aspect are subject to additional scrutiny 
through weapons review boards. These boards are comprised of experts to 
evaluate weapons systems against industry and government standards and 
to develop and apply best practices.  
Obviously, weapon systems that have certain autonomous functions are 
subject to this defense acquisition process as well as additional reviews to 
ensure that the design allows for the exercise of an appropriate level of 
human judgment over the use of any autonomous weapon system. 
According to the Department of Defense Directive 3000.09, to establish the 
autonomy of weapon systems requires two separate reviews by senior 
officials, prior to any formal development or fielding of a weapon system 
with certain autonomous functions.  
The first review occurs before the weapon system enters into formal 
development, and at this stage the senior officials must ensure that the 
system design that incorporates the necessary capabilities that will allow 
the commander and the operator to exercise appropriate levels of human 
judgment over the use of force. The system is designed to then complete 
engagements in a time frame consistent with commander and operator 
intentions, and if it is not able to do that then to determinate the 
engagement and seek additional input from the human operator before 
continuing. The system design then has to address and minimize the 
probability in consequences of failure that could lead to unintended 
engagements, or the loss of control over that system, which will include 
reviews of safeties; we look at anti tampering mechanisms, information 
security systems. Then you would have plans in place for verification and 
validation, we would do operational tests and evaluation to ensure that the 
system is reliable, effective and suitable under realistic conditions, 
including possible adversary actions, and they would be done to a sufficient 
standard consistent with the potential consequences of an unintentional 
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engagement or a loss of control over the system. Then we would write a 
preliminary legal review of that weapon system.  
The second phase occurs right before the weapon system would be 
fielded. The senior officials will then get together again and ensure that the 
design requirements I mentioned above have been implemented to 
standard. The verification and validation, the operational testing and 
evaluation have adequately assessed the systems’ performance, the 
capability, its reliability, its effectiveness and suitability under realistic 
conditions. And then you would look at the system capabilities, we would 
look at human-machine interface, our doctrine, our tactics, techniques and 
procedures, also known as TTPs, and then the training that we have 
implemented to allow our commanders and operators again to exercise the 
appropriate level of human judgment over the use of force. And then to 
operate the system with appropriate care and be able to use it in accordance 
with the law of war, any applicable treaty the United States is a party to, 
our weapons safety rules, and any applicable rules of engagement for that 
operation. We would obviously make sure that there was adequate training 
done by the operators of the systems, that training is periodically reviewed 
and is used and understood by the commander and the operators so they 
understand the functions of autonomous capabilities and also the limitations 
of the autonomy with the system. Then once the legal review is done it 
would be fielded.  
So, under the Directive, our weapon systems with certain autonomous 
functions get two legal reviews instead of one. The legal reviews should 
then consider whether other measures should be taken to assist in assuring 
compliance with IHL obligations related to the type of weapon being 
acquired or procured. So with LAWS, we need to ensure that it is 
sufficiently predictable and reliable and we think that takes on particular 
significance because of the nature of the system. So, there needs to be 
appropriate system designs and safeties, rigorous hardware and software 
verification and validation and, most importantly, the realistic system 
development and operational testing to ensure they comply with IHL.  
Speaking more broadly, we would note that IHL does not specifically 
prohibit or restrict the use of autonomy that aids in the operation of 
weapons. In fact, we have seen the use of autonomy enhance the way IHL 
principles are implemented in military operations today. For example, 
munitions that have homing functions that enable the user to strike the 
military objectives with greater discrimination and have less risk of 
incidental harm. So we think improving the performance of the weapon 
systems is one area which the interest of military effectiveness and 
humanitarian interests coincide. 
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Do weapons reviews under current technology ban fully autonomous 
systems? 
I think in certain circumstances, like the offensive use of certain 
systems, technology might not be able to meet the requirements of IHL. We 
have many systems today, especially defensive systems, like AGIS, that 
have humans on the loop. So autonomy has been used with some effect 
now. I do think that technology is in its beginning phases in order to try to 
do some of this stuff. I think you have to look at the context, because it 
always matters. Is the system that you are trying to develop going to be 
used where there are only combatants? If it is out in the desert and nobody 
is around and no civilians – that is one level. If you start trying to use them 
in cities and populated areas then that becomes significantly harder. I do 
think you have to look at the context and what the system is designed to do 
and how it is going to be used. 
 
In relation to new technology, and specifically autonomous systems, 
how can you know and assess in relation to what you don’t know is 
going to happen? 
I think that it is a valid concern and a struggle that you have to look at. 
When you do testing for M16s or other weapons, you test them for a certain 
amount of times. If you get into autonomous weapons systems that are 
computer generated, do you do 10 thousand or 10 million tests? You have 
to look and see what you are trying to do. Certainly engineers and other 
people are looking at those types of things to figure out how we will be able 
to properly test them. Through our Directive those are the questions that 
have to be answered: it has to be reliable and predictable. You would have 
to have all those questions answered before you could conduct your legal 
review. 
 
It has often been said today that all of these reviews must be evidence 
based. One of the difficulties about not being able to have perhaps 
more transparency, because of all of the commercial and state secrecy 
about, is that it isn’t usually possible to track down whether 
governments are using best evidence. Can you say something about 
that? 
I’m not so sure about the best evidence piece but I would like at least to 
address a couple of points that Richard Moyes made and then come to your 
question on the rationale for weapons reviews. I would parrot what Colonel 
Batty said in that one of the reasons we do this is that we owe it to our 
commanders to ensure that they are confident that the weapons they have 
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are legal and the same goes for the operators and we owe it to our own 
civilian population.  
With respect to some of the issues Moyes made about modifications and 
whether we look at existing systems at least for the United States – we do. 
One of the pieces of information we try to get for weapons reviews is a 
complete description of the intended use of the weapon or weapons systems 
and the tactical operational needs that it intends to fill. One of the things 
that we do look at is making a comparison with approved systems and 
approved weapons that are in our inventory. Any time there is a 
modification that changes the function of an existing system, you have to 
go back and then look at that weapon system. In this way, you have a 
pattern of use that I think we would look at and compare. So, I would have 
to disagree a little bit with Richard. It is not that once you do an initial 
weapons review then you are done and you never look at the weapon 
system again as they get better. Even on the autonomy of weapon systems 
you would sometimes go back and start looking at those different systems. 
With respect to cluster munitions effects, certainly the United States is not a 
party to the Convention on Cluster Munition (CCM). We have cluster 
munitions in our inventory, we still view those as lawful weapons and that 
they serve a legitimate military purpose. Obviously, we have taken steps to 
develop systems that have a 99% greater reliability rate. They have self-
destruct and self-deactivation systems in them to make sure that they don’t 
cause the harm of some of the older systems, I think others have talked 
about, used in the ‘70s. I think we do look at those. Also, when States enter 
into certain treaties they are accepting legal restrictions on the use of that 
particular system; it doesn’t necessarily mean that the State has made a 
determination that that particular weapon is inherently indiscriminate or 
that it causes superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. They have made 
a political decision to restrict or limit the use of a particular weapon. I don’t 
think we can jump directly to the point that they are inherently 
indiscriminate or have those types of effects. 
 
Imagine two weapons come up for review: one of them can be used at 
close range but definitely not at long range because at a longer range it 
causes injuries that are definitely superfluous, while the other weapon 
can be used in the open air but not in confined spaces. When carrying 
out a weapons review do you simply say “we know it is intended and 
designed for that so that’s enough we’ll just say it’s lawful” or do you 
say “it’s lawful for use only as intended by the manufacturer” or do 
you actually say “you must not use this at longer range and you must 
not use this in confined spaces”? Cathcart  referred to the fact that you 
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can’t predict what people do in the field, but you can as sure as hell 
shape it! If something is lawful in some circumstances and unlawful in 
others, do you actually issue a specific health warning: “do not do the 
following”, because otherwise, I think weapons reviews would be much 
less effective? 
Are you aware of any weapon that has been modified or abandoned 
as a result of weapons reviews? If not, isn’t it a sort of a mild deterrent 
for manufacturers who know when coming up with an idea you’ve got 
to talk the talk and make sure that that is not intrinsically unlawful? 
So it’s a small barrier for manufacturers to get over it. That doesn’t 
mean it’s useless but it just means it has got a deterrent effect rather 
than any other effect. 
Regarding the second scenario, the way the US process works is that we 
would be doing a disservice to our clients and everyone else if we got to the 
point in the weapon review that it was determined unlawful after spending 
hundreds of millions of dollars. That’s why we have the holistic process. 
We bring all the different people together to make sure that you don’t get to 
an end result where you are going to have that sort of finding. You try to 
resolve all those issues before you would ever get there. About the question 
on the scenarios, I think as lawyers we would have to ask hard questions 
such as why would you develop something for that specific sort of purpose 
and try to get around those other systems for the two scenarios. When you 
do the legal review we talk about it, at least in the US process, even if we 
find it legal we would then look at whether there are certain tactics, 
techniques and procedures that need to be put in place, whether certain 
restrictions need to be put in place. So, we do that sort of function that you 
were addressing in your first scenario, so at least for us that is part of our 
process. 
 
Therefore, you would direct the use of the weapon so it would not be 
used contrary to what the manufacturer intended?  
You are correct. In the review we look at what the intended purpose of 
the weapon is, and at what it is designed to do. We look at the design and 
intent of that weapon and then if there are other sorts of restrictions or 
procedures that we need to put in place to make sure that it’s used 
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About reviews of Article 36 of Geneva Additional Protocol I on the use 
of new weapons, do they do anything in practice to prevent superfluous 
injuries and unnecessary suffering? How do you assess this at the 
weapons review stage? 
How far has the ICRC and those who are involved in this issue 
consulted the WHO on the definition of unnecessary suffering? 
There was a bit of a push in the late 1990s to think more in a more 
medical health based way, about how certain types of injury patterns could 
be considered in this context. So, health data was being brought into the 
debate. Bringing evidence from the field into this international 
consideration around weapons has been very important for developing the 
law. In that context they have been looking at particular patterns of 
wounding and perhaps at particular severities of wounding associated with 
certain weapon types. However, that type of approach has been rather over-
shadowed by an interpretation of the law, by some that always sees this 
wounding pattern in relation to the balance of military necessity. That 
approach makes it rather more difficult in a generalized sense to straight-
forwardly stipulate that this or that pattern of wounding is always 
unacceptable from a legal perspective. 
Also thinking about the types of wounding that have been considered 
important, sometimes the inevitability of death has been seen particularly 
problematic, or the inevitability of permanent disability, blindness in the 
context of blinding laser weapons and, in particular, the untreatability of 
wound injuries you get with undetectable fragments. There have been some 
issues raised about that recently with certain types of explosive weapons 
that perhaps contain fine metal particles in the explosive fill creating a 
pattern of wounding that is particularly problematic. 
But it definitely feels that in terms of the ongoing international 
discussions there hasn’t been that much of a renewed focus on how these 
types of medical data can inform perspectives on this, rather because the 
locally contextualized orientation is predominating in terms of state legal 
interpretation. 
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Would you think that a little bit more attention to the kinds of medical 
criteria you have mentioned could be drawn up as criteria or 
principles or things to look at by every State? 
I tend to find that the analytical and political dynamics of the 
unnecessary suffering and superfluous test seem rather tricky. In part it 
seems to be that the predictability of a very specific pattern of wounding is 
held to be problematic in a way almost to suggest that unpredictability of 
wounding would be considered as preferable in a legal analysis. This feels 
slightly awkward to me. And I’m not sure that there is much appetite at 
present for pursuing a criteria-based approach to weapons in general. 
Rather we tend to see that this issue is coming up more in relation to 
specific weapon technologies that are already being associated with a 
particular pattern of wounding after they have already been brought into 
use. This perhaps relates to another issue about these review processes and 
leads to some wider consideration about the role of these processes, that 
they tend to be somewhat in the abstract in the initial phase because you are 
not testing them on humans and there is an extent to which certain patterns 
of harm from weapons have only really emerged over time as the result of 
their process of use. But these review systems are not particularly well set 
up to capture that. This is not to say that they are set up in the wrong way in 
terms of what the law necessarily demands. I think it is just that, as  
currently formulated, they are not set up to test patterns of harm. They are 
set up to straightforwardly test abstract legality as opposed to likely longer 
term patterns of actual harm. 
 
Where does the proportionality test concerning unnecessary suffering 
come from? 
Aside from the issue of unnecessary suffering, in relation to the 
prohibition of indiscriminate attacks, ruling out weapons that are 
completely incapable of being directed towards the target is a pretty simple 
test. But there is a very large grey area between “incapable of being 
directed” and “highly accurate”. So I do wonder in terms of Article 36 and 
its requirement to assess legality in some or all circumstances. Whether that 
is interpreted in terms of some circumstances that are explicitly prescribed 
in law as being illegal for the use of that weapon, or whether that might 
imply some sort of contextual assessment regarding where a certain type of 
weapon should be used even if that is not explicitly articulated in the law. 
So, obviously with incendiary weapons, the prohibition of their use in 
concentrations of civilians is differently formulated for different types, but I 
wonder for weapons that are not explicitly subject to such treaty 
formulation whether the review process would still articulate some 
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guidance with respect to that. This is linked to the ‘concept of use’ - 
whether the proposed use of a specific weapon already provides 
contextualized information regarding where it might be expected to be 
used. I would be interested to know what sort of contextual descriptions are 
used in those kinds of processes, if they are used at all. 
 
How can prohibition on widespread long-term and severe 
environmental damage possibly be assessed at the weapons review 
process? 
 It is obviously a pretty steep test, again, and I think that it is very 
challenging. It does put in mind the question of whether nuclear weapons 
would be considered to breach that test. I think it is hard to think that they 
wouldn’t. I recognize, of course, that a number of States have got 
reservations in place regarding the applicability of these rules to nuclear 
weapons anyway but that’s perhaps revealing in itself of the coherence of 
those weapons with the more generally established legal regime. So, it 
seems rather a steep test for most technologies that you can see being 
brought to bear.  
On the other hand, there are perhaps positive developments in this area 
as well, away from that specific legal framework. The International Law 
Commission considers legal principles relating to the environment in the 
context of armed conflict. This is part of a wider movement, recognizing 
that wider legal frameworks continue to apply even in situations of armed 
conflict – which can produce positive developments, helping to pull back 
the exceptionalism of armed conflict. This, perhaps, builds a greater sense 
of direct respect and responsibility for the environment and civilian 
population in those areas. So, I suppose that also brings to mind how States 
relate to specific legal obligations in terms of the laws of war and how they 
might also bring to bear other policy considerations in relation to the 
assessment of weapons, for example the toxicity of materials that are used 
in weapons. There may not be explicit rules regarding that, but at the same 
time, it would seem quite reasonable and a positive development if States 
took such factors into account when weapons were being assessed.  
 
In relation to new technology, and specifically autonomous systems, 
how can you know and assess in relation to what you don’t know is 
going to happen? 
There’s a lot of material that could be covered in response to this 
question given that there’s already been a lot of debate on the issue of lethal 
autonomous weapons internationally. I suppose a lot depends on how you 
conceptualize the problem of lethal autonomous weapons systems in the 
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first place. I agree with Meier that some functions that could be called 
autonomous have provided benefits to commanders in terms of allowing for 
more predictable and more constrained applications of force. I think our 
particular concern with respect to this technological development is more in 
the other direction - of the potential loss of control for human beings in 
terms of the application of force. This, of course, relates to issues of 
predictability and reliability. Reliability is a function of technology to an 
extent, but predictability is a function of technology and also the context of 
space in which the system will operate and the time over which the system 
will operate. I think a fundamental concern for us is that, as technologies 
develop, we will see weapons systems that are capable of operating over a 
wider area and over a longer period of time and so start to challenge what 
we consider to be an attack as a unit of legal decision making and of 
military operations. So, where military human commanders have 
obligations to undertake certain legal judgments in relation to an attack, 
there needs to be some conceptual and spatial boundaries to that notion of 
an attack if it isn’t going to expand outwards to the point where the 
application of that human legal judgment and determination is effectively 
meaningless. This is slightly different from simply making assertions about 
whether technology can undertake processes analogous to determining a 
civilian or military object and the like. It is rather a concern that through a 
wider adoption of these systems we see a blurring, or an eroding, of certain 
key terms in the law we rely on for ensuring legal application at a 
sufficiently tight level. 
In our perspective, strengthening the idea of human control, human 
judgment, as well as both coupled together - as I think you need both in 
reality - strengthening the idea that there needs to be a sufficient level of 
human control to enable the application of the law or to ensure compliance 
with the law is something that should be articulated collectively by States; 
because describing the nature of that human control is rather different from 
simply describing what the provisions of existing international law already 
say.  
All that said, clearly whatever the future, how we review technologies 
as they start to be proposed for development, or as they come into 
development, will be a very significant aspect to this. I think this is almost 
edging towards the second question about what the function of these 
processes is. But national level Article 36 review processes do not have an 
external normative standard setting function because they almost inevitably 
involve a degree of secrecy and privacy that curtails their ability to build 
common international standards.  
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However, if you did have a more common international standard 
requiring a sufficient level of human judgment and control to be applied in 
certain technologies to allow for legal compliance then you could couple 
that with an obligation to review new technologies at a national level. In 
addition, you could draft some guidance for States collectively to provide 
them with a frame of reference for how that ongoing review process could 
be undertaken. That wouldn’t necessarily need to be a strict and binding 
guidance. I think inevitably in the face of such variations of possible 
technology there needs to be some flexibility regarding how our 
instruments orientate to that process. But I think a coupling of an 
international standard with a strengthening of the obligation to undertake 
these sorts of reviews in relation to specific characteristics of human 
judgment and control would provide a workable framework for engaging 
with the issue of lethal autonomous weapons at this stage. 
 
States have got to use weapons in accordance with international 
humanitarian law; there is a tiny number of States which actually have 
formal weapon review processes: are they really adding anything to the 
whole compliance with the international humanitarian law business? 
What is the point of it all? 
It would be tempting from a civil society perspective to hope that 
national level weapons review processes were in some way going to 
provide a tool that shapes new progressive ways of curbing civilian harm 
from weapons, but I don’t realistically think that is what is going on here 
and I don’t think it’s entirely unreasonable that that’s not the case. 
Essentially I think we see the Article 36 review processes as a mechanism 
for ensuring that States are taking seriously the legal obligations that they 
have taken upon themselves, in particular, the obligations of specific 
weapons treaties, and checking that the weapons that they are acquiring and 
developing fall within that legal framework. But it is essentially a test of 
legality. It is not a test of what harm weapons might cause in a wider sense, 
it is not a test of whether these are going to be positive weapons to bring 
into the world in terms of their wider implications. I think we’ve seen that 
in terms of the history of developments in the law regarding weapons over 
the last twenty years. New developments in the law have not being driven 
out of national level Article 36 processes, rather they’ve been driven out of 
humanitarian actors, medical professionals in the field, non-governmental 
organisations and international organisations, gathering evidence and data 
of actual harm experienced and actual patterns of harm and bringing those 
back into the international and the multilateral frameworks. That has 
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underpinned a lot of developments with respect to weapons law in recent 
years. I tend to expect that to continue.  
I think there are a number of challenges for Article 36 reviews in 
suggesting that they might fulfill that process. Essentially we know they are 
not going to be transparent and I think we can understand why that’s the 
case. Of course, more transparency around such processes is to be 
encouraged, as is more undertaking of Article 36 reviews at a national level 
by States because assessing legality does have a purpose, but they are not 
going to generate wider international normative effects, or standard setting 
effects, or agreement around where the threshold of acceptability and 
unacceptability should lie.  
They also have a bit of a challenge as they tend to reflect a sort of 
hypothetical concept of weapon use, and that means they are not looking at 
the patterns of actual use of weapons, the patterns of actual harm that have 
accrued over time because those patterns tend to occur subsequent to 
weapons being used, often by various actors. I think it would be interesting 
to think more about how data on actual patterns of civilian harm might be 
generated by States and fed back into their own thinking about these 
processes. I am reminded a little bit of an example on cluster munitions a 
national government explained in parliament that with cluster munitions, as 
with all weapons, you need to weigh the military utility against the risk to 
civilians - and they said they had undertaken a very careful weighing of 
these two elements and had decided that they should continue using these 
weapons. But when they were asked what data they had gathered on actual 
civilian harm in a number of contexts where they had used these weapons 
they hadn’t actually undertaken any evidence gathering whatsoever. 
 So, there’s a bit of an imbalance in terms of how experience from the 
field with respect to civilian experiences comes back into these processes 
other than in so far as that has been facilitated by humanitarian 
organisations and wider members of the international community in 
international discussions. This is rather a reflection of the fact that Article 
36 reviews don’t have any representation from key stakeholders who are 
likely to be put at risk - civilians in foreign countries. That’s understandable 
given the structures that are operating here, but that does have a bearing on 
a system for assessing technologies. And I think more and more in the way 
that the law is developing and perhaps more and more in how we are seeing 
the engagement of victims of weapons in international multilateral 
discussions on these issues, we need to see a process of trying to bridge that 
gap and see some more proximity and accountability in relation to the 
actual populations that are affected. 
105 
So, those things might sound very critical of Article 36 reviews but in a 
way I’m not sure that processes are really set up to fulfill that function. 
Rather I think that’s a function that the wider community needs to continue 
to undertake. However, I also thing that means that simply asserting that 
implementing existing Article 36 processes will from now on resolve all of 
the issues related to the problematic impacts of weapons in the world is 
distinctly misguided - not just because new evidence will be developed and 
new technologies will be developed - but also because I think we should 
hope that as a community our expectations of civilian protection should 
also develop and change over time. We may hopefully come to evaluate 
certain weapons differently as our own social structures make us less 
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Case study: law enforcement 
by military personnel 
 
Juan Carlos GOMEZ RAMIREZ 
Colombian Air Force, Bogotá 
I will talk from my experience as a soldier who has been in the military 
forces for 33 years in a country that has been in a conflict for 52 years. I 
would like to explain and try to answer the question that Nils has given to 
us and that is; are the Military engaged in counter-insurgency operations 
conducting law enforcement or hostilities? I can tell you that after these 52 
years I think we know pretty well the difference between these two 
paradigms. I would especially like to talk about the last 15 or 16 years. 
If I recall well, in 2002 the guerrilla had about 30,000 men. Today, they 
have less than 7,000. The military forces and the Colombian Government 
have defeated the guerrillas in too many places and in some others, the 
Government and the military forces have weakened them. In this process 
we pass from a pretty clear NIAC (hostilities) to a law enforcement 
paradigm without realizing it and noticing the real difference. 
 
At the beginning of this century, the guerrillas were very well armed, 
with military uniforms, in an important and robust military organization. 
They were living in the jungle, in the countryside, in camps and they acted 
in a mass military structure. But some time later, after have been affected 
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by the military forces with special operations including air strikes, they 
started to move in small groups from rural areas to urban areas wearing 
civilian clothes, carrying pistols, revolvers and allocated with their issues in 
the middle of the population. At the same time the institutions in Colombia 
like justice, local governments, health and education started to flourish 
again. 
At that moment, Colombia moved from a clear NIAC with hostilities to 
a law enforcement paradigm, without any further notice, and there are some 
consequences that I want to share with you. Many civilians were killed, as 
well as many guerrilla members. About 6,000 members of the military 
forces and police were also killed in this period; more than 18,000 were 
injured; and about 9,000 of them, lost part of their integrity or their limbs. 
Legally and due to the improvement of the institutions justice grew up. 
Right now, there are around 5,000 military members under criminal 
investigation. 1,000 of them have already been sentenced from 20 to 50 
years of jail. Colombian military forces really know the legal cost of not 
knowing in which paradigm they were involved in at that time (hostilities 
or law enforcement). 
Now, I would like to talk not only about Colombia but also about Latin 
America. If you check the United Nations homepage you will find that 
America is the most violent region in the world. When you check the 
figures, you can see that per 100,000 inhabitants in America, there are 16 
people violently killed. In the case of Europe there are 3, in Asia 2.9, in 
Africa 12, and in the whole world 6. If you analyze by countries, in the case 
of Colombia, there are 27 deaths per every 100,000 inhabitants. In 
Venezuela the number is 62; in El Salvador 64 and in Honduras 84 – which 
unfortunately, is the most violent country in the world right now. So, with 
this reality it is pretty understandable that governments try to use their 
military forces to confront the violent reality in any of these countries. The 
crimes that are present in America right now are very violent: narco-
trafficking, illegal mining, extortion, human trafficking and some other 
crimes that are transnational.  
The military forces are one of the most credible institutions in those 
countries. People find them capable of confronting criminal violence, and 
delinquents fear them. So, it is pretty easy to comprehend that governments 
try to involve the military forces in law enforcement operations.  
Honestly, I believe that military forces can strongly support law 
enforcement authorities, but cannot replace them. What I want to share with 
you is how hostilities (NIAC) and law enforcement environment in some 
countries in America are overlapping. This violent reality makes it very 
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difficult for authorities, for institutions and for the population to see and 
understand differences. 
In the case of Colombia, right now, after the military defeat of the 
FARC in so many places and their weakened position in some others, I can 
say that almost all the military operations that the military forces are 
performing belong to the law enforcement paradigm and not to the 
hostilities paradigm. The main reason for this to happen is because the 
FARC to date lost the military capability that it had at the beginning of the 
century. But, there is something else. As you may know we are ending the 
war against the FARC but we still have another guerrilla force that is the 
ELN. There is something that might be new for you and could be 
interesting for professors here. Last April, the Colombian Government 
through a guideline gave the military forces and to the Police the possibility 
to confront criminal bands under international humanitarian law rules. The 
reason for doing so, is because these criminal bands crossed the legal 
threshold of NIAC (hostilities) to be consideredas armed groups. They are 
very well armed, they have a chain of command, they have positive control 
in some areas of the country and the level of violence they produce is 
higher than the riots and disorders, which are common in situations 
different from NIAC or IAC.  
So, what I want to say is: that independently of the end of NIAC with 
the FARC and probably with the ELN in the future, the Colombian military 
forces and the police will still be allowed to use IHL rules to confront the 
criminal reality of the country. This is not only the case of Colombia 
(Directive 15 and 16 of the Colombian Ministry of Defense, 2016). Peru 
has also a law approved by Congress and revised by the constitutional 
tribunal of that country allowing the military forces to face illegal 
organizations under special circumstances by using IHL or rules for 
hostilities. The norm, legislative decree number 1095, allows the military 
forces to use international humanitarian law rules in southern parts of Peru 
because in those places there are groups that pass this level of violence and 
can be confronted under this legal paradigm. 
To conclude the part of the issue of using military forces not only in a 
NIAC situation, but in law enforcement operations, I want to emphasise 
something that I believe is important: governments in Latin America will 
continue the tendency to use military forces to confront criminal situations 
inside the borders of each country. This is legal and produces a dissuasive 
effect on the criminals and a sense of security among the population. 
Common perception of security with military personnel patrolling streets in 
big cities is generally positive. Nowadays, as we can see in Colombia and 
Peru, it is possible to apply the rules of IHL (hostilities) independently of 
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the acceptance or the existence of a NIAC. This legal allowance to the 
military forces gives them a very good tool to be used in case of necessity. 
Also this reality generates a deterrence effect on those who want to subvert 
order in a democratic country.  
Furthermore, as Professor Dinstein said, and I completely agree with 
him, the key to succeed against these very violen and criminal groups is 
intelligence along with advanced technology, interaction, joint operations 
and coordinated operations. In the case of Colombia, the police is under the 
Ministry of Defense, so we have a Police that by the way is very 
militarized. The police, the army, the navy and the air force are under the 
same umbrella. Right now it is absolutely normal to perform operations 
between the Military Forces and the Police. So, one day it is feasible to see 
a Black Hawk helicopter from the Colombian Air Force performing an 
attack and launching bombs against the FARC or the ELN in the middle of 
the jungle, and the day after, the same helicopter participating with the 
Colombian Police in a law enforcement operation against illegal mining. In 
these cases the crew knows very well because of their training and the rules 
of engagement, that they cannot use lethal force or any kind of force to 
conduct this type of operation. The only reason why they are there is to 
protect the police and to allow them to stop and capture those committing 
illegal activities. To achieve this level of proficiency, you have to have 
political will, legal tools and training, and a sound knowledge of the 
operational environment. 
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Case study: law enforcement 
by military personnel1 
 
Françoise HAMPSON 
Essex University, United Kingdom; Member, IIHL 
I would emphasize that from the scenario we are to assume we are in a 
non-international armed conflict. Occasionally, I shall make reference to 
other contexts. 
I think the starting point is determining the law applicable. Which legal 
regime are you going to use? Is it LOAC, also known as IHL, or human 
rights law? It is more complicated than that. There’s just LOAC, then 
there’s a mixture of LOAC and human rights law, which does not mean a 
blending, but a mixture of bits of LOAC rules and bits of human rights 
rules (see Hassan). The third option is human rights law taking account the 
factual context of conflict – not taking into account LOAC but the fact of 
conflict - and then there is peacetime human rights law.  
So, there are four options. In order to identify the regime applicable you 
first have to characterize the situation. In this case, we have been told it is a 
NIAC. The second question that in practice you have to ask is: does the 
State acknowledge that you are dealing with a NIAC? Because, 
numerically, the majority of NIACs globally are within national territory 
and the State denies the applicability of the law of armed conflict. In this 
case, they cannot be surprised if everything has to be evaluated in terms of 
human rights law. Then you need to look at the kind of NIAC because I 
suspect that the regime applicable will vary depending on whether it is only 
just across the border of Common Article 3 or whether you are dealing with 
a situation like Syria, which is a high-intensity non-international armed 
conflict, and by high-intensity I mean there are concerted and sustained 
military operations on both sides. There does not have to be control of 
territory by the non-state party but often there will be. 
The next thing you have to consider to sort out the regime applicable is 
the situation in the particular place where the incident occurs, just because 
the general situation is one of non-international armed conflict does not 
mean that in the particular place where something occurs that armed 
conflict is going on. And then the key thing is the function that is being 
performed, not the label. Counterinsurgency per se is irrelevant, it matters 
that you know what you are doing there.  
                                                     
1 Text not revised by the author. 
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There is a useful distinction between the conduct of hostilities and law 
enforcement. By law enforcement I would include things like manning 
check points, ordinary patrols, intelligence-led detention operations, and 
police in demonstrations. Such kinds of things which can occur in an armed 
conflict context, I see as law enforcement. I think the starting point when 
you are dealing with law enforcement functions as opposed to the conduct 
of hostilities, will be human rights law taking into account the fact of the 
armed conflict. Human rights law bodies or law enforcement monitoring 
bodies will recognize that a situation can shift very easily from law 
enforcement to a conflict paradigm. For example, if you are trying to 
engage in intelligence-led detention you move towards a compound and as 
you advance towards it you encounter fire not only from within the 
compound but from the general vicinity. There, clearly, you have suddenly 
found yourself in hostilities. So, there is no problem in shifting from one to 
the other. 
The determination of the legal regime applicable affects the weapons 
that can be used, the circumstances in which you can open fire and the 
target against whom you can open fire. That is why I think it is essential to 
start by determining what the legal regime is because it then has significant 
knock on effects. 
There is an oddity in human rights decisions, particularly where you are 
dealing with a court. That means you have to handle with care previous 
decisions because they do not address questions in a logical order. They are 
looking to see whether or not the State has violated some aspect of human 
rights law. If they know they are going to find a violation with regard to 
issue X they may not consider logically prior issue Y. For example, in the 
Isayeva case, it would be rash to assume that all States are free to open fire 
with air strikes against civilian convoys in NIACs just because the ECHR is 
focused on proportionality. Similarly, in the Moscow theatre siege case, 
just because the focus was on the medical care available at the scene and 
the information given to doctors, does not mean to say that it will always be 
legitimate to use fentanyl or a fentanyl derivative in a context where you 
cannot control the dosage. So, handle with care previous cases because they 
are not dealing with all issues. That is why you need strategically to 
identify the legal regime applicable and not just base it on previous case-
law. 
Human rights bodies are good, not very good but good enough at taking 
into account the context of a conflict. To find a violation they will need 
more or different things in that context than you would in peacetime. But 
you have got to go along with them, you have got to be able to show, if you 
are using human rights law, that you took account of different possible 
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outcomes in your operation, say intelligence-led detention, that you bore in 
mind that it might end up in a fire fight but your starting point was your 
attempt to detain. You bore that in mind and it effected the equipment that 
you took with you. It affected the ROE. If you can show that, and that 
means some form of paper record, nothing complicated, then there is likely 
to be an understanding as to what happened. You cannot simply assert it 
but you do need to be able to establish that you have thought about these 
things, you do need a record. That means you need monitoring at the time. 
States have got used to the idea of monitoring in the context of criminal 
proceedings but I am not certain that enough systematic monitoring is done 
at the time not just for lessons learned but to define whether or not the 
State’s behaviour is compatible with the rules of state responsibility 
including both LOAC and human rights law.  
So, you have got to translate how a human rights body examining the 
issue years after the event will analyse the situation and convert that into 
rules that can be applied now for your Armed Forces. This is going to mean 
a huge emphasis on training and ROE because they are going to need to be 
able to operate in two modes for ease of reference: a rules of engagement 
mode or a LOAC mode. And they need to know, particularly the officers 
commanding them, when you switch. This is not rocket science. Armed 
Forces are very used to doing it. For example, in Northern Ireland where 
the British military were assisting the civil power, they effectively just had 
ordinary law enforcement (ROE); in the case of Colombia, we have heard 
before about the red rules and the blue rules. So, it is not too complicated to 
switch between two paradigms but you do need to have everything that 
enables you to switch. So you need the right equipment, and under human 
rights law, in some respects, it is more open than the law of armed conflict. 
For example, in some circumstances, you will be required to use dum-dum 
bullets or hollow point ammunition. In some circumstances, human rights 
bodies will require you to use tear gas. 
If you are going to use weapons that the military are not familiar with 
they need to be trained to use them and know when to use them. There 
needs to be very clear rules for weapon release and also for when the 
commander shifts from one to the other. There are some weapons I would 
be a bit surprised to see ratified by human rights bodies, analysing it in 
terms of human rights law. One could be a little surprised at air strikes and 
at the use of artillery if it is not conduct of hostilities. If what you are 
dealing with is conduct of hostilities in a high-intensity NIAC then I would 
suspect a human rights body would basically only find a violation of human 
rights law if there were a violation of LOAC. But that regards conduct of 
hostilities where you are supposed to be doing law enforcement even 
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though it can shift. You would not be expected to use those kinds of 
weapons.  
I shall throw out one of the things I think could be controversial. I 
mentioned it can affect who you can target. I suspect that outside conduct 
of hostilities in a high-intensity conflict the idea that you can target 
members of organized armed groups, leave aside the exercising of 
continuous combat function because none of you out there believe in it 
except for the ICRC, if you are just trying to target by membership it is 
very, very unlikely a human rights body will buy that with a possible 
exception of conduct of hostilities in a high-intensity NIAC. 
So, it is not just a weapons question, it is a question of: Who can you 
target? When can you open fire? I think generally speaking, there would 
not be a problem because self-defence means as soon as you come under 
fire you can start firing back. I think the problem could be who you can 
target and what weapons you might use. 
How to behave when you are definitely not in a non-international armed 
conflict but you have the Armed Forces of the State wandering around, 
allegedly to reassure the population, armed to the teeth in airports, stations, 
etc.? Let us assume there is no armed conflict, in this case it is clear that a 
human rights body will only use human rights law, possibly interpreting it 
with a little flexibility. It should not be a problem with regard to opening 
fire because all being well you are only going to open fire in self-defence or 
in the defence of others. However, the equipment they have got could cause 
problems if it is of a nature to cause significant collateral casualties. So, 
you do need to bear in mind how you equip your Armed Forces wandering 
around airports in order to protect people. 
Because if you have the police and the military in the same operation 
and that operation shifts from a law enforcement one to one subject to 
LOAC paradigm, where does that leave the police in terms of equipment, 
training and everything else? 
I think the key issue is the choice of weapons. I think soft law is a one-
way guide in peacetime. If you act consistently with the UN principles I 
don’t see how, apart from failing to give medical support, you would be 
found to be in violation of human rights law. But if you are not acting in 
conformity with those principles, I don’t think it necessarily means there’s 
a violation and the more you are in a conflict situation, even without 
formally evoking LOAC, the more flexibly you have to handle the UN soft 
law. The key issue is the choice of weapons and where I think there is a 
very real problem is hollow-point ammunition not helped by the Kampala 
amendment. As far as law enforcement is concerned there are 
circumstances in which in order to reduce the risk of harm to those in the 
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vicinity, a human rights court would require you to use hollow-point 
ammunition simply because it causes less harm to others in the vicinity. 
Now, this is not just an NIAC issue. I understand that the special forces in 
the United Kingdom, i.e. part of the military, are equipped with hollow-
point ammunition for certain operations where that is the appropriate thing 
to use. So, I imagine that sometimes they might be using it in international 
armed conflicts unless they have been trained not to. So, I think the issue of 
hollow-point ammunition is a problematic issue. I am reluctant to see the 
ban on their use in international armed conflicts shifted but I recognise that 
there may be circumstances where it is the least damaging thing to use. 
Madame Landais mentioned that it could be practically problematic to 
equip forces with different forms of weaponry. I think, as a starting point, 
that ought to be the goal where you are sending Armed Forces in to do law 
enforcement in a situation where there is a real risk that significant fighting 
might arise, then I think you need, as a backup, equipment you couldn’t use 
if it were merely law enforcement. Ideally, they need to have both available 
but that implies that there is going to be a shift that most of the time under 
law enforcement they won’t use some of it, but if it changes to a different 
kind of situation they might use it. What’s interesting there is that there is 
human rights case law that suggests that it is not just a matter of what you 
use and what you had available. A human rights court will not assume that 
all strikes can be carried out by precision-guided munitions - they are aware 
of budgetary issues but, nevertheless, if there is something fairly basic that 
you haven’t supplied your forces with, I think there is going to be a 
problem. 
On the question of training, one has to decipher all the things that are 
needed. Trainings differ between the Police, the Gendarmerie and the 
Armed Forces. The key element of the training is going to be the training of 
the officer who has the authority to shift the paradigm. That’s the key point 
in addition to easier training for soldiers on the ground. Moreover, it is 
really important that in the planning of the operations you take into account 
the risk of a shift in either direction or both and what the implications are 
and partly because you want to generate the paper work which will cover 
your back subsequently. You also need to monitor how your operations are 
going to see whether you seem to be getting it generally right, so don’t wait 
for litigation to perform the investigative function. 
On the issue of less lethal weapons, as far as the law of enforcement 
paradigm is concerned, they are not interested in the label, they are 
interested in what happens to an individual. It’s worth remembering as well 
that you can’t be subject to inhuman treatment once you are dead, but your 
next of kin can be. So, what happens to the state of a body is of particular 
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interest to human rights law because of the right of the next of kin not to be 
subjected to inhuman treatment and the military sport of loping off ears as 
souvenirs has been found to violate the prohibition of inhuman treatment 
with regard to the next of kin in the case of Akkum, Akan and Karakoç in 
Turkey. 
I think the distinction between the two are important but that doesn’t 
mean you have only got one answer in LOAC and only one answer in 
human rights law. Be careful with the cases against Russia, because Russia 
has not derogated, it has not evoked the law of armed conflict, so officially 
the European Court of Human Rights can’t use LOAC, but it does take into 
account the factual situation. In the Isayeva case they did express surprise 
that you use airstrikes as part of law enforcement, but there was another 
ground on which they could find a violation which was proportionality. So, 
we don’t know if another State that didn’t have a proportionality problem 
would be allowed to do it. But it is clear that where there is a factual 
background of conflict they will apply the relevant provisions of the 
Convention in a different way from complete peacetime. That doesn’t mean 
it is appropriate to have a complete elision between the law of armed 
conflict and human rights law. We are not going to get to the stage where 
it’s quite O.k. for dealing with a demonstration to bomb it. That’s why it is 
really important to keep the distinction that to be able to open fire, without 
it being necessarily responsive, you don’t want that as part of law 
enforcement, but you do want it as part of LOAC. Certain forms of 
weaponry would be completely inappropriate to use in a law enforcement 
context, but it’s obvious you need them in armed conflicts. Both areas are 
needed, but this doesn’t mean that human rights law in time of armed 
conflicts is the same as in time of peace. Actually, even in LOAC there’s 
flexibility because things like proportionality, the principle of necessity and 
so on, affect what you do even within the LOAC framework. There are 
obviously sliding scales within both, but keep them in different categories. 
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Case study: law enforcement 
by military personnel1 
Laurent GISEL 
Legal Adviser, Legal Division, International Committee 
of the Red Cross, Geneva 
 
This presentation will discuss certain aspects raised by the two questions 
put forward by the Chair.2 Addressing the first question, I will start by 
laying out the International Committee of the Red Cross’s (ICRC) 
understanding of the interplay between the conduct of hostilities and law-
enforcement paradigms. I will then discuss some specific situations that 
military forces may encounter in current armed conflicts. Turning to the 
second question, I will first address implementation, training and 
equipment in general. I will then end by discussing a number of important 
points with regard to specific types of weapons that military personnel may, 
should or indeed may not use when carrying out law enforcement 
operations in armed conflicts.  
Let me turn first to the paradigms that govern the use of force in 
different situations.  
The ICRC distinguishes between the conduct of hostilities paradigm and 
the law-enforcement paradigm.  
The conduct of hostilities paradigm consists of the principles and rules 
which govern the employment of means and methods of warfare in armed 
conflict. This paradigm belongs to international humanitarian law (IHL) 
exclusively and, therefore, cannot be resorted to outside of armed conflict.  
The law-enforcement paradigm governs the use of force in all other 
situations. It consists of rules mainly derived from international human 
rights law, and more specifically from the prohibition of arbitrary 
                                                     
1 The views expressed in this presentation are those of the author alone and do not 
necessarily reflect the views of the ICRC. The author would like to thank Neil Davison for 
his useful comments on earlier drafts of this presentation. 
2 Question 1: Armed forces are called upon to carry out law enforcement functions by 
resorting to military-type weapons and equipment. Can you explain to us the ICRC’s 
approach in this respect, particularly also in light of the Challenges Report submitted to the 
last RC Conference? 
Question 2: States basic obligations with regard to the equipment and training of 
personnel engaged in law enforcement operations and on the obligations of such personnel 
with regard to the choice of weapons during law enforcement operations. What is the 
ICRC’s position in this respect? 
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deprivation of life,3 which regulate the use of force by State authorities 
when maintaining or restoring public security, law and order. The law-
enforcement paradigm, therefore, governs any use of force outside 
situations of armed conflict. It also governs any use of force within 
situations of armed conflict, when such a use of force does not amount to 
hostilities. IHL likewise contains a few rules related to the law-enforcement 
paradigm. This is the case in particular for the maintenance of public order 
and safety by an occupying power,4 and for the use of force in detention 
settings.5 More generally, the law-enforcement paradigm governs any use 
of force against a person who is not a lawful target under IHL at the time 
that force is used. The law of naval warfare also contains principles and 
rules on the use of force that might be considered akin to law enforcement, 
notably for enforcing blockades, but these are outside the scope of this 
presentation.6  
The principles and rules governing the use of force within these two 
paradigms have important differences. Though some of the principles share 
the same name, such as the principle of “proportionality”, they nevertheless 
have distinct meanings and operate differently under each paradigm.7 It is, 
                                                     
3 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 3; International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, Art. 6; American Convention on Human Rights, Art. 4; European 
Convention on Human Rights, Art. 2; African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Art. 
4; Arab Charter on Human Rights, Art. 5. 
4 According to Article 43 of the 1907 Hague Regulation: “the authority of the 
legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take 
all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and 
safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.” 
See notably ICRC, Expert Meeting Report, Occupation and Other Forms of 
Administration of Foreign Territory, Third Meeting of Experts: The Use of Force in 
Occupied Territory, prepared by Tristan Ferraro, ICRC, Geneva, Switzerland, April 2012, 
available at: www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/publications/icrc-002-4094.pdf. 
5 Article 42 of the Third 1949 Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners 
of War establishes that the use of weapons against those “who are escaping or attempting to 
escape, shall constitute an extreme measure, which shall always be preceded by warnings 
appropriate to the circumstances.”  
6 See San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea, 
June 1994, para.s 98, as well as 50 to 52 and 57, available at: www.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/ 
560?OpenDocument.  
7 For a summary of some of these differences, see ICRC, International Humanitarian 
Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts, Geneva, Switzerland, October 
2011, (hereinafter ICRC 2011 IHL Challenges Report) p. 18-19, available at www.icrc.org/ 
eng/assets/files/red-cross-crescent-movement/31st-international-conference/31-int-conference- 
ihl-challenges-report-11-5-1-2-en.pdf, and ICRC, Expert Meeting: The use of force in armed 
conflicts, Interplay between the conduct of hostilities and law enforcement paradigms, 
Report prepared by Gloria Gaggioli, ICRC, Geneva, November 2013 (hereinafter, ICRC Use 
of Force Report), pp. 8-9 available at:. www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/publications/icrc-002-
4171.pdf. 
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therefore, crucial to identify which paradigm governs a particular use of 
force. Significantly, both paradigms can apply in parallel to the same 
situation - I will elaborate on this later - but even in these situations of 
parallel application, it is necessary to know which paradigm applies to 
every specific instance in which force is used. 
The law enforcement paradigm operates as the default paradigm, while 
the conduct of hostilities paradigm operates as the lex specialis, in the way 
that IHL operates for armed conflicts in general.8 Accordingly, the most 
conducive way to identify which paradigm applies is to first determine 
when the rules governing the conduct of hostilities apply; any other 
situation is governed by the law-enforcement paradigm. Strategies or labels 
that have no legal bearing, such as “counter-insurgency” mentioned in the 
case study outline, do not influence the paradigm applicable as a matter of 
law - though obviously belligerents remain entitled to order their armed 
forces to follow more restrictive rules.  
To determine whether the conduct of hostilities paradigm applies the 
first question is whether there is a situation of armed conflict. This is 
indeed the case for this panel case study, as our discussion is situated in the 
framework of a non-international armed conflict (NIAC). The second 
question is whether the use of force takes place within the scope of 
application of IHL. In a NIAC, IHL in general applies to the entire territory 
under the control of the parties to the conflict whether or not hostilities take 
place there - this stems from the wording of Common Article 3 as well as 
from the case-law of the ICTY.9 Only after these two initial questions have 
been addressed can we move to address the question of which paradigm 
should be applied to a specific instance of the use of force.  
In January 2012, the ICRC organized an expert meeting to discuss 
precisely this question.10 The ICRC published its own view on some of 
these issues in its 2015 report entitled “International humanitarian law and 
                                                     
8 Nils Melzer and Gloria Gaggioli Gasteyger, ‘Conceptual Distinction and Overlaps 
Between Law Enforcement and the  
Conduct of Hostilities’ in Terry D. Gill and Dieter Fleck (eds), The Handbook of the 
International Law of Military Operations, 2nd edition, Oxford University Press, 2015, para.s 
4.04 (1 and 2) pp. 75f.  
9 ICRC, Commentary on the First Geneva Convention: Convention (I) for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 2nd 
edition, ICRC/CUP, Geneva, 2016, para.s 457 to 459, and references therein (hereinafter 
ICRC, Commentary on the First Geneva Convention, 2016), available at: https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Comment.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=59F
6CDFA490736C1C1257F7D004BA0EC#_Toc465169871. 
10 ICRC Use of Force Report, note 7 above. 
122 
the challenges of contemporary armed conflicts”,11 on which much of this 
presentation relies.  
The ICRC, alongside the experts it consulted in 2012, holds that the 
defining criterion for determining which rules govern the use of force 
against a particular individual under IHL is whether such a person is a 
lawful target under the conduct of hostilities paradigm.  
Conversely, if force needs to be used against persons who are protected 
against attack, this force will be governed by the law enforcement paradigm 
rather than by the conduct of hostilities paradigm. As noted above, this 
could be the case for the use of force against detainees, or the use of force 
in the face of a threat that has no nexus to the conflict and, therefore, does 
not amount to direct participation in hostilities.12  
It is important to note that the relevant question is not who is using 
force, but against whom force is used. Indeed, the same rules apply whether 
it is the military, the police or other paramilitary or law-enforcement 
agencies using force.  
In our view, whether the target is a military objective under IHL is the 
defining criteria which determines which use of force paradigm is 
applicable within the entire geographical scope of application of IHL in 
international armed conflicts (IAC).13  
The situation is more complicated in NIACs, for a range of reasons, and 
therefore in NIACs the assessment of which paradigm applies requires a 
fact-specific analysis of the interplay between the relevant IHL and 
international human rights law (IHRL) rules.14 While IHL does not bar 
parties to a NIAC from using force under the conduct of hostilities 
paradigm against lawful targets in situations of hostilities, there is some 
debate with regard to the use of force against isolated fighters. This is in 
particular the case for isolated individuals who would normally be lawful 
targets under the rules of the conduct of hostilities, but in situations when 
such individuals are within the territory of the parties to the conflict15 but in 
an area removed from where the fighting is taking place.  
                                                     
11 See ICRC, International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary 
Armed Conflicts, Geneva, Switzerland, October 2015 (hereinafter ICRC 2015 IHL 
Challenges Report), pp. 32ff, available at: www.icrc.org/en/download/file/15061/32ic-
report-on-ihl-and-challenges-of-armed-conflicts.pdf.  
12 ICRC, Commentary on the First Geneva Convention, 2016, note 9 above, para. 460.  
13 ICRC 2015 IHL Challenges Report, note 11 above, p. 35, and ICRC 2011 IHL 
Challenges Report, note 7 above, pp. 19-20.  
14 ICRC 2011 IHL Challenges Report, note 7 above, p. 20. 
15 The issue discussed here is therefore distinct from the debate about the targeting of 
individuals in the territory of non-belligerent States; on this latter issue, see e.g. ICRC 2015 
IHL Challenges Report, note 11 above, pp. 12-16, as well as Jelena Pejic, ‘Extraterritorial 
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In this scenario, three positions may be said to exist:  
 The first position holds that the rules on the conduct of hostilities 
apply to the use of force against lawful targets in NIAC with no 
restraints other than those found in specific IHL rules, even when 
these individual are in an area removed from the fighting.16 The 
ICRC does not share this view.  
 The second view holds that the principles of military necessity and 
humanity require that the kind and degree of force used does not 
exceed what is necessary to accomplish a legitimate military 
objective. The ICRC submitted this position in Recommendation IX 
of its “Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities”.17 We are aware that this recommendation attracted 
criticism, notably for allegedly introducing IHRL standards within 
IHL.18 This latter criticism shows a misunderstanding of the 
recommendation, as the recommendation is drawn from the two main 
principles at the heart of the entire body of IHL - military necessity 
and humanity. It, therefore, does not introduce an IHRL standard 
within IHL,19 and on the contrary is “without prejudice to further 
restriction that may arise under other applicable branches of 
international law” - a reference notably to IHRL.20  
 The third view holds precisely that the use of force in such a 
situation would instead be governed by the law enforcement 
                                                                                                                          
targeting by means of armed drones: Some legal implications’, International Review of the 
Red Cross (2014), Vol. 96, No. 893, pp. 67-106, available at: www.icrc.org/en/ 
download/file/11954/irrc-893-pejic.pdf. 
16 See e.g. W. Hays Parks, ‘Part IX of the ICRC “Direct Participation in Hostilities” 
Study: No Mandate, No Expertise, and Legally Incorrect’, N.Y.U. Journal of International 
Law and Politics, Vol. 42, 2009-2010, pp 769-830, and Michael N. Schmitt, ‘The 
Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities: A Critical 
Analysis’, Harvard National Security Journal, Vol. 1, 2010, pp. 5-44, at pp. 39-43. 
17 ICRC, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities 
under International Humanitarian Law, ICRC, Geneva, 2009, (hereinafter ICRC DPH 
Guidance) pp. 77ff, available at: www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc-002-0990.pdf. In 
the ICRC’s view, this recommendation applies for IAC and NIAC. 
18 See references in note 16 above. For a support of the position that “LOAC forbids, in 
some circumstances, killing an enemy fighter when doing so is manifestly unnecessary - for 
instance, when capture is equally effective and does not endanger the attacking party’s 
armed forces,” see Ryan Goodman, ‘The Power to Kill or Capture Enemy Combatants’, The 
European Journal of International Law, Vol. 24, No. 3, pp. 819-853, at p. 853. 
19 Nils Melzer, ‘Keeping the balance between military necessity and humanity: a 
response to four critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct 
Participation in Hostilities’ New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, 
Vol. 42, 2010, pp 831 ff, at pp. 899-904. 
20 ICRC DPH Guidance, note 17 above, p. 82. 
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paradigm (which is by far more restrictive than Recommendation 
IX),21 in particular, when the operation takes place in territory under 
the firm and stable control of the government and in an area where 
there are no hostilities and no enemy re-enforcement is expected.22 
The scenario proposed indeed begs the question of whether the use 
of force in such a situation amounts to “hostilities”, with “hostilities” 
being the collective resort by parties to an armed conflict to means 
and methods of warfare.23  
 
It can be further noted that in practice, reasons other than the law may 
lead a belligerent to capture an enemy rather than kill him when this is 
feasible such as, for example, the possibility of gathering intelligence 
through the interrogation of captured enemy personnel.  
In today’s conflicts military forces also face situations where lawful 
targets and protected persons are simultaneously present in the same area. 
In these situations, soldiers may need to use force against both 
simultaneously. A civilian demonstration during an armed conflict may 
create such a situation, for example, if enemy fighters are present in the 
middle of a crowd. Significantly, the presence of enemy fighters does not 
change the crowd’s civilian character.24 Violent forms of civil unrest will 
often aim to express dissatisfaction with the authorities, but this violence 
does not amount to direct participation in hostilities even if it is directly 
                                                     
21 Melzer, note 19 above, pp. 899-904.  
22 See e.g. Marco Sassòli and Laura Olson, ‘The relationship between international 
humanitarian and human rights law where it matters: admissible killing and internment of 
fighters in non-international armed conflicts’, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 
90, No. 871, September 2008, p. 614. Sassòli and Olson recommend a sliding scale 
approach, and conclude notably that “A government cannot simply argue that the presence 
of a solitary rebel or even a group of rebels on a stable part of its territory indicates that in 
fact it is not fully in control of the place, and therefore act under humanitarian law as lex 
specialis. The question is rather one of degree. If a government could effect an arrest (of 
individuals or groups) without being overly concerned about interference by other rebels in 
that operation, then it has sufficient control over the place to make human rights prevail as 
lex specialis.” See also David Kretzmer, Aviad Ben-Yehuda and Meirav Furth, ‘‘Thou shall 
not kill’: the use of lethal force in non-international armed conflicts’, Israel Law Review, 
Vol. 47, No. 2, 2014, pp. 191-224.  
23 The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia noted that “Although 
the Geneva Conventions are silent as to the geographical scope of international ‘armed 
conflicts,’ the provisions suggest that at least some of the provisions of the Conventions 
apply to the entire territory of the Parties to the conflict, not just to the vicinity of actual 
hostilities. Certainly, some of the provisions are clearly bound up with the hostilities and the 
geographical scope of those provisions should be so limited” (ICTY, Prosecutor v. D. 
Tadić, Appeals Chamber, Decision of 2 October 1995, case IT-94-1-AR72, para.s 68-69, 
emphasis added). 
24 Art. 50(3) AP I.  
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aimed at soldiers or law-enforcement officials.25 The use of force to 
manage such a demonstration and face the threat that the crowd - or 
individual civilians within the crowd - might pose remains governed by the 
rules on law enforcement operations, which is usually called crowd control 
measures. This being said, if fighters are present in the middle of the 
crowd, IHL does not prohibit the application of conduct of hostilities rules 
to specifically target these fighters - provided that this targeting can be 
carried out in full respect of the conduct of hostilities requirements 
including the principles of proportionality and precautions, which require 
taking into account the risk of harming the civilians in the crowd. We refer 
to this as the “parallel approach”: namely the application of the hostilities 
and law-enforcement paradigms at the same time and place, but for distinct 
instances of the use of force depending on the person against whom the 
belligerents are using force.26 However, if it were to prove too difficult to 
distinguish the violent civilians from the enemy fighters, it might be 
appropriate to deal with the entire situation under the law enforcement 
paradigm, and apply an escalation of force procedure with respect to all 
persons posing a threat.27 
The last situation I will discuss arises when it is not clear whether a 
person is a lawful target. This often occurs at check-points, many of which 
are manned by military forces during armed conflict. Manning check-points 
is normally governed by the law enforcement paradigm. When a person (or 
vehicle) approaches a check-point and does not slow down as instructed, or 
otherwise disregards signs or orders by the officials manning the check-
point, it may not be immediately evident whether the person actually poses 
a threat, and if so whether the person is a lawful target. It is submitted that a 
lack of respect for a military order alone does not amount to direct 
participation in hostilities and is, therefore, not sufficient to permit the use 
of lethal or potentially lethal force. In case of doubt as to whether such a 
person is a lawful target, he or she must be presumed to be protected 
against attack.28 An escalation of force procedure must, therefore, be 
applied - this is in fact how military forces manning check-points usually 
proceed, and indeed are required to proceed by their rules of engagement 
                                                     
25 Violence may become direct participation in hostilities only when it exhibits the 
necessary belligerent nexus, namely it must be specifically designed to harm soldiers or law-
enforcement officials in support of a party to the conflict and to the detriment of the other; 
see ICRC DPH Guidance, note 17 above, p. 63.  
26 ICRC 2015 IHL Challenges Report, note 11 above p. 35, ICRC Use of Force Report, 
note 7 above, p. 25ff.  
27 ICRC 2015 IHL Challenges Report, note 11 above, p. 36.  
28 Art. 50(1) AP I and ICRC DPH Guidance, note 17 above, Recommendation VIII, pp. 
74ff.  
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(ROE).29 Beyond ROE, the requirement to carry out an escalation of force 
procedure stems from the principle of necessity under IHRL. It should be 
noted, however, that the application of the IHL requirement to take all 
feasible precautions to verify that a target is a military objective would lead 
to a similar need for an escalation of measures until the status of the target 
has been ascertained.30 If it can be ascertained that the person approaching 
the checkpoint is a lawful target under the rules on the conduct of 
hostilities, then this person may be directly targeted. 
I will now turn to the Chair’s second question. As mentioned at the 
outset of the presentation, I will first address national implementation, 
training and equipment generally, and then proceed to address some issues 
related to specific weapons.  
IHL and IHRL require that the legal obligations imposed by the conduct 
of hostilities and law enforcement paradigms are integrated into domestic 
law. IHL notably requires that States enact legislation to provide penal 
sanctions for grave breaches,31 and more generally that they take numerous 
steps to implement IHL.32 Under IHRL, the right to life must be “protected 
by law”, which means in particular that States have an obligation to 
establish an adequate legal and administrative framework limiting the use 
of force to the maximum extent possible.33 This framework should extend 
                                                     
29 See e.g. International Institute of Humanitarian Law, San Remo Handbook on Rules of 
Engagement, Appendix 5 to Annex A, Escalation of Force in Self-defence, para.s 5.4 (d): 
“5.4 General Considerations. There are a number of general considerations that should be 
taken into account in relation to EOF policy, options, and training: (…) (d) Force 
preparation should include scenario-based training in EOF situations that members of the 
Force are likely to encounter during the operation, such as checkpoint or access control 
operations” (available at: www.iihl.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/ROE-HANDBOOK-
ENGLISH.pdf). For example, an April 2010 amendment of the ISAF standard operating 
procedure on escalation of force procedure “gave soldiers more options for warning drivers 
at a distance, (…). These include laser dazzlers, paint ball guns, and even chalk bullets”, 
which reportedly led to a drop in civilian casualties (John Bohannon, ‘Counting the Dead in 
Afghanistan’, Science Vol. 331, No. 6022, March 2011, pp. 1256ff, at p. 1260).  
30 See ICRC Use of Force Report, note 7 above, p. 41; Art. 57(2)(a)(i) AP I; ICRC, 
Customary International Humanitarian Law, Vol. I: Rules, Jean-Marie Henckaerts and 
Louise Doswald-Beck (eds), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005 (hereinafter 
ICRC Customary IHL Study), Rule 16 (available at https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-
ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule16).  
31 Art.s 49 GC I, 50 GC II, 128 GC III, 145 GC IV and 84 AP I. 
32 See ICRC, Implementing International Humanitarian Law: from Law to Action, 
Advisory services in IHL, 2002, available at www.icrc.org/en/document/implementing-
international-humanitarian-law-law-action.  
33 See references in note 3 above; See also: Basic Principles on the Use of Force and 
Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials (Adopted by the Eighth United Nations Congress on 
the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, Cuba, 27 August to 7 
September 1990, hereinafter UN Basic Principles), Principles 1 and 11; Human Rights 
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to ROE, which constitute a useful and necessary tool for regulating the use 
of force in armed conflict situations.34 In particular, ROE applicable in 
NIAC should include not only rules on the use of force against lawful 
targets under IHL, but also rules on the force that may be used outside 
hostilities. As these rules differ, it is necessary that the legal and 
administrative framework in place - including ROE - identifies the 
situations in which each legal paradigm and set of rules of engagement 
apply. In addition (and as noted earlier), States may decide to adopt legal 
and administrative frameworks going beyond what is required under 
international law. Taking the example of check-points given earlier, States 
may decide to apply rules of engagement providing for an escalation of 
force as required by IHRL, irrespective of whether the person is a lawful 
target under the conduct of hostilities paradigm.  
Appropriate training and equipment are necessary to put these rules into 
practice. Training is required both by IHL (implicit in the obligation to 
disseminate knowledge of IHL)35 and IHRL,36 and IHRL also requires that 
law enforcement operations are planned to avoid the use of force in the first 
place. This latter obligation implicitly requires the provision of self-
defensive equipment, in order to reduce the need to use force of any kind, 
and “less-lethal” weapons (such as hand-held batons, rubber bullets, and/or 
riot control agents) in order to allow a differentiated use of force, often 
called an escalation of force procedure.37 An obligation to provide armed 
forces with law enforcement means such as these can also be derived from 
IHL in some circumstances: for example, the duty to ensure law and order 
in the law of occupation,38 or the quelling of riots in detention settings,39 
necessarily imply a duty to have appropriate law enforcement means. It is 
                                                                                                                          
Committee, General Comment No. 6, The Right to Life (article 6), 30 April 1982, UN Doc. 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1, para. 3.  
34 See ICRC Use of Force Report, note 7 above, p. 45.  
35 See Art.s 47 GC I, 48 GC II, 127 GC III, 144 GC IV, 83 AP I and 19 AP II; ICRC 
Customary IHL Study, note 30 above, Rules 142 and 143. See also ICRC, Commentary on 
the First Geneva Convention, 2016, note 9 above para.s 2773 - 2776, available at https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Comment.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=E9
25A7160C083CC9C1257F15004A58D9#_Toc452053772.  
36 UN Basic Principles, note 33 above, Principles 18-21. See also ECtHR, Hamiyet 
Kaplan and others v. Turkey, 13 September 2005; HRC, Rickly Burrell v. Jamaica, 18 July 
1996, UN Doc. CCPR/C/53/D/546/1993, para. 9.5; IACtHR, Montero-Aranguren et al v. 
Venezuela, 5 July 2006, para.s 77-78; IACtHR, Zambrano Vélez et al. c. Ecuador, 4 July 
2007, para. 87.  
37 UN Basic Principles, note 33 above, Principles 2-4. See also ECtHR, Güleç v. Turkey, 
27 July 1998; ECtHR, Hamiyet Kaplan and others v. Turkey, 13 September 2005.  
38 See ICRC Use of Force Report, note 7 above, p. 47. 
39 See Art. 42 GC III; ICRC, Commentary on the Third Geneva Convention, Jean Pictet 
(ed.) ICRC, Geneva, 1960, p. 246; ICRC Use of Force Report, note 7 above, pp. 33-34.  
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important to keep in mind, however, that despite their denomination, “less-
lethal” (also sometimes referred to as “less-than-lethal”) weapons can cause 
serious injury, and even kill, depending on the specific weapon and the 
particular circumstances of its use (e.g. a plastic bullet at close range, or 
riot control agents in enclosed spaces) in the same way that a weapon 
described as “lethal” can have a non-fatal outcome in some circumstances 
(e.g. causing a non-fatal injury). 
Traditionally, armed forces are trained and equipped to carry out 
hostilities. IHL rules governing the conduct of hostilities recognize that the 
use of lethal force is inherent to waging war, given that the ultimate aim of 
military operations is to prevail over the enemy’s Armed Forces,40 and 
military forces are trained and equipped accordingly. Conversely, police 
forces are trained and equipped to refrain from the use of force to the 
maximum extent possible.  
However, whether the State officials who use force are members of the 
Armed Forces or of the police is not relevant for identifying the applicable 
paradigm under international law, even though this may be an important 
consideration under domestic law. In practice, if Armed Forces use force 
against persons protected against direct attack, including against civilians 
who pose a threat that does not amount to direct participation in hostilities, 
the rules on the use of force in law enforcement operations apply. For 
example, the United Nations Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement 
Officials specifies that “[i]n countries where police powers are exercised by 
military authorities, whether uniformed or not, or by State security forces, 
the definition of law enforcement officials shall be regarded as including 
officers of such services.”41 Conversely, if police forces take a direct part in 
hostilities against lawful targets under IHL, they must respect the IHL rules 
on the conduct of hostilities.  
Consequently, in situations in which military forces are reasonably 
expected to use force under the law enforcement paradigm, they must be 
able to do so in compliance with the law. There is no doubt, however, that 
this, in practice, is challenging. Because the mind-set, training, equipment 
and operating procedures of the two paradigms are so disparate, one 
approach - favoured notably by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
                                                     
40 See e.g. the description of the principle of military necessity in United Kingdom, The 
Joint Service Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, JSP 383, 2004, para. 2.2 (as amended in 
September 2010).  
41 Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, adopted by General Assembly 
Resolution 34/169 of 17 December 1979, Commentary (b) on Art. 1.  
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(IACtHR)42 - could be to ensure that the officials tasked with carrying out 
law-enforcement operations are distinct from military forces tasked with 
carrying out hostilities. There are different manners of achieving this in 
practice: for example, by refraining from allowing military forces to 
conduct law enforcement operations alone and instead planning joint 
operations where military forces act in support of the police; or by setting 
up special units, such as the gendarmerie, carabinieri or military law 
enforcement forces, that are qualified and highly trained to conduct law-
enforcement missions involving relevant crowd-control and de-escalation 
techniques.43  
Whatever the approach adopted, the level of training and equipment 
should be adapted to the situation and reflect the likelihood of having to use 
force under the law-enforcement paradigm. Whenever considering 
engaging in an operation against persons who are not lawful targets, 
military forces must respect the law-enforcement paradigm from the 
inception of the operation, namely by ensuring that troops are trained and 
equipped and that the operation is planned accordingly. Furthermore, 
whenever troops might reasonably be expected to encounter situations 
where they will be required to apply the law enforcement paradigm, 
including the use of force against protected civilians - a likely occurrence in 
current conflicts - soldiers must be appropriately trained in and equipped 
for law enforcement techniques, so as to be able to switch mind-set 
between the two paradigms.44 
Let me now address the final issue of this presentation, namely weapons 
that military forces may, should or indeed may not use when carrying out 
law enforcement operations in armed conflicts.  
Law enforcement operations cover a very broad range of situations, 
from arresting a suspect who is otherwise a peaceful individual, to 
confronting a group of heavily-armed criminals. The choice of weapons, if 
any, must therefore always depend on the specificities of the situation; 
weapons that are appropriate in one situation may not be suitable in 
another. Contrary to IHL, IHRL does not expressly prohibit specific 
weapons, but with a couple of notable exceptions discussed below, the use 
                                                     
42 Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), case of Montero-Aranguren et al 
(Detention Center of Catia) v. Venezuela, Judgment of July 5, 2006 (Preliminary 
Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs), para. 78. See also ICRC, Violence and the Use 
of Force, Sept. 2015, p. 41, available at: http://icrcndresourcecentre.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2016/03/icrc-002-0943-11.pdf.  
43 ICRC Use of Force Report, note 7 above, p. 47.  
44 ICRC 2015 IHL Challenges Report, note 11 above, p. 37; see also ICRC Use of Force 
Report, note 7 above, pp. 47-8.  
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of weapons is governed by much more restrictive rules under the law-
enforcement paradigm than under the conduct of hostilities paradigm.  
To analyse the lawfulness of a weapon, it is important to look at the 
specific weapon system, namely both the weapon and the ammunition. The 
outcome of the use of any weapon will depend on a combination of factors, 
including, in particular, the technical characteristics of the weapon (its 
mechanism of injury), the context of its use and the vulnerability of the 
victim.45  
As the case-study at issue is about military forces in a NIAC, it is 
important to consider automatic weapons and explosive weapons, as these 
are the two categories of weapons most often used by military forces during 
armed conflicts. Let me first recall, however, that “[t]he use of firearms [by 
law-enforcement officials] is considered an extreme measure”.46 
Several judgements of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
and IACtHR on situations that involved the use of explosive weapons or 
automatic weapons concluded that such use was illegal in the particular 
circumstance of the case.47 In one of the few cases where the ECtHR has 
identified that a weapon was switched to automatic mode, it noted that the 
law-enforcement official “could not possibly have aimed with any 
reasonable degree of accuracy using automatic fire”.48 However, I am not 
aware of any express statements from the ECtHR or the IACtHR which 
would stipulate in a definitive manner that the use of explosive weapons or 
of automatic weapons in full automatic mode would necessarily always be 
unlawful under IHRL. Some ECtHR judgments indeed leave open whether 
their use was illegal while finding a violation of the right to life for other 
reasons, such as because of inadequate investigation after the operation.49 
Furthermore, in one case in which mortar and grenades had been used, the 
ECtHR considered that the use of force “cannot be regarded as entailing a 
                                                     
45 Neil Davison, ‘New Weapons: Legal and Policy Issues Associated with Weapons 
Described as ‘Non-lethal’’, in Dan Saxon (ed.), International Humanitarian Law and the 
Changing Technology of War, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden Boston, 2013, pp 281-
313, at 281.  
46 Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, note 41 above, Commentary (c) on 
Art. 3.  
47 ECtHR, Gül v. Turkey, Judgment 14 December 2000, para. 82; ECtHR, Isayeva and 
others v. Russia, Judgment 24 May 2005, para. 178; IACtHR, Santo Domingo Massacre v. 
Colombia, Judgment of November 30, 2012 (Preliminary objections, merits and 
reparations), para.s 221, 229, 230 and 282; IACtHR, Neira Alegria et al v. Peru, Judgment 
of 19 January 1995 (Merits), para. 74. 
48 ECtHR, Nachova and others v. Bulgaria, Applications no.s. 43577/98 and 43579/98, 
Judgment 6 July 2005, para. 108. 
49 ECtHR, Cangöz and others v. Turkey, Judgment 26 April 2016, para. 149. 
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disproportionate degree of force”.50 It is worth noting though that some 
hold that ECtHR case-law has addressed situations in which IHL was 
arguably relevant, but wherein the Court did not consider IHL notably 
because the States concerned denied its applicability.51 This situation raises 
the question of whether these decisions can be considered to amount to 
conclusive statements on the appropriateness of the use of automatic 
weapons or explosive weapons under the law-enforcement paradigm in 
other situations. 
While some national laws foresee the possibility of using automatic 
weapons and even some explosive weapons in very exceptional 
circumstances, a strong condemnation of the use of automatic rifles in law-
enforcement operations can be found in the Marikana Commission of 
Inquiry’s final report.52 Amnesty International has also argued that fully 
automatic weapons, as well as any weapon designed to kill, (including 
explosive weapons), may only be used in extreme situations.53 
In any case, the use of any weapon must always be consistent with 
international legal standards on its use. Accordingly, it is submitted that any 
weapon whose effects cannot be strictly controlled so as to be necessary, 
proportionate to the seriousness of the offence and the legitimate law 
enforcement objective, and consistent with the obligations to limit damage 
and injury and to avoid risks to bystanders are, therefore, not suitable for 
use under the law-enforcement paradigm. 
In light of these requirements, assault rifles in fully automatic mode (or 
multiple shot mode) and other fully automatic weapons,54 as well as 
explosive weapons such as fragmentation grenades, mortars, rockets, 
bombs and missiles, will generally be inconsistent with international 
standards on the use of force in law enforcement. Fully automatic fire is 
                                                     
50 ECtHR, Ahmet Özkan and Others v. Turkey, Judgement, Application No. 21689/93, 6 
April 2004, para. 305. 
51 Françoise Hampson, ‘The case-law of the European Court of Human Rights and the 
Use of Force’, Written Statement, in ICRC Use of Force Report, note 7 above, Appendix 3 
pp. 69ff, at pp. 75f; Maya Brehm, Protecting Civilians from the Effects of Explosive 
Weapons, An Analysis of International Legal and Policy Standards, UNIDIR, 2012, pp. 
115ff.  
52 Marikana Commission of Inquiry, South Africa, 31 March 2015, p. 547, available at 
www.sahrc.org.za/home/21/files/marikana-report-1.pdf.  
53 Amnesty International, ‘Use of Force, Guidelines for Implementation of the UN Basic 
Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials’, August 2015, 
pp. 35 and 121 (hereinafter AI Use of Force Guidelines).  
54 Automatic or multiple shot mode is understood here as weapons that fire two or more 
shots when the trigger is held down for a prolonged time. It must be distinguished from 
single shot or semi-automatic modes that require the repeated pulling of the trigger for each 
shot.  
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inaccurate and cannot be controlled to target the specific person posing a 
threat. For fragmentation explosive weapons, it is difficult to discern how 
they could satisfy the strict criteria for the use of force in law enforcement; 
it is indeed unlikely that such explosive weapons will be the lowest 
possible level of force necessary to achieve any given legitimate law 
enforcement aim.55  
Let me end by highlighting that the conduct of hostilities paradigm is 
more restrictive than the law-enforcement paradigm with regard to the use 
of two specific weapons, and by briefly recalling the reasons justifying 
such an exceptional situation.  
The use of riot control agents, commonly referred to as ‘tear gas’, as a 
method of warfare, is prohibited during the conduct of hostilities.56 
Conversely, the use of riot control agents is permitted for law enforcement 
including domestic riot control purposes;57 for example, the use of riot 
control agents instead of firearms in order to disperse a violent crowd might 
even be required under the law-enforcement paradigm, whether employed 
by police or military forces.58 Let me recall in this regard the ICRC’s view 
that the use of toxic chemicals for law enforcement should be limited to riot 
control agents only, as defined in the Chemical Weapons Convention, and 
that international law leaves little room, if any, for the legitimate use of 
other toxic chemicals, including highly toxic anaesthetic and sedative 
chemicals.59 While the prohibition of the use of a legitimate law-
enforcement means as a method of warfare might be surprising at first 
                                                     
55 Brehm, note 51 above, p. 110.  
56 ICRC Customary IHL Study, note 30 above, Rules 75; Art. I.5 of the 1993 Convention 
on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons 
and on their destruction (CWC).  
57 CWC Article II.9(d); for a critical discussion of this difference, see Kenneth Watkin 
‘Chemical Agents and “expanding” bullets: Limited Law Enforcement Exceptions or 
Unwarranted Handcuffs”, in Anthony Helm (ed.), The Law of War in the 21st Century: 
Weaponry and the Use of Force, International l Law Studies, Vol. 82, pp. 193ff.  
58 UN Basic Principles, note 33 above, Principles 13 and 14. Amnesty International 
underlines that “In view of all these risks involved, when anticipating a situation in which 
firearms may have to be used, the command leadership in charge of policing the assembly 
should first consider all alternatives: less lethal weapons and devices may be a more 
appropriate response to the anticipated threats and carry a lower level of risk.” (AI Use of 
Force Guidelines note 53 above, p. 159).  
59 ICRC position on the use of toxic chemicals as weapons for law enforcement, 
Statement, ICRC, Geneva, 6 February 2013, available at: www.icrc.org/eng/assets/ 
files/2013/2013-02-toxic-chemicals-icrc-position-eng.pdf. For detailed explanations of the 
concerns raised by toxic chemicals other than riot control agents, see also ICRC, Toxic 
chemicals as weapons for law enforcement: A threat to life and international law?, 2012, 
available at www.icrc.org/en/download/file/7781/toxic-chemicals-for-law-enforcement-
synthesis-icrc-09-2012.pdf, and Davison, note 45 above, pp. 301 - 307.  
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glance, it is worth recalling a major rationale for this prohibition, namely 
the risk of escalation that the use of riot control agents in warfare entails; 
indeed, the use of ‘lethal’ chemical weapons - including chlorine, phosgene 
and mustard gas - in World War I, in the Egypt-Yemen war of the 1960s 
and in the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s all began with the use of tear gas.60  
Similarly, IHL prohibits the use of expanding bullets,61 whose design 
contributes to the increased size of the wound and severity of tissue damage 
caused when compared to non-expanding (full metal jacket) bullets, while a 
number of States consider that expanding bullets may be used by police for 
domestic law-enforcement purposes. This is seen as appropriate by law 
enforcement officials in particular when using force against suspects in the 
middle of a crowd, to avoid bullets passing through the body of the suspect 
and endangering bystanders, and to increase the chance that once hit, the 
suspect is rapidly incapacitated. However, due to the particular injury risks, 
expanding bullets must only be used when necessary, when other means are 
insufficient or inappropriate, and keeping in mind the obligation to limit 
damage and injury. It is important to note that expanding bullets fired by 
police forces are usually fired with weapons and ammunition that are far 
less powerful than military rifles and ammunition. The amount of energy 
that such bullets deposit in the body is, therefore, much lower than the 
energy deposited by a normal or expanding bullet fired from a military 
rifle. Police forces, therefore, do not normally use the type of expanding 
bullet that is prohibited for military rifles.62 
Authorities must, therefore, ensure that any riot control agents or 
expanding bullets used in law enforcement operations are not deployed and 
used in the conduct of hostilities. This is particularly relevant where 
military forces or law enforcement officials are involved in both types of 
operations and where law enforcement operations and hostilities occur in 
parallel. 
                                                     
60 Davison, note 45 above, p. 299.  
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Case study: law enforcement 
by military personnel 
 
Claire LANDAIS 
Head of Legal Services, French Ministry of Defence, Paris 
Dans la pratique, comment se fait, dans vos pays respectifs, la 
distinction entre le cadre légal des opérations de maintien de l’ordre public 
et celui de la conduite des hostilités militaires, en particulier dans le 
contexte de la zone grise de la lutte contre le terrorisme et contre-
insurrection? Mais aussi dans quelle mesure, les fonctions sont-elles 
partagées et réparties respectivement entre vos forces de police et vos 
forces armées nationales? Quel genre de retour d’expérience pourriez-vous 
partager avec nous? 
La problématique assignée à notre table ronde sur l’équipement et les 
moyens à disposition des forces armées chargées du maintien de l’ordre 
public en situation de conflit armé non international me semble en réalité 
comporter deux sous-problématiques : la première insiste sur l’aspect 
organique des choses : quelles questions soulève l’implication d’un 
personnel militaire dans des fonctions de police ou de maintien de l’ordre 
(notions qui en français sont synonymes ou en tout cas recouvrent celle de 
« law enforcement » en anglais) ? Et la seconde insiste davantage sur le 
contexte de conflit armé international : les missions de police exercées en 
situation de conflit armé sont-elles régies par le DIDH eu égard à leur 
finalité ? Ou bien par le DCA eu égard au contexte général ? 
S’agissant du premier point, et pour apporter un témoignage concret sur 
le cas français, je me permets de rappeler que le paysage français des forces 
de sécurité est composé d’un trio : des forces de police, sous l’autorité du 
ministère de l’intérieur, qui sont des personnels civils ; la gendarmerie, qui 
est une force armée au sens où les gendarmes sont des militaires soumis 
aux règles du statut des militaires (notamment en matière de droits civils et 
politiques, de droit d’association professionnelle ou de temps de travail), 
qui est passée en 2009 de l’autorité du ministère de la défense à celle du 
ministère de l’intérieur, et enfin les armées. On pourrait en faire une 
présentation simple – qui reste d’ailleurs assez largement vraie - qui 
consisterait à dire que la police et la gendarmerie – regroupées sous 
l’appellation de « forces de sécurité intérieure » sont chargées de la police 
ou du maintien de l’ordre public sur le territoire national quand les armées 
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« font la guerre » en OPEX. Mais la réalité, surtout depuis quelques mois, 
est en fait plus complexe : 
- parce que les armées peuvent être envoyées en opération extérieure 
dans une zone où sévit un conflit armé mais avec un mandat 
(notamment du CSNU) qui est cantonné à la protection de la 
population civile ou à l’auto-protection et renvoie davantage à du 
maintien de l’ordre qu’à la conduite d’hostilités, y compris de façon 
offensive. C’est moins le cas aujourd’hui dans la mesure où les 
mandats onusiens ont été rendus plus « robustes » et du fait du choix 
de la France d’agir autant que possible sous commandement national 
(cf « à côté et en soutien de la MINUSMA au Mali ou de la 
MINUSCA en RCA) 
- parce que même lorsqu’elles sont envoyées dans un pays ou une 
zone marquée par un conflit armé pour y conduire des hostilités, 
certaines des missions des forces armées peuvent s’apparenter 
davantage à des missions de police, notamment lorsque la situation 
oscille (dans le temps ou dans l’espace) entre une situation de 
troubles et tensions intérieures et une situation de conflit armé.  
 
Cf le cas de la RCA : contexte d’Etat failli, objectif : s’interposer entre 
deux groupes armés organisés, mettre fin aux exactions contre les 
populations civiles, rétablir la sécurité publique. A comparer au cas malien 
: intervention pour « détruire » (termes employés par le président Hollande 
au moment du déclenchement de l’opération Serval) des groupes armés qui 
entendent occuper par la force des territoires au détriment du pouvoir des 
autorités légales (détruire ne signifiant pas tuer tous les membres des 
groupes armés organisés (GAO) bien sûr mais mettre hors d’état de nuire 
ces groupes en s’attaquant à leurs infrastructures, leurs équipements, leur 
logistique militaire, leurs chefs). Ainsi, dans des situations toutes deux 
qualifiables de conflit armé, les finalités de l’intervention peuvent être 
assez différentes. Et il est notamment clair qu’à Bangui, les forces armées 
ont eu à gérer des situations de contrôle de foule, de dissipation de 
rassemblement ou de lutte anti-émeute, qui sont des situations de maintien 
de l’ordre très différentes des opérations offensives qui ont pu être menées 
contre certaines Katibat d’Aqmi ou d’Ansar Dine au nord Mali.  
On peut aussi penser à la variété des missions de la force barkhane en 
BSS : dans le cadre de l’opération Barkhane, les forces françaises peuvent 
être amenées à agir sous l’emprise du droit international humanitaire (DIH) 
contre des GAO liés au conflit malien opérant au Niger par exemple, et 
dans le même temps, ou presque, agir en soutien des forces locales en vertu 
d’accords de défense bilatéraux. C’est le cas notamment lorsqu’elles 
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participent à l’interception d’un convoi d’hommes en armes. Il peut en effet 
s’agir de membres d’un groupe armé terroriste (GAT) en route pour le Mali 
ou de trafiquants, connus pour être nombreux et dangereux dans ce secteur 
de l’Afrique et qui relèvent d’une opération de police en ce sens qu’elle a 
pour objet d’interrompre des activités criminelles : 
- parce que les gendarmes ne sont pas cantonnés au sol national et que 
précisément ils peuvent être déployés lorsque les missions sont 
proches de celles qu’ils peuvent connaître sur le sol national (ex 
RCA ou Kosovo) 
- enfin, parce que le déploiement récent de 10 000 militaires des 
armées sur notre sol national (opération sentinelle) après les attentats 
de janvier 2015 et alors même que nous considérons (en dépit des 
déclarations politiques recourant un peu trop largement au 
vocabulaire guerrier mais aussi en dépit de l’ampleur et de la 
régularité des attentats) qu’il n’y a pas, à ce jour en tout cas, de 
situation de conflit armé sur le sol français et qu’il s’agit donc bien 
d’une situation régie par le DIDH et clairement pas par le DIH, 
conduit évidemment à repenser le partage des rôles entre les 3 forces 
de sécurité dont dispose la France. 
 
Je reviendrai, je pense, dans la suite de la table ronde sur les débats qu’a 
connus la France du fait de ce déploiement massif, sur le sol national, de 
militaires chargés de seconder les forces de sécurité intérieure et donc de 
missions de police et de maintien de l’ordre. 
La seconde sous-question, qui est de savoir si le droit applicable doit 
dépendre de la nature de la mission - la guerre ou la police pour prendre des 
notions un peu caricaturales mais parlantes - ou plutôt de la qualification de 
la situation générale - situation de paix ou de conflit armé - est tout aussi 
complexe. Elle l’est d’autant plus que si la qualification de la situation 
générale comme étant une situation de conflit armé peut a priori suggérer 
un usage de la force plus permissif, en termes d’équipement ou 
d’armement, qui est la thématique précise de notre TR, certaines 
restrictions existent au contraire pour la conduite des hostilités alors 
qu’elles ne s’appliquent pas pour des missions de maintien de l’ordre. 
Au risque de paraître esquiver la question, je crois que la doctrine 
française consiste en réalité à mêler les deux critères de finalité et de 
contexte. Cela revient à dire de facto, lorsque les armées françaises sont 
engagées dans des opérations de police ou de maintien de l’ordre alors 
qu’elles sont en opération dans un contexte de conflit armé, leurs règles 
d’engagement sont en fait très proches de celles qui s’appliqueraient pour le 
temps de paix. Pour dire les choses autrement les ROE, pour les missions 
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de maintien de l’ordre, reflètent une conception des trois grands principes 
que sont les principes de nécessité, de proportionnalité et de précaution, qui 
sont inspirés davantage du DIDH que du DIH: 
- Contrairement à la situation de conflit armé qui impose une nécessité 
pour faire un usage de la force, y compris létale, le maintien de 
l’ordre en temps de paix repose sur le principe «d’absolue nécessité», 
lequel implique que la force soit utilisée en dernier recours et 
uniquement pour poursuivre un but légitime, comme la légitime 
défense, effectuer une arrestation régulière, ou réprimer une émeute. 
- Le principe de proportionnalité est également appréhendé de manière 
différente en DIH et en DIDH. En DIH, ce principe protège les 
personnes civiles et biens civils contre les dommages qui seraient 
excessifs par rapport à l’avantage militaire direct attendu d’une 
attaque, mais non la cible légitime d’une attaque. En situation de 
maintien de l’ordre où sont appliquées, les règles du DIDH, le 
principe de proportionnalité exige la recherche d’un équilibre entre la 
menace représentée par l’individu et le risque potentiel pour cette 
personne ainsi que pour les tiers. Ainsi, la vie de l’individu posant 
une menace imminente est elle-même prise en compte, à la 
différence du DIH.  
- Enfin le principe de précaution, revêt également une acception 
différente en situation de conflit armé et de maintien de l’ordre en 
temps de paix. En DIH, ce principe exige que les belligérants veillent 
constamment à épargner la population civile et les biens civils. Au 
contraire, en DIDH, toutes les précautions doivent être prises pour 
éviter, autant que possible, l’usage de la force en tant que telle, et 
non la mort civile simplement accidentelle ou une blessure ou des 
dommages causés aux biens civils. Il s’agit ici avant de respecter le « 
droit à la vie » qui n’est pas consacré comme tel en DIH. 
 
Mais cette doctrine de l’usage de la force minimale pour les missions de 
maintien de l’ordre, force strictement nécessaire pour faire cesser un acte 
ou un comportement et dénué de tout caractère offensif, ne va pas jusqu’à 
conclure que la situation de conflit armé n’aurait aucune incidence. On 
reviendra je pense sur le sujet de l’armement mais en termes d’usage de la 
force également, nous considérons que la contrainte de la légitime défense 
ou de la nécessité absolue qui s’applique pour les opérations de police en 
temps de paix peut être desserrée pour ces opérations réalisées dans un 
contexte de conflit armé, du fait de la porosité des situations et des liens qui 
peuvent exister entre les activités des membres des groupes armés 
directement liées au conflit et les activités de trafic ou de violence de droit 
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commun que ces groupes pratiquent aussi. Tout dépendra en réalité des 
circonstances. Pour reprendre le cas de la RCA, la dissipation d’une 
manifestation de civils à Bangui peut facilement prendre une autre 
coloration si des membres des groupes armés se mêlent à la population 
civile et sont armés. 
Un point en tout cas ne fait pas de doute à nos yeux : les armées, sauf 
exception rarissime, ne sont pas des acteurs de la police judiciaire = leur 
finalité n’est pas de poursuivre des criminels pour les arrêter et les insérer 
dans un circuit judiciaire (l’exception rarissime étant le cas de la traque des 
criminels de guerre qui avait été confiée aux armées en Bosnie). 
Contrairement aux policiers et aux gendarmes qui agissent sous les ordres 
de l’autorité judiciaire dès lors que leur mission n’est plus de la prévention 
mais de la répression d’une infraction qui a été commise, les forces armées 
sont placées sous la seule autorité du commandement militaire et donc du 
ministre de la défense. Cela signifie aussi que quand la France indique 
qu’elle engage ses militaires dans des opérations de contre-terrorisme, en 
tout cas au Mali ou sur le théâtre irako-syrien, il ne faut pas considérer qu’il 
s’agirait d’une opération de police engagée contre des criminels que les 
armées auraient pour mission d’arrêter car ils seraient des terroristes au 
sens du droit pénal français ou local. Il s’agit bien de conduite d’hostilités 
contre un ennemi. Cet ennemi utilise des méthodes qu’on peut qualifier de 
terroristes dans la mesure où nombre d’entre elles (prise d’otage, IED, 
attentats suicides, utilisation de la population civile comme bouclier 
humain) a pour objet de terroriser les populations et sont les armes 
classiques du faible au fort. Mais c’est à vrai dire le lot assez commun des 
conflits asymétriques. En revanche il est clair à nos yeux que s’agissant de 
la conduite des hostilités contre les organisations terroristes au Sahel ou 
contre Daech, c’est bien le DIH qui s’applique et non le droit international 
des droits de l’homme. 
Je souhaite rendre compte ici des éléments du débat qui a eu lieu en 
France sur la question de l’équipement des soldats lors du déploiement 
massif de militaires des armées sur le sol national, dans une situation, je l’ai 
indiqué, qui n’est pas une situation de conflit armé. 
Certains, y compris au sein de l’institution militaire, ont plaidé pour que 
l’équipement des militaires de Sentinelle soit adapté à la nature de la 
mission. La justification de cette adaptation de l’équipement résidait dans la 
volonté de pouvoir mieux respecter le principe de nécessité absolue pour 
l’usage de la force létale (article 2 CEDH) et de proportionnalité de la 
riposte qui est au cœur de l’excuse pénale de légitime défense. Il paraît en 
effet a priori compliqué de garantir cette proportionnalité avec des armes 
de guerre, sans compter les risques de dommages collatéraux. 
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Cette demande a été en partie entendue puisque les militaires de 
sentinelle sont dotés de bâtons télescopiques et de bombes lacrymogènes, 
alors que telle n’est pas la dotation classique en OPEX. 
Il a en revanche été considéré que l’éventail des armes à disposition des 
militaires (FAMAS – dont la crosse peut elle-même être utilisée comme 
arme -, le bâton et la bombe lacrymogène donc) constituait un panel 
suffisant pour permettre d’adapter la réponse à l’agression. Et le choix a été 
fait de ne pas doter les militaires de sentinelle d’armes à létalité réduite de 
types flash ball ou taser. Demander à des soldats qui ont été formés et sont 
habitués au maniement du famas d’apprendre en peu de temps à se servir 
d’armes à létalité réduite aurait posé de très sérieuses difficultés et risquait 
en réalité de modifier les réflexes de militaires d’autant plus enclins à 
maîtriser l’usage de la force qu’ils savent que leur armement est meurtrier. 
L’introduction des flash balls dans la police en France avait d’ailleurs 
permis de mesurer que l’usage d’armes à létalité réduite pouvait avoir pour 
effet, au moins temporairement, de désinhiber l’usage de l’arme et de 
rendre les accidents et les blessures voire les décès plus fréquents.  
Le choix de ne pas équiper les militaires des armées engagés sur le 
territoire national d’armes à létalité réduite répondait aussi à un objectif 
symbolique : ne pas banaliser la présence de militaires sur le sol national en 
créant une sorte d’armée de l’intérieur distincte de celle qui serait déployée 
en OPEX. 
Enfin, Sentinelle est une opération conçue pour répondre à la 
militarisation de la menace terroriste sur notre sol ; il aurait ainsi été 
paradoxal que les soldats soient « démilitarisés ». 
Ce qui est vrai pour l’opération Sentinelle l’est aussi, a fortiori, pour les 
missions de maintien de l’ordre en OPEX : en clair, ce n’est pas d’abord 
l’équipement qui doit être adapté à la nature de la mission mais bien les 
règles d’engagement et la façon dont l’équipement peut être utilisé (ex : tirs 
en rafale, tirs au coup par coup). J’ajoute que pour des militaires déployés 
en OPEX être dotés d’armes qui, parce qu’elles sont à létalité réduite, 
visent en réalité d’abord la population civile, est symboliquement et 
politiquement compliqué dès lors qu’ils ont d’abord en tête le principe 
fondamental en DIH de distinction entre les combattants (ou les membres 
des groupes armés organisés) et les civils à protéger. L’impact de 
l’utilisation de ces armes sur la « perception » de la Force dans le pays 
d’intervention (par exemple, la diffusion d’images montrant des éléments 





















V. Waging contemporary conflicts: 

































The role of international organizations, 
including the UN in supporting compliance, 
including by establishing fact-finding procedures 
Angela KANE 
Senior Fellow, Vienna Centre for Disarmament 
and Non-Proliferation  
 
The UN was set up as an international organization that deals with 
Member States, and the aspect of dealing with non-state armed groups has 
only fairly recently come into focus. I have chosen to limit my remarks to 




Several instruments adopted by the international community 
 
In response to the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York on 11 
September 2001, the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) was set up on 
28 September 2001 through Security Council resolution 13731  
 CTC’s mandate is to monitor the implementation of resolution 
1373 – which requested countries to implement a number of measures 
intended to enhance their legal and institutional ability to counter 
terrorist activities at home. 
 
These measures included taking steps to: 
 criminalize the financing of terrorism 
 freeze without delay any funds related to persons involved in acts of 
terrorism 
 deny all forms of financial support for terrorist groups 
 suppress the provision of safe haven, sustenance or support for 
terrorists 
 share information with other governments on any groups practicing 
or planning terrorist acts 
 cooperate with other governments in the investigation, detection, 
arrest, extradition and prosecution of those involved in such acts; and 
                                                     
1 S/RES/1373 of 28 September 2001. 
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 criminalize active and passive assistance for terrorism in domestic 
law and bring violators to justice 
 
Resolution 1737 was further strengthened by the adoption, in September 
2005, by resolution 16242 on incitement to commit acts of terrorism, calling 
on UN Member States to prohibit it by law, prevent such conduct and deny 
safe haven to anyone “with respect to whom there is credible and relevant 
information giving serious reasons for considering that they have been 
guilty of such conducti”. The resolution also called on States to continue 
international efforts to enhance dialogue and broaden understanding among 
civilizations.  
This was followed, on 8 September 2006, by the adoption of the Global 
Counter-Terrorism Strategy3, when Member States reiterated their strong 
and unequivocal condemnation of terrorism in all its forms and 
manifestations, “by whomever, wherever, and for whatever purposes”. 
The Strategy contains practical recommendations in four key areas:  
 tackling the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism 
 measures to prevent and combat terrorism 
 building countries’ capacity to prevent and combat terrorism and to 
strengthen the role of the United Nations system in that regard 
 and ensuring respect for human rights for all and the rule of law 
while countering terrorism. 
 
Countries are reporting to the CTC on compliance with this mandate, 
but there is nothing in either the mandate nor in the Global Counter-
Terrorism Strategy that includes establishing fact-finding procedures. The 
General Assembly reviews the Strategy every two years (last in July 
2016)4. 
To strengthen this effort, the United Nations Counter-Terrorism 
Implementation Task Force (CTITF) was created in 2005. The Under-
Secretary-General for Political Affairs is the Chair of CTITF and the 
Executive Director of the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre 
(UNCCT). CTITF’s mandate is to enhance coordination and coherence of 
counter-terrorism efforts of the United Nations system. The Task Force 
consists of 38 international entities which, by virtue of their work, have a 
                                                     
2 Ibid., op. para. 1(c). 
3 www.un.org/counterterrorism/ctitf/en/un-global-counter-terrorism-strategy. 
4 See report of the Secretary-General on the implementation over the last decade, 
A/70/826. See also Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, A/70/674 and A/70/675, 
and General Assembly resolution A/RES/70/291 adopted on 19 July 2016. 
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stake in multilateral counter-terrorism efforts. Each entity makes 
contributions consistent with its own mandate. 
While the primary responsibility for the implementation of the Global 
Strategy rests with Member States, CTITF ensures that the UN system is 
attuned to the needs of Member States, to provide them with the necessary 
support and spread in-depth knowledge of the Strategy and, wherever 
necessary, expedite delivery of technical assistance. 
 
 
UN Security Council resolution 1540  
 
The resolution was adopted in 20045 - under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter - and obliges States, inter alia, to refrain from supporting by any 
means non-State actors from developing, acquiring, manufacturing, 
possessing, transporting, transferring or using nuclear, chemical or 
biological weapons and their delivery systems. The resolution also requires 
all States to establish various types of domestic controls to prevent the 
proliferation of those weapons and their related materials. It also 
encourages enhanced international cooperation on such efforts. 
While the mandate was extended until 2021, the year 2016 marks the 
year of the Committee’s Comprehensive Review of the Status of 
Implementation of the resolution (which was mandated by Security Council 
resolution 1977 in 2011). 
It should be noted that following the adoption of resolution 1540 in 
2004, a number of States criticized the Security Council for adopting a 
resolution that takes on a legislative function and puts binding 
commitments on countries not members of the Security Council. Yet, by 
2011, more than 120 States had reported to the 1540 Committee on their 
national framework for non-proliferation. What remains an issue, though, is 
that many States reported that they lacked the capacity to implement all 
measures required under 1540. 
Yet another measure was taken in 2008 by the General Assembly: 
resolution 63/60, entitled Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring 
weapons of mass destruction.  
In its operative paragraph 5, the Assembly requested “the Secretary-
General to compile a report on measures already taken by international 
organizations on issues relating to the linkage between the fight against 
terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to seek 
the views of Member States on additional relevant measures, including 
                                                     
5 S/RES/1540 of 28 April 2004. 
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national measures, for tackling the global threat posed by the acquisition 
by terrorists of weapons of mass destruction and to report to the General 
Assembly at its sixty-fourth session”. 
The first such report was issued a year later in 2009: only 12 States 
reported on their activities, as did five UN organizations and six other 
international organizations. While the reports were issued regularly, the 
latest report6 shows responses from 14 States and eight international 
organizations – a disappointing result. 
The year 2005 brought another agreement to prevent nuclear terrorism: 
the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear 
Terrorism (ICSANT). Based on an instrument originally proposed by the 
Russian Federation in 1998, the Convention provides 
 a wide definition on materials and facilities covering both military 
and peaceful applications; 
 it criminalizes the planning, threatening or carrying out acts of 
nuclear terrorism;  
 it requires for States to take all practicable measures to prevent and 
counter preparations for offenses to take place inside or outside of 
their territories; 
 it provides innovative provisions dealing with post-crisis situations 
concerning the handling of seized radioactive material, devices or 
nuclear facilities, as well as on modalities of return and storage 
thereof. 
 
While ICSANT provides an important multilateral legal framework for 
countering terrorist threats, the Convention, as of May 2016, has 115 





The Secretary-General’s Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of 
Chemical and Bacteriological Weapons (SGM) is in fact the one instrument 
that focuses exclusively on investigating WMD use. It was adopted by the 
General Assembly7 and was later affirmed by the Security Council8. The 
investigations are to be conducted in accordance with guidelines and 
procedures9 that were endorsed by the General Assembly in 1990 and were 
                                                     
6 A/71/122 of 8 July 2016. 
7 UN General Assembly resolution 42/37C. 
8 UN Security Council resolution 620 (1988). 
9 A/44/561, annex I. 
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later updated in 1997. Since then, lists of qualified experts and 
laboratories10 are compiled and maintained. The Guidelines and the roster 
of experts and laboratories constitute the key elements of the Mechanism. 
The procedures were again updated in 2006 to reflect relevant technical 
developments and experts have trained over the years to ensure readiness. 
The UN did not, however, and I should say fortunately, have much 
experience in putting the SGM to use. Investigations according to the 
Mechanism were conducted in Mozambique and Azerbaijan in 1992; both 
were inconclusive. 
When chemical weapons use was alleged in Syria, the SGM was 
activated in 2013, initially by the Government of Syria who requested the 
Secretary-General to investigate an incident in Khan al-Assal. It had been 
over twenty years since the SGM had been last activated; meanwhile, the 
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) was concluded and ratified by 
many Member States, leaving only a few outside the CWC – like Syria – to 
avail themselves of the SGM. 
I will not dwell in detail on the findings, which were based on over 30 
environmental samples and 80 interviews with victims, 34 of whom gave 
blood, urine and hair samples. These established definitive evidence of 
exposure to Sarin. The findings of the clinical assessments were consistent 
from both the interviews with clinicians and the review of medical records. 
I am sure many of you have read the report11.  
While the destruction of Syria’s chemical stockpiles was progressing 
under resolution 211812, the use of chemical “barrel bombs” continued to 
affect the civilian population in Syria. The OPCW, already in April 2014, 
had established a Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) in response to persistent 
allegations of use of chlorine gas as a weapon in Syria. The FFM issued 
three reports over the course of a year, concluding in the second report, 
with a high degree of confidence, that chlorine had been regularly and 
systematically used as a weapon in the north of the Syrian Arab Republic.  
These findings led to strong calls for accountability; calls that had been 
continuously made since the Ghouta report was first published. While the 
FFM reports were made available to the Security Council in February 2015, 
it was only in August that final accommodation was reached among the P-5 
and a resolution adopted which established an OPCW-UN Joint 
                                                     
10 The experts on the roster can only be replaced or changed upon official notification 
from their respective governments. 
11 A/67/997 – S/2013/553 of 16 September 2013 and A/68/663 – S/2013/735 of 13 
December 2013. 
12 S/RES/2118 of 27 September 2013. 
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Investigative Mechanism (JIM)13 with the aim to identify to the greatest 
extent feasible individuals, entities, groups, or governments who were 
perpetrators, organizers, sponsors or otherwise involved in the use of 
chemicals as weapons, including chlorine or any other toxic chemical, in 
the Syrian Arab Republic.  
What is important to note is that the JIM, as stated in its first report to 
the Security Council14, is not mandated to act and function as a judicial or 
quasi-judicial body. Moreover, it does not have any authority or 
jurisdiction, either directly or indirectly, to make a formal or binding 
judicial determination of criminal liability. Accordingly, the Mechanism 
will function as a non-judicial investigative mechanism within its mandate, 
identifying “to the greatest extent feasible” individuals and other actors 
involved in the use of chemicals as weapons and the roles that they played.  
The JIM team took at its starting point the 116 alleged incidents of CW 
use that were mentioned in the three OPCW Fact-Finding Mission reports. 
It narrowed them down to 23 incidents that lent credence to the view that 
toxic chemicals were used. They selected nine of these as potential cases.  
Despite the difficulties (lack of access to the locations; investigations – 
in some cases - conducted more than two years after the incident; sources 
that were secondary or tertiary, difficulty of finding independent sources of 
information that could provide access to individuals and information 
material), the Mechanism, in its third report to the Security Council15, 
concluded in two cases (Talmenes and Sarmin) that the incidents were 
“caused by the Syrian Arab Republic helicopter dropping a device”, while 
it concluded in a third incident (Marea) that “there was sufficient 
information that the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) was the 
only entity with the ability, capability, motive and means to use sulfur 
mustard”. 
In its fourth report16, the Mechanism determined that a Syrian Armed 
Forces helicopter caused the release of a toxic substance in Qmenas, while 
another incident in Binnish remained inconclusive. This report was released 
after a short one-month extension of the mandate17. 
Following consideration of the evidence before them, the Security 
Council authorized another one-year extension of the mandate of the JIM18, 
“with the possibility of further extension”. 
                                                     
13 S/RES/2235 of 7 August 2015. 
14 S/2016/142 of 12 February 2016. 
15 S/2016/738 of 16 August 2016. 
16 S/2016/888 of 21 October 2016. 
17 S/RES/2314 of 13 October 2016. 
18 S/RES/2319 of 17 November 2016. 
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What is lacking in the resolution authorizing the extension is any 
mention of the critical question of the final determination of accountability. 
As noted, the JIM does not have any authority of jurisdiction, either 
directly or indirectly, to make a formal or binding judicial determination of 
criminal liability. So how would the issue of accountability be taken up? 
It had been expected that the Security Council would address this 
question in some form, but in the difficult political environment in the 
Security Council, kicking the can down the road and mandating an 
extension was probably the only feasible solution. What will ultimately be 
the effective outcome is anybody’s guess at this point, but after having been 
closely involved with the Syria dossier for the last three years, I, like so 
many others, am hoping for any steps that will bring us closer to a solution 
of this sad and painful chapter in world events. 
 
 
The Nuclear Security Summits 
 
The nuclear security summit initiative began with an April 2009 call by 
U.S. President Barack Obama to hold a global summit on nuclear security 
in 2010 as part of an effort to "secure all vulnerable nuclear material around 
the world within four years”. The broad goal of the summit process is to 
address the threat of nuclear terrorism by minimizing and securing 
weapons-usable nuclear materials, enhancing international cooperation to 
prevent the illicit acquisition of nuclear material by non-state actors such as 
terrorist groups and smugglers, and taking steps to strengthen the global 
nuclear security system. I must add that the Summits addressed civilian 
nuclear materials – which amount to only some 15% of all nuclear 
materials 
The summit process ended in 2016 at a fourth summit in Washington, 
DC March 31-April 1. The three previous summits were held in 
Washington D.C. in 2010, Seoul, South Korea in 2012, and The Hague, 
Netherlands in 2014. 
Each summit has produced a consensus communique that reaffirmed the 
broad goals of the summits and encouraged States to take actions, such as 
ratifying key treaties or minimizing stockpiles of weapons-usable materials. 
These voluntary, caveated recommendations were enhanced by individual 
state-specific commitments made at each summit. These pledges, known as 
house gifts, included actions such as repatriating weapons-usable materials, 
holding trainings for nuclear security personnel, updating national laws and 
regulations, and taking steps to combat illicit trafficking. At each 
subsequent summit, States reported on the progress made toward fulfilling 
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these commitments. All 53 participating States made national pledges at at 
least one summit. 
Among the summits’ chief accomplishments is the recovery or 
elimination of more than 1,500 kilograms of highly-enriched uranium and 
separated plutonium, the establishment of dozens of new training and 
support centers, and updates to national laws on nuclear safety and security 
by most States.  
The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) which was 
launched in 2006, is a voluntary international partnership of 86 nations and 
five international organizations that are committed to strengthening global 
capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear terrorism. The GICNT 
works toward this goal by conducting multilateral activities that strengthen 
the plans, policies, procedures, and interoperability of partner nations. 
All partner nations have voluntarily committed to implementing the 
GICNT Statement of Principles (SOP), a set of broad nuclear security goals 
encompassing a range of deterrence, prevention, detection, and response 
objectives. The eight principles contained within the SOP aim to develop 
partnership capacity to combat nuclear terrorism, consistent with national 
legal authorities and obligations as well as relevant international legal 
frameworks such as the Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear 
Terrorism, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, 
and United Nations Security Council resolutions 1373 and 1540. 
The United States and Russia serve as Co-Chairs of the GICNT, while 
the Netherlands leads the Implementation and Assessment Group (IAG) 
under the guidance of the Co-Chairs. To date, the GICNT has conducted 
over 70 multilateral activities and nine senior-level meetings. The GICNT 
is open to nations that share in its common goals and are actively 






The international community has taken a lead role in focusing on the use 
of weapons by non-state actors. I have outlined above the various 
instruments in the United Nations (Counter-Terrorism Committee and 
CTITF, resolution 1540, Secretary-General’s Mechanism, Joint 
Investigative Mechanism) as well as other initiatives taken by the 
international community, and while no new initiatives are currently on the 
table, increased focus has been on drawing attention to what is seen to be 
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the increasing probability of non-state actors able to obtain and deploy such 
weapons. 
The issue continues to have a high profile. The Security Council held a 
one-day meeting on 23 August 2016 devoted to the evolving threat of 
weapons of mass destruction falling into the hands of non-state actors and 
terrorist groups. The Secretary-General, while urging States to “refocus 
seriously on nuclear disarmament”, also questioned the international 
community’s ability to prevent or respond to a biological attack19. This 
concern was echoed by a number of speakers at the meeting, who cited new 
threats such as the use of unmanned aerial vehicles, 3-D printers and 
malicious software to launch a cyberattack on chemical, biological, 
radiological or nuclear facilities. 
What remains to be seen is whether the currently-available tool box is 
sufficient. It clearly strengthens States’ efforts to put up barriers to access 
of WMD materials, but it will not guarantee that non-state actors will not 
gain access to illicit materials, and use them. 




Measures to bring accountability 
Judge Chile EBOE-OSUJI 
International Criminal Court, The Hague 
1. The elementary considerations of humanity  
 
The subject of this panel concerns legal accountability for non-state 
groups, with regards to their unlawful use of weapons. I propose to 
approach the subject from the perspective of a certain debate that is 
currently troubling the conception of crimes against humanity as defined in 
the Rome Statute.  
In the taxonomy of international crimes a technical distinction now 
exists between war crimes and crimes against humanity, as a matter of their 
respective definitions. But that does not negate the importance of the 
occasional reminder that the normative regulation of war crimes derives 
context and orientation from the needs of international law to proscribe 
crimes against humanity. That is to say, basic considerations of humanity 
have always underlain the motives of international law in its directional 
growth in the area of international humanitarian law.  
This is all too evident from the Declaration of St Petersburg (1868). It 
contains the following memorable attestations that: 
 the progress of civilization should have the effect of alleviating as 
much as possible the calamities of war; 
 the only legitimate object which States should endeavour to 
accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy; 
 for this purpose it is sufficient to disable the greatest possible number 
of men; 
 this object would be exceeded by the employment of arms which 
uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled men, or render their 
death inevitable; 
 the employment of such arms would, therefore, be contrary to the 
laws of humanity… 
 
Notably, the Declaration ended with the stated aspiration of the parties 
to reach an understanding in future, as soon as ‘a precise proposition shall 
be drawn up in view of future improvements which science may effect in 
the armament of troops, in order to maintain the principles which they have 
established, and to conciliate the necessities of war with the laws of 
humanity.’ 
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The concerns that animated the Declaration of St Petersburg were 
wholly echoed (half a century later) in the sentiments of President 
Woodrow Wilson, as he articulated them on behalf of the statesmen 
gathered in Paris in 1919 (after the First World War) to create the League 
of Nations. As he expressed the matter, the purpose of the League of 
Nations was to bring an end to a warring culture that had ravaged Europe 
through the years - and, in that regard, to craft a treaty they hoped would 
maintain peace permanently among nations.  
The golden thread that ran through those purposes was the need to stop 
the real strains and burdens of war from being thrown back from the war 
front to ‘where the heart of humanity beats.’ Wilson’s high hope in creating 
the League of Nations was that ‘the watchful, continuous cooperation of 
men can see to it that science, as well as armed men, is kept within the 
harness of civilization.’ No doubt, the ‘harness of civilisation’ that he and 
his colleagues contemplated at the Paris Peace Conference is one that 
typically protrudes from basic considerations of humanity. 
The Martens Clause picks up that thread, in its repeated reiteration in 
international law instruments that regulate armed conflicts. We all recall the 
classic message of the Martens Clause: ‘Until a more complete code of the 
laws of war is issued, the High Contracting Parties think it right to declare 
that in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, populations 
and belligerents remain under the protection and empire of the principles of 
international law, as they result from the usages established between 
civilized nations, from the laws of humanity and the requirements of the 
public conscience.’ 
For the sake of time, we can skip reading article 227 of the Versailles 
Treaty and the report of its antecedent negotiations, and the text of the 
Nuremberg Charter, for a similar theme. But I should note the continuation 
of that ubiquitous theme into one of the most dominant contemporary 
documents of our time - the Rome Statute - in the concern (as stated in its 
preamble) about a history of the world in which ‘children, women and men 
have been victims of unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the 
conscience of humanity.’ 
I could keep going in this vein, of course. But, I am sure that you do not 
need to be persuaded as to how the need of international law to proscribe 
crimes against humanity has served to give direction and content to 
international humanitarian law.  
However, it is important to recall these things, as I engage the topic of 
accountability for non-state actors (in their unlawful use of weapons in 
contemporary armed conflicts) - and as I propose to do so from the 
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perspective of a certain debate that is currently troubling the conception of 
crimes against humanity as defined in the Rome Statute. 
 
 
2. The theory of centrally directed aggregate complicity  
 
Now, what is that debate? And why did it arise? I shall consider the last 
question first. Why did the debate arise? It arose from what is at best an 
awkward attempt to define the offence of ‘crimes against humanity’ in the 
Rome Statute. The drafters began by defining crimes against humanity 
under article 7(1) as certain acts and conducts ‘when committed as part of a 
widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, 
with knowledge of the attack.’  
Having done so, the drafters thought also to define - in article 7(2)(a) - 
the phrase ‘attack directed against any civilian population.’ And the 
definition runs thus: ‘Attack directed against any civilian population” 
means a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts 
referred to in paragraph 1 against any civilian population, pursuant to or in 
furtherance of a State or organisational policy to commit such attack.’ 
With that, we come to the debate. That definition has resulted in a 
certain theory that should be of interest to us – the theory of centrally-
directed aggregate complicity. The theory comes in two versions: (i) the 
basic or light version; and, (ii) the extended or extreme version. 
 
Organisational Policy 
The basic or light version is to this effect: at the ICC no accused may be 
convicted of a crime against humanity, if it cannot be shown that the acts of 
violence were committed ‘pursuant to an organisational policy.’ According 
to this theory, for every charge of crime against humanity, the Prosecutor 
must prove centrally-directed aggregate complicity in the attack against a 
civilian population. This is in the sense of: (a) the existence of an 
organisation; and, (b) that the organisation was complicit in the attack.  
On a casual view, there may be the temptation to think that this manner 
of complicity is easily proved when you have an armed group alleged to 
have sponsored the attack. That may well be the case, when you have an 
armed group that had claimed responsibility for a particular attack.  
But, even here, it is an interesting question how you prove in a court of 
law that the statements made in the media by someone claiming 
responsibility for, say, a terrorist attack, is a claim that must translate into 
the imputation of criminal responsibility against a particular accused person 
who pleaded not guilty to the resulting criminal charge. And the question of 
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legal accountability can get even more interesting when no armed group 
has claimed responsibility for the attack; in addition to the accused’s 
profession of his own innocence in relation to any resulting criminal 
charge.  
In those scenarios, it becomes very difficult to find the link in the fact 
pattern that readily connects the accused to an organisation, for purposes of 
establishing that centrally-directed aggregate complicity said to be a 
necessary element of crimes against humanity, by virtue of article 7(2)(a) 
of the Rome Statute. 
But, beyond all that, there is the broader question, from the point of 
view of accountability, as to the wisdom - in the first place - of requiring 
proof of centrally-directed aggregate complicity in an attack that shocks the 
conscience of humanity. 
 
‘State-like’ Organisation 
Then there is the extended or extreme version of the theory of centrally-
directed aggregate complicity. That theory is to the effect that it is not 
enough merely to prove that an aggregate entity was behind the attack and 
had directed it. But, just as crucially, it must be proved that the organisation 
in question has ‘state-like’ characteristics. The reason for this insistence is 
said to be that article 7(2)(a) speaks of ‘state or organisational policy’. That 
asyndetic phrasal structure, it is argued, has a distinct substantive 
significance - in the sense (the argument goes) of signalling that the Rome 
Statute does not cover attacks by ‘gangsters, motorcycle gangs, drug 
cartels, or even serial killers’ or ‘mafia-type groups’ against a civilian 
population, whether or not they acted further to an organisational policy - 
regardless of the degree of widespread or systematic nature of the attack. 
It is enough to say that the extreme version of the theory of centrally-
directed aggregate complicity did not take into account that international 
criminal law got its start centuries ago, by criminalising pirates and slave 
traders as hostis humani generis. If one considered that those enemies of 
humanity were really no different from ‘gangsters, motorcycle gangs, drug 
cartels, or even serial killers’ or ‘mafia-type groups’, the tendency of the 
Rome Statute to cover those kinds of criminals may not be too far-fetched 
after all. It does so, not so much by looking at what the culprits are called 
as a criminal genre, or how they are organised, but by their actual infliction 
of widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population in any 






At a fundamental level, the implication of these theories simply comes 
to this: for purposes of the Rome Statute, there is no international crime, in 
the order of crimes against humanity, unless centrally-directed aggregate 
complicity can be proved. The theory of centrally-directed aggregate 
complicity - in any of its versions - raises a myriad of very difficult 
questions that worry the theory’s normative stability. 
 
Complementarity 
In order to appreciate that normative instability, we may begin by 
keeping in mind that the operative force of the Rome Statute is triggered 
only as a matter of last resort. In other words, the jurisdiction of the ICC is 
a complementary one. That means, as you will recall, that the Rome Statute 
system engages only when States with the closest sovereign connections to 
the situation in question have proved unable or unwilling to exercise 
national criminal jurisdiction genuinely.  
This, then, is a critical prerequisite - and a threshold issue. It is a 
threshold matter in the sense that before we can get to the question of 
whether the material facts of the case would satisfy the elements of crime 
as set out and defined in the Rome Statute for purposes of its classification 
as an international crime, it must be shown that the States with the closest 
sovereign connections to the case have proved unwilling or unable to 
exercise national criminal jurisdiction at all or genuinely. 
Now, this prerequisite immediately begins to drag in the following 
proposition: However deeply shocking to the conscience of humanity, and 
however widespread the massacre of a civilian population might be, no one 
implicated in, say, a massacre may be tried at the ICC for a crime against 
humanity, unless aggregate complicity can be shown to have driven the 
attack. And - here is the clincher - it is wholly irrelevant that the national 
authority with sovereign jurisdiction over the crime has been unwilling or 
unable to investigate or prosecute the crime genuinely. I do not know about 
you, but the proposition induces a very sinking feeling in my own heart. 
For it feels to me like a prescription for a miscarriage of accountability for 
a crime that shocks the conscience of humanity. 
 
Comparative Factual Situations 
The looming absurdity may further be viewed from the following 
illustrative angle (SLIDE). In Situation A, a widespread or systematic 
attack that left 1,000 victims dead amounts to a crime against humanity, 
because there is clear evidence of centrally-directed aggregate complicity. 
But there is no crime against humanity in Situation B, where a widespread 
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or systematic attack left 5,000 victims dead: this is simply because there is 
no clear evidence of centrally-directed aggregate complicity in the attack. 
Some may think it a far-fetched example, that 10,000 people could ever be 
subjected to a ‘widespread or systematic attack’ without centrally- directed 
aggregate complicity. But it requires only to consider that ‘Little Boy’ (the 
smaller of the two bombs dropped on Japan over 70 years ago) killed over 
70,000 in Hiroshima.1 It took one airplane to deliver that lethal payload. 
Is it possible that a single individual may be able in the future to fly one 
airplane, and may be able to drop one bomb or two that could kill that 
many people - equalling the total population of an ethnic or national 
population? In contemplating the probabilities in that question, it may help 
to keep in mind that there are 30 countries around the world, the population 
of each of which is less than 70,000 inhabitants. It may also help to keep in 
mind that there are over 30 football stadiums around the world with 
occupant capacities ranging between 70,000 and 150,000 people. The May 
Day Stadium in Pyongyang, North Korea has a capacity of 150,000 people. 
There are 40 countries each of which has less than that number of 
inhabitants. 
All that should give us some perspective on how many innocent 
civilians can be exposed to the atrocities of one incident alone or a few at 
most - thus making the aggregate complicity a pointless inquiry in the order 
of crimes that have the capacity to shock the conscience of humanity. 
With the endless quest of science to shrink kinetic matter to the 
vanishing point, the conception of crimes against humanity can, thus, not 
depend on the practical ability of States - acting in good faith - to secure 
humanity against the ability of individuals to inflict casualty and 
destruction upon a very large number of people, with weapons of mass 
destruction that come in small sleevings - regardless of the question 
whether they acted pursuant to centrally-directed aggregate complicity.  
Indeed, harm from ‘lone wolves’ need not come in the dramatic manner 
of exploding bombs. Depending on the circumstances, the intentional 
release of injurious chemical or biological agents for civilian populations to 
ingest or inhale, may properly raise questions of an attack against the 
civilian population such as may amount to a crime against humanity. 
The foregoing betray absurdities that may not readily be presumed as 
the intendment of the State Parties to the Rome Statute in relation to article 
7(2)(a). Yet, that is the logic of the theory of centrally-directed aggregate 
                                                     
1 See Hiroshima in Encyclopædia Britannica at www.britannica.com/place/Hiroshima-
Japan. 
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complicity in a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian 
population.  
It is, indeed, such views of the law that once caused Lord Reid to say: 
‘Sometimes the law has got out of step with common sense. We do not 
want to have people saying: “if the law says that the law is an ass”.2 It is 
possible to save the Rome Statute - and the international law that it helps to 
give shape - from that view. But that requires keeping in mind at all times 
that it is the protection of humanity that gave the Rome Statute its purpose. 
 
Further Reading 
A very large tome can be written on the difficult prospects of the theory 
of centrally-directed aggregate complicity as an element of crimes against 
humanity as defined in the Rome Statute. I do not have the time to engage 
more fully in that discussion. For those of you interested in further 
discussion of the matter, you can read the decision delivered on 5 April 
2016, terminating the case against Ruto and Sang. 
 
Implications for International Crimes in General 
As I said earlier, the questions engaged by the theory of centrally-
directed aggregate complicity render that theory normatively unstable, 
hence making the theory a difficult one to rely on in the actual 
administration of justice. Conversely, the acceptance of the theory may also 
in the long run render unstable other types of international crimes, such as 
war crimes and the crime of genocide. It is noted in this connection that the 
definitions of those crimes in the Rome Statute do not require on their face 
proof of centrally-directed aggregate complicity, as such.  
And here comes one more signal of theoretical instability. Is it correct to 
insist that an incident cannot amount to an international crime, in the 
manner of a crime against humanity, unless centrally-directed aggregate 
complicity is proved? And this is so because of the form of words and 
phrases used to define crimes against humanity in article 7(2)(a) of the 
Rome Statute. 
But what about the definitions of war crimes and genocide within the 
Rome Statute? There is no equivalent form of words and phrases in their 
own definitions that require centrally-directed aggregate complicity as an 
element of those crimes. Does it then mean that the absence of an 
equivalent form of words and phrases in their own definitions, does not 
trouble their status as international crimes? Or will we (sooner or later) 
                                                     
2 Lord Reid, ‘The Judge as Law Maker’ (1972-73) 12 Journal of Society of Public 
Teachers of Law 22 at p. 25. 
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begin to see an evolution - consciously or subconsciously - in the manner of 
normative reorientation of theories concerning the elements of those other 
crimes; so that a subconscious view is taken of them as also requiring proof 
of centrally-directed aggregate complicity as well? After all, we all know of 
the jural kinship that exists between crimes against humanity, war crimes 
and the crime of genocide.  
 
The solution  
If it is accepted that the theory of centrally-directed aggregate 
complicity will lead to absurdity sooner or later, as I fear will be the case, 
notwithstanding the words and phrases appearing in article 7(2)(a) of the 
Rome Statute, the question arises as to what should be the solution, mindful 
of the actual words and phrases appearing in the provision. 
In my view, we are not presented with an impossible legal problem. The 
solution is that article 7(2)(a) must follow the interpretation that Grotius 
and Vattel have offered in their time. Vattel had observed that ‘[t]here is 
not perhaps any language that does not also contain words which signify 
two or more different things, and phrases which are susceptible of more 
than one sense.’3 It is for that reason that ‘[e]very interpretation that leads 
to an absurdity, ought to be rejected; or, in other words, we should not give 
any piece a meaning from which any absurd consequences would follow, 
but must interpret it in such a manner as to avoid absurdity. As it is not to 
be presumed that any one means what is absurd, it cannot be supposed that 
the person speaking intended that his words should be understood in a 
manner from which an absurdity would follow… We call absurd not only 
what is physically impossible, but what is morally so…’4  
Grotius, before him, had said much the same thing. According to him, 
consequences are a proper clue to correct interpretation. As he put it: 
‘Another source of interpretation is derived from the consequences, 
especially where a clause taken in its literal meaning would lead to 
consequences foreign or even repugnant to the intention of a treaty. For in 
an ambiguous meaning such an acceptation must be taken as will avoid 
leading to an absurdity or contradiction’.5 
The absurdity to be avoided is that those who engage in attacks that 
shock the conscience of humanity - especially when directed against 
innocent civilians - by exploiting or harnessing (in abusive way) the lethal 
                                                     
3 Vattel, The Law of Nations, supra, p. 416. 
4 Ibid, p. 418. 
5 Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, including the Law of Nature and of 
Nations (translated from the original Latin with notes and illustrations from political and 
legal writers, by A C Campbell) (1901) p. 179. 
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capacity of science to inflict maximum casualty (beyond strict military 
necessity), should escape accountability, due to some improbable legal 
theories that ignore the plight of humanity that so centrally preoccupies 
international law. That, in my view, should be a guiding consideration in 
measures to bring accountability to bear when non-state actors use unlawful 
weapons in armed conflicts of today and those of the future. 
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Role of civil society in supporting compliance 
Katherine KRAMER 
Programme Director for Asia, Geneva Call 
 
To be clear, there are many civil society organisations (CSOs) that work 
to promote compliance of armed non-state actors (ANSAs) with regards to 
weapons-related issues in different ways and to different degrees. Today, I 
will focus my presentation on the efforts of one NGO, Geneva Call, which 
is unique in many ways, in engaging armed non-state actors to adhere to 
international humanitarian norms, including those related to weapons 
issues. 
Geneva Call is an international humanitarian organization and as such, it 
operates under the principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality, 
independence and transparency (meaning that Geneva Call informs the 
concerned government about its work). Its purpose is to enhance the 
protection of the civilian population during situations of armed violence 
/armed conflict. Geneva Call itself does not classify whether something is a 
non-international armed conflict (NIAC) or not. What is important is 
whether there is an armed non-State actor present, carrying out armed 
action with a humanitarian impact on the civilian population. Geneva Call 
engages ANSAs to respect the principles of international humanitarian law 
(IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL). It is also important to 
note that we are an advocacy organization, not an assistance organization 
(nor a peacebuilding one for that matter). Thus we often work in 
cooperation with local actors and specialized organizations. 
As a quick recap, the majority of ANSAs use small arms and light 
weapons (SALW) as compared to heavy weaponry - although there are 
exceptions to be sure. But generally they are involved in asymmetrical 
warfare against States who are better resourced and equipped. Explosives - 
specifically IEDs - are a main component of most ANSA arsenals. 
Components are cheap and easily obtained.  
Action on Armed Violence (AOAV) identified 59 different armed non-
state actors using explosive weapons in 2015. The most prolific non-state 
actors in 2015 are ISIS, non-Kurdish Syrian rebels, Ukrainian seperatists, 
Houthi rebels and the Afghan Taliban, which collectively account for 56% 
of all explosive weapons incidents. Non-state actors collectively caused at 
least 40% of civilian casualties over all for the period, although this figure 
is considered low as in some cases ANSAs do not claim responsibility and 
in others it is very difficult to attribute an incident to a specific actor. These 
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figures include lawful use (where civilian casualties could be considered 
acceptable collateral damage), as well as unlawful use of explosive 
weapons. 
Geneva Call was launched in March 2000. Until 2010, its engagement 
of ANSAs was focussed solely on promoting the (victim-activated) anti-
personnel mine ban. Geneva Call’s innovative tool, the Deed of 
Commitment, allows ANSAs to both take ownership of the norms, but also 
be part of something bigger than themselves - to join their peers in 
expressing adherence to international humanitarian norms. All ANSAs sign 
the same document, which is then counter-signed by Geneva Call and the 
Government of the Republic and Canton of Geneva, who act as the 
custodians of the commitment.  
To date, 49 ANSAs from around the world have signed the Deed of 
Commitment banning anti-personnel mines. It is currently engaging another 
16 ANSAs on the APM ban, and promoting mine action as an interim step 
for those ANSAs not yet ready to sign. There are some ANSAs using 
victim-activated landmines/IEDs that we are not yet engaging.  
However, it is not enough just to collect signatures. Geneva Call 
monitors and supports the ANSAs implementation of their commitments. 
Mine use has halted, stockpiles have been destroyed, mines have been 
marked and cleared, victims assisted, and communities informed of how to 
live safely in affected areas. As the bottom right picture shows, mine action 
efforts by ANSAs (and CSOs operating in their areas) is often not very 
professional nor up to international standards (of safety much less quality 
assurance). While they would welcome support in these endeavours, often 
support is not forthcoming, so they have to make do.  
Despite the fact that many signatories (nearly half) were former AP 
mine users, compliance to the obligations runs high. There have only been 
a handful of allegations of violations, which Geneva Call then verified—
both by collecting information from different sources, as well as through 
field visits and verification missions. There is one investigation ongoing—
Geneva Call is awaiting government approval to undertake a verification 
mission. However, of the violations investigated to date, it was determined 
that only one ANSA had violated its commitment by using string-pulled 
devices, which if left unattended can function as a trip-wire (and thus 
victim-activated) device. After further discussion with the ANSA 
responsible, it decided to desist such use effective immediately. 
That brings us to the internal cycle for compliance to international 
humanitarian norms by ANSAs. First, it is important that their internal rules 
and regulations are compliant to humanitarian norms. Their policies then 
must be disseminated to their members, who in turn need to put the policies 
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into practice. As with any other internal rules and regulations, the ANSAs 
have to monitor and enforce compliance. Nor is enforcing compliance just 
about sanctioning the person who broke the rule, but identifying what went 
wrong and addressing it. Sometimes this entails launching the cycle once 
again. 
This brings us to Geneva Call’s work to promote compliance to IHL 
more broadly through the promotion of 15 Rules for fighters in internal 
armed conflict (derived from over 140 rules applicable to NIAC as 
identified in the ICRC’s 2005 study of customary international law). In 
2010, Geneva Call formalized its trainings on IHL by developing a specific 
training package and material on the 15 Rules. Today, Geneva Call is 
conducting awareness raising and trainings on the 15 Rules to 
approximately 30 ANSAs, civil society and communities in around 10 
countries. 
In terms of weapons use, the rules 1 (distinction), 2 (proportionality), 3 
(precautionary measures) and 4 (methods and means) are most relevant. In 
2013, Geneva Call launched its «Fighter not Killer» video campaign. We 
have two videos thus far that address weapons related issues. In 2015, 
Geneva Call produced both illustrated booklets and posters to help with the 
dissemination of the norms to combatants. The same year, we also launched 
a mobile phone application to test combatants’ knowledge of the 15 Rules 
(which includes a section on weapons use). I have used some of the 
scenarios in training and they are very popular. 
In terms of the explosive weapons issue, with regards to ANSAs, 
Geneva Call: 
• continues to conduct workshops and advocate for the respect of the 
AP mine ban 
• conducts training on IHL. 
• included a session on the humanitarian impact of the use of explosive 
weapons in populated areas for 35 ANSAS attending the 3rd Meeting 
of Signatories to the Deeds of Commitment in November 2014 
• encourages ANSAs to refrain from using explosive weapons in 
densely populated areas (which is a commitment we made during the 
World Humanitarian Summit) 
• plans to undertake a research project on explosive weapons use by 
ANSAs, funding permitting. 
 
Geneva Call also contributes its experience in engaging ANSAs on 
explosive weapons-related issues to international fora aimed at trying to 
address the explosive weapons problem.  
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• We promote the engagement of ANSAs towards changing behaviour, 
as in our experience it works (at least with the majority of ANSAs 
we have engaged) 
• We encourage the clearance and destruction of ERW in areas where 
ANSAs are ready and willing to cooperate. I remember a time when 
there was a window of opportunity to destroy a number of AP mines 
in Somalia, however, by the time assistance was mobilized, the 
window had closed and Al Shabbab had moved in. Later, when 
access was again possible, it was found that the explosive 
components had been salvaged and most likely used in IEDs.  
• Local civil society and communities can play an instrumental role in 
encouraging most ANSAs to change their behaviour. As such, these 
organizations should be trained on IHL to aid in the dissemination 
and advocacy process. 
• Supporting ANSAs in the implementation of their different 
humanitarian commitments can also aid to curb the diffusion of these 
devices and help create powerful advocates for positive change. 
• Lastly, it is important to remember that ANSAs also become victims 
of explosive devices, becoming hors de combat and, therefore, should 
also receive medical care. Civilian victims in ANSA-controlled areas 
should also receive aid. All too often these victims receive much less 
assistance than those in government controlled areas. 
 
Yes, Geneva Call has had positive results, but it is not without its 
challenges. It has faced roadblocks to access - restrictions placed by States 
or in some cases security challenges. It is difficult to show ANSAs the 
benefits of compliance, especially if the ANSA’s policy or practice 
includes unlawful use of weapons. There is a dismal lack of technical 
assistance for clearance/EOD. States’ unlawful use of weapons is also a 
challenge. Why should they comply if the States do not? And, lastly, 
changing behaviour takes time. Patience is a must; especially from donors 
who might expect an immediate change of behaviour of the groups we are 
engaging. 
In conclusion, it is hard for governments and government organizations 
to directly engage in dialogue with ANSAs without it becoming 
politicized…this makes the work of civil society in supporting compliance 
by ANSAs essential. But, we can’t do it without the support of 
governments namely, those concerned, who provide access; those who 
fund; those who mobilize to ensure clearance and EOD can take place; and 
those who work to ensure there is humanitarian space within which 
engagement can take place. 
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VI. The use of explosive weapons 

























Un-/Acceptable Area Effects? 
Assessing Risk of Civilian Harm from the Use 
of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas 
in Three Cases before the ICTY 
Maya BREHM 
Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law 
and Human Rights 
“Clearly, it is impossible to predict what happens to 
a particular munition; all that may be done is to 
describe the behavior, in a statistical sense, of the 
sample of impact points.”1 
“The application of… precautions arises, first of all, 
from a moral perspective, namely how best to act 
responsibly and within the codes of accepted behavior 
and international law; and, secondly, on a much more 
pragmatic and military basis, in order to gain and 
maintain the support of the indigenous population… A 
consideration of such precautions was as relevant in 
1995 as it is today, and will be tomorrow.”2 
Introduction 
 
In recent years, humanitarian actors and international policy makers 
have raised growing concern about the harm caused to civilians by the use 
of explosive weapons, such as air-dropped bombs, artillery and mortars, 
rockets and cluster munitions. Across different conflicts, civilians make up 
over 90% of those directly injured or killed when explosive weapons are 
used in populated areas, such as in towns or cities.3 The use of explosive 
weapons that affect a wide area with blast and fragmentation is of particular 
                                                     
1 M.R. Driels, Weaponeering: Conventional Weapon System Effectiveness, 2nd edn, 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA), 2013, p 135. Consider also, 
No-Strike and The Collateral Damage Estimation Methodology, [United States of America] 
Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction, CJCSI 3160.01A, 12 October 2012, D-2: 'The CDM does 
not predict the actual outcome of weapon employment'. 
2 ICTY, The Prosecutor v Ante Gotovina, Ivan Čermak and Mladen Markač, IT-06-90-
A, ‘Lt General Applegate’s Comments on Expert Witness Report’, Notice of the Filing of 
Public Redacted Version of Prosecution Response to Gotovina’s Second Rule 115 Motion, 
and Request for Change of Status in Corrigendum, 3 August 2012, Public Annex I, p 5663. 
3 E.g. C. Hitchcock, Patterns of Harm: Five Years of Explosive Violence, 2011-2015, 
Action on Armed Violence, June 2016. 
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concern from a humanitarian perspective.4 The documented pattern of harm 
to civilians from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas calls into 
question the capacity of existing rules of international humanitarian law 
(IHL) governing the conduct of hostilities, as implemented in present 
practice, to effectively protect civilians against the effects of explosive 
weapons.5 The UN Secretary-General and other international and non-
governmental actors are calling on states to review military practice and 
policy on explosive weapons. A number of states are taking steps to 
enhance the protection of civilians, including by way of a political 
commitment to refrain from the use of explosive weapons with wide area 
effects in populated areas.6 
Several judgments of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) deal with the legality of explosive weapon use in a 
populated area. This contribution examines how risk of civilian harm from 
such use is described in case materials and how such descriptions are 
translated into legal determinations in three cases: Martić (IT-95-11), Galić 
(IT-98-29) and Gotovina et al. (IT-06-90). Materials submitted by the 
prosecution and the defence indicate what legal professionals deem 
permissible use of explosive weapons in light of IHL rules for the 
protection of civilians. Testimonies and reports by expert witnesses afford 
insights into what military practitioners consider appropriate and acceptable 
in light of professional standards. 
The case discussion shows that views diverge among legal and military 
practitioners about where the line against wide area effects of explosive 
weapons should be drawn. The ‘200m-Standard’ proposed by the Trial 
Chamber in Gotovina is controversial. The discussion also shows, however, 
that practitioners and judges routinely use a variety of measures, including 
metrics, to assess the acceptability, respectively, the permissibility, of risk 
of civilian harm from explosive weapons. Such metrics can support the 
articulation of a more widely shared and concrete, normative standard 
                                                     
4 Wide-area effects can result from the inaccurate delivery of a munition, a wide 
dispersal pattern of multiple munitions, a large blast or fragmentation radius of a munition 
or a combination of these factors. 
5 For a more detailed treatment of the issue, see, e.g. M. Brehm, ‘Protecting Civilians 
from the Effects of Explosive Weapons in International Humanitarian Law’, in C. Harvey, J. 
Summers and N. D. White (eds), Contemporary Challenges to the Laws of War: Essays in 
Honour of Professor Peter Rowe, Cambridge University Press, October 2014, pp 235-267; 
ICRC, Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas: Humanitarian, Legal, Technical and 
Military Aspects, Expert Meeting, Chavannes-de-Bogis, Switzerland, 24 - 25 February 2015, 
June 2015. 
6 For a compilation of relevant statements and further references, see International 
Network on Explosive Weapons (INEW), www.inew.org/acknowledgements. 
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against which practices of explosive violence can be judged with a view to 





In ICTY case law, concern about the effects of explosive weapons on 
civilians tends to be framed in terms of the IHL prohibition to direct attacks 
against civilians and civilian objects, the prohibition on indiscriminate 
attacks, the prohibition on disproportionate attacks and the obligation to 
take precautionary measures in attack and against the effects of attack.7 As 
attackers seldom admit to having launched a direct attack on civilians, 
jurisprudence dealing with the use of explosive weapons in populated areas 
tends to revolve around the question whether an attack was indiscriminate 
or, more rarely, whether it was disproportionate or violated the attacker’s 
precautionary obligations.8 
Launching an indiscriminate attack or using an indiscriminate weapon is 
a serious violation of IHL but these acts are not listed among the crimes 
over which the ICTY has jurisdiction. It does have jurisdiction, however, 
over the war crime of attacking civilians.9 The ICTY has adopted the 
position that the ‘indiscriminate character of an attack’ can assist in 
determining whether the attack was directed against the civilian population, 
and that ‘attacks which employ certain means of combat which cannot 
discriminate between civilians and civilian objects and military objectives 
are tantamount to direct targeting of civilians’. The war crime of directing 
an attack on civilians can, thus, be ‘inferred from the indiscriminate 
character of the weapon used’.10 
                                                     
7 Arts 51(2-5), 52(2), 57 and 58, 1977 Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions (API), reflecting customary IHL, applicable in non-international and 
international armed conflict. 
8 E.g. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Caso Masacre de Santo Domnigo v 
Colombia, Judgment, Series C, no 259, 30 November 2012, §§228-229 (finding that 
launching a cluster munition in or near the urban area of Santo Domingo, was contrary to 
the precautionary principle, in light of the munition’s lethality and limited accuracy). For a 
discussion of why proportionality does not occupy centre-stage, see, e.g., J. Dill, Applying 
the Principle of Proportionality in Combat Operations, Policy briefing, Oxford Institute for 
Ethics, Law and Armed Conflict, December 2010; J. D. Ohlin, ‘Targeting and the Concept 
of Intent’, 35 Michigan Journal of International Law (2013) 79-130. 
9 Under Art 3 of the ICTY Statute, though not spelled out. 
10 ICTY, The Prosecutor v Stanislav Galić, IT-98-29-A, Judgment (Appeals Chamber), 
30 November 2006, §132. This inference is not automatic, however. For an accused to be 
held responsible for the ‘wilful killing’ of civilians as a war crime, the victim must be dead, 
the death must have been caused by an act or omission on the part of the accused (or a 
170 
There is insufficient consensus about what commonly used explosive 
weapons are deemed indiscriminate in certain or all contexts, absent a 
specific treaty prohibition, as exists, for example, for cluster munitions and 
anti-personnel landmines.11 The criteria that are most frequently used to 
determine whether a weapon is of ‘indiscriminate character’ are those laid 
out in Art 51(4) of 1977 Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions (API) relating to a user’s capacity to direct a weapon and limit 
its effects.12 Consequently, the legality of explosive weapon use in a 
populated area depends on whether a weapon is dirigible enough and is in 
fact sufficiently directed and on whether its effects can be and are in fact 
sufficiently limited, so as not to ‘strike military objectives and civilians or 
civilian objects without distinction’. 
 
 
Measures of Explosive Weapon Effects 
 
Military practitioners tasked with determining what quantity and type of 
munition is required to effectively and efficiently achieve a defined level of 
damage to a target tend to frame issues of dirigibility and limits on the 






The accuracy of delivery of unguided, indirect fire, surface-to-surface 
weapons discussed in the cases examined in this contribution is critically 
dependent on the user’s ability to predict the trajectory of a round and 
knowing the position of the target relative to the launcher. Delivery 
accuracy is a function of many factors, including delivery technique, 
hardware and software capabilities and various non-standard atmospheric 
conditions affecting the flight of the projectile, such as wind.  
                                                                                                                          
person for whom he or she was criminally responsible) and such act or omission must have 
been committed with intent to kill, or in the knowledge that death was a probable 
consequence. With regard to the latter (the means rea), it is insufficient that death was a 
possible consequence, but ‘indiscriminate intent to kill whoever is fatally injured as a result 
of [the perpetrator’s] action is sufficient’. (ICTY, The Prosecutor v Milan Martić, Case no 
IT-95-11-T, Judgment (Trial Chamber), 12 June 2007, §60.) 
11 Under the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions and the 1997 Antipersonnel Mine 
Ban Treaty, respectively. 
12 Art 51(4), API. See also, ICRC, Customary IHL Database, Rules 11 and 71. 
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All indirect fire, surface-to-surface explosive weapon systems 
experience two kinds of random errors: the mean-point-of-impact (MPI) 
error and the precision error. The MPI error (occasion to occasion error)13 
relates to a weapon system’s capability to place ordnance on the intended 
point of impact (on or next to a target). The precision error (round to round 
error) describes the closeness of impact points of a group of rounds to the 
mean point of impact, and is different for each round fired.14 The 
distribution of impact points around a desired point of impact reflects the 
effects of MPI error and precision error. A weapon that is precise but not 
accurate will hit close to the same point repeatedly, but that point may not 
be the desired point of impact. A weapon that is accurate but not precise 
will hit close to the desired point of impact, but not all shots will land close 
to each other, creating a dispersion pattern of impact points. If the weapon 
is both inaccurate and imprecise, the impact points are spread over a large 
area. 
A common measure of the dispersion of impact points is the range error 
probable (REP, PEr) and the deflection error probable (DEP, PEd).15 The 
assumption in the analysis of delivery accuracy data is that the distribution 
of impact points is normal in the statistical sense (which does not hold in 
real life). The REP is, thus, defined as the distance from the desired point of 
impact to one of a pair of lines perpendicular to the range direction, 
equidistant from the desired point of impact, such that 50% of the impact 
points lie between them. Another commonly used measure is the circular 
error probable (CEP, CE50), which is the radius of a circle, centred on the 
desired point of impact such that 50% of the impact points lie within it.16 
The CEP, REP or DEP can be interpreted in two ways: 
 the distance inside which 50% of the munitions are expected to 
impact, or  
                                                     
13 A series of rounds fired or a salvo would be one occasion (Driels, p 127). The 
terminology used is common for surface-to-surface weapon systems and may differ from 
that used in the context of air-to-surface and naval weaponry. 
14 Driels, p 127, 212-213. MPI errors are the result of variations that affect all of the 
rounds on a given occasion the same way, e.g. due to variations in atmospheric conditions, 
variations in muzzle velocity of the projectile, calibration errors in the location system or 
firing technique. Precision errors result e.g. from manufacturing tolerances and round-to-
round variations in launch velocity. 
15 And height error, e.g. for time-fuzed rounds. 
16 Driels, p 136. In many instances, the actual distribution of miss distances is not 
circular, however. The distribution pattern for mortars and gun or rocket artillery is 
elliptical. 
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 the distance inside which a single munition has a 50% chance of 
impacting.17 
 
The other 50% of rounds fall outside of that perimeter, sometimes at a 
considerable distance from the desired impact point. In the case of 
unguided artillery or mortar rounds, rockets or cluster munitions, the 
dispersion pattern can represent an area of several hectares wide. These 
weapons are therefore often called ‘area weapons’, appropriate for use 
against ‘area targets’. A US field manual describes weapons with ‘a CEP 
greater than 50 meters’ as ‘area capabilities’,18 and a US procedure 
concerned with ‘mitigating collateral damage’ establishes a strong 
presumption against the use of unguided munitions to attack a target whose 
dimensions are below the ‘minimum target size value’ (MTS), that is, twice 
the area of 90% of impact points due to delivery error.19 
 
 
Area of Effects 
 
Another measure used to describe explosive weapon effects is the so-
called 'lethal area' (or 'lethal radius', 'damage criterion', 'damage function' or 
'damage definition'), which is an effectiveness index defined for 'a given 
degree of damage by a specific weapon to a particular target'.20 The lethal 
area is a function of the weapon-munition-fuze combination and is 
dependent, among other factors, on the weight and velocity of fragments, 
detonation height, impact angle, the vulnerability of the target to blast and 
fragmentation and the specified level of damage to the target (such as 
'prevent standing enemy combatant from assault within 5 minutes' or 'cause 
irreparable damage to tank'). In the context of ‘collateral damage 
mitigation’, a related measure, the ‘warhead collateral effects radius’ 
(WCER) can be used to describe the distance between a target and the point 
at which the damage from the warhead can be expected to fall below a 
specified level.21 
                                                     
17 Driels, p 136. 
18 Fire Support, US Department of the Army, FM 3-09, 3 November 2011, Sec 2-96. 
19 CJCSI 3160.01A (2012), D-A-16; Driels, p 1027. MTS = 2xDE90 where DE90 for 
surface-to-surface unguided munitions takes into account the MPI, precision error and target 
location error (at the 90% error probable). 
20 Driels, p 283. In weaponeering parlance ‘lethal’ and ‘kill’ do not necessarily mean 
death in the medical sense. 
21 Driels, pp 535, 1021. From an effectiveness perspective, this range describes the 
‘effective miss distance’ (EMD). Rounds impacting within the EMD range still damage the 
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Delivery error and area of effects measures are the basis for the 
calculation of minimum distances to avoid exposing own or friendly troops 
in the vicinity of a detonation to more than a specified level of risk. 
Similarly, with a view to minimizing incidental civilian harm, delivery 
error and weapon effects radius can be combined to calculate the ‘collateral 
effects radius’ (CER)22 and an area around a target where civilians and 
civilian objects are at a certain risk from explosive weapon effects (the 
‘collateral hazard area’ (CHA) in US doctrine).23 Based on the level of risk 
(e.g. a 10% or higher risk of serious or lethal injury from fragmentation to a 
70kg-man wearing two layers of clothing akin to a summer uniform and 
standing in the open (a sports stadium, playground or open-air market) or a 
1% or higher risk of structural damage to buildings in the area due to 
blast)24 and population density data, the total number of civilians in the 
‘collateral hazard area’ can be estimated,25 and measures taken to reduce 
that number to a legally and otherwise acceptable level. Information about 
what ‘collateral damage threshold’ is deemed acceptable in any given 
situation, respectively, at what point risk of incidental civilian harm is 
reduced to an acceptable level is not publicly available. 
Military practitioners commonly use such measures to assess the 
appropriateness of explosive weapon use in a given situation and manage 
the risk of harm to civilians or own/friendly forces in the vicinity of a 
target. Such measures are of interest to legal assessments about 
                                                                                                                          
target to a sufficient degree. From the perspective of civilian protection, the same measure 
can be used to describe the distance within which civilians remain at risk of harm. 
22 A CER can be described as ‘a radius representing the largest collateral hazard distance 
for a given warhead, weapon, or weapon class considering predetermined, acceptable 
collateral damage thresholds that are established for each CDE level’. (CJCSI 3160.01A 
(2012), D-A-3.) 
23 CJCSI 3160.01A (2012), D-A-3. If the estimate is higher than a ‘predetermined, 
situation-specific threshold’ (the ‘non-combatant cut-off value’), additional measures need 
to be taken to limit weapon effects or delivery error before an attack can proceed. 
Ultimately, the decision to attack may have to be reviewed and authorized at a higher 
command level.  
24 Structural damage refers to the % of surface area (floors, walls) or of structural 
volume that is removed to prevent enemy military activity in or the ‘function’ of the 
building. At 1% structural damage, persons within the building are assumed to face a 10% 
risk of serious or lethal fragmentation injury. This method does not take into account the 
effects of blast-induced debris, which ‘has been operationally observed to be a significant 
hazard to noncombatant personnel’. (CJCSI 3160.01A (2012), D-A-2.) 
25 This data can reflect variations in density in function of time of day. It represents ‘the 
likelihood of civilians sustaining injuries if they are standing in the open near the target’. 
However, this method does not take into account ‘transient civilians’, that is, ‘random 
personnel walking by, or standing in close proximity to the intended target’. (Driels, p 1027; 
CJCSI 3160.01A (2012), D-5 and D-A-23.) 
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indiscriminate attacks, even if policy restrictions or requirements based on 
such measures are not explicitly required by IHL.26 Conversely, even an 
elaborate procedure to estimate direct bodily harm to civilians is but one 
measure among others that those who plan or decide upon an attack are 
legally required to take in order to avoiding and minimizing civilian harm.27 
The next section discusses how technical and operational measures to 
manage risk of civilian harm from explosive weapon effects have been used 







The Martić case deals with shelling on 2 and 3 May 1995 of the city of 
Zagreb, Croatia, by forces of the self-proclaimed Republic of Serb Kraijna 
under the command of Milan Martić. M-87 Orkan Multiple Barrel Rocket 
Launchers (MBRL) were used to launch unguided rockets (the exact 
number was not confirmed) into Zagreb from a distance of 47-51km. Every 
rocket carried a warhead containing 288 shaped-charge and fragmentation 
submunitions, each containing 420 steel pellets (ball bearings) to be 
projected as primary fragments upon detonation.28  
Several experts considered that ‘due to its relatively large dispersion 
pattern’, the Orkan was ‘not a particularly suitable weapon for use (firing) 
against populated areas (particularly a large and densely populated area like 
Zagreb) as there is a high probability that major civilian casualties ... will 
result’.29 According to one expert all impact points could be expected to lie 
within an elliptical area of dispersion of 972m by 1032m when the rockets 
are fired from a distance of 49km.30 
The Trial Chamber noted that the ‘dispersion error’ of the rocket 
                                                     
26 According to the CJCSI 3160.01A (2012), D-4, the CDM ‘should not be construed as 
state practice with respect to customary international law’. 
27 Art 57, API. For instance, the method does not account for the risk of harm from 
marking or adjusting rounds of surface-to-surface unguided munitions. It is also unclear how 
indirect and longer-term, though foreseeable harm to civilians (as may result from damage 
to critical infrastructure or explosive remnants of war) is accounted for, and whether the 
models used adequately represent vulnerability to blast and fragmentation of members of the 
civilian population (including children and elderly persons). 
28 Martić, Judgment (Trial Chamber), 12 June 2007, §§462-463. 
29 Martić, Prosecution’s Submission of the Expert Report of Lieutenant Colonel Jožef 
Poje pursuant to rule 94bis, 28 February 2005, p 4145. See also the testimony of Major Ted 
Itani, Public Transcript of Rule 61 Hearing, 27 February 1996. 
30 Martić, Judgment (Trial Chamber), footnote 1248. 
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‘increases with the firing range and that, this error is about ‘1,000m in any 
direction’ when fired from the maximum range. It further noted that ‘The 
area of dispersion of the bomblets on the ground is about two hectares. 
Each pellet has a lethal range of ten metres’ and that ‘the weapon was fired 
from the extreme of its range’.31 The Trial Chamber characterized the 
weapon as ‘a non-guided high dispersion weapon’ and concluded that, ‘by 
virtue of its characteristics and the firing range in this specific instance, was 
incapable of hitting specific targets’. For these reasons, the Trial Chamber 
found that the M-87 Orkan is ‘an indiscriminate weapon, the use of which 
in densely populated civilian areas, such as Zagreb, will result in the 
infliction of severe casualties’.32 
With regard to the relationship between explosive weapon effects and 
the finding of indiscriminateness, several points are noteworthy:  
 the ‘dispersal area’ referred to by the Trial Chamber is a measure for 
all rocket impact points and not one PE or CEP. Furthermore, in a 
footnote, the Trial Chamber pointed out that if a warhead opens 
along the edge of the dispersion ellipse, it is possible that part of the 
bomblets fall outside of the ellipse, by approximately 100m.33  
 In contrast, the Trial Chamber operates with the notion of a 10m 
‘lethal area’, although one expert had testified that casualties can be 
produced up to 50m from the detonation point of a bomblet,34 and 
another had mentioned that a ‘safe distance’ for own unconcealed 
personnel was 300m.35 
 What experts had also said, and which is not reflected in the Trial 
Chamber Judgment, is that they considered the use of the Orkan 
would only be appropriate for firing at targets of dimensions of 
300x200m and above. The Trial Chamber noted that one of the 
alleged targets Zagreb, the Ministry of Defence complex, was 
300x400m large,36 but the Chamber considered, in light of ‘the 
nature of the M-87 Orkan’, that ‘the presence or otherwise of 
military targets in Zagreb is irrelevant’ and concluded that Martić 
                                                     
31 Ibid, §§462-463. 
32 Ibid, §463. 
33 Ibid, footnote 1249. 
34 Martić, Testimony of Major Ted Itani, Public Transcript of Rule 61 Hearing, 27 
February 1996. 
35 Martić, Prosecution’s Submission of the Expert Report of Lieutenant Colonel Jožef 
Poje pursuant to rule 94bis, 28 February 2005, p 4159. 
36 Martić, Judgment (Trial Chamber), footnote 1240. 
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had wilfully made the civilian population of Zagreb the object of 
attack.37 
 
The Martić case is often cited as an early judicial recognition that 
launching cluster munitions into a populated area is deeply problematic 
from a humanitarian standpoint. The weapon that was used is banned today 
under the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions. But what the Judgment 
means for the legality of long-range, unguided MBRL fire into a populated 
area remains ambiguous, not least because the Trial Chamber made 
reference to a variety of metrics, but it is at times unclear what these 






The Galić case concerns the siege of Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
by forces of the Bosnian-Serb Army under the command of Galić between 
September 1992 and August 1994. A variety of explosive weapons were 
fired into Sarajevo during that time, but the Galić case focuses on incidents 
involving 80mm and 120mm mortars. One such incident is the shelling of 
Markale market on 5 February 1994: Around mid-day, a 120mm mortar 
shell landed in the market (which occupied a space of ca. 41m x 23m). The 
shelling killed over 60 persons and injured over 140, including many 
children and elderly people.38 
In the Galić case, no claims were made that mortars are 'indiscriminate 
weapons' per se. The key question was what the (in)accuracy of delivery of 
mortars meant for legal determinations under IHL (and international 
criminal law (ICL)), specifically, whether civilians were directly targeted, 
whether they were the victims of an indiscriminate attack (from which 
intent to attack civilians may be inferred), or whether civilian casualties 
were incidental to a lawful attack. 
                                                     
37 Ibid, §§461, 472. On appeal, the Defence challenged the characterization of the Orkan 
as an indiscriminate weapon and argued that the targets were large and that artillery fire is 
‘fraught with the possibility of [accidental or inevitable] errors’, but the Appeals Chamber 
did not overturn the Trial Chamber’s finding. (Martić, Judgment (Appeals Chamber), 8 
October 2008, §240.) 
38 Galić, Judgment (Trial Chamber), 5 December 2003, §§438-439. The incident is 
sometimes referred to as Markale I. Another attack on the market (the Markale II incident) 
took place on 28 August 1995, shortly after Galić was replaced by Dragomir Milošević. 
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Expert witnesses held different views on the accuracy of mortar fire. 
One expert described mortars in several instances as accurate and as having 
a high probability of hitting a target. According to this expert, ‘The modern 
mortar is no longer the inaccurate weapon of the past, a proficient 
detachment with training can easily hit targets, throughout its ranges, to an 
accuracy of less than 40m’.39 Regarding the Markale market shelling, he 
considered it ‘distinctly possible to hit the market with a single initially 
sighted round’, even more so if the target was pre-recorded.40 This 
characterization contrasts with that of another expert who concluded with 
reference to technical limitations, challenges in accurately aiming mortars 
and weather influence, that mortars ‘are very inaccurate’. That expert 
considered it ‘entirely illegitimate… to be using artillery or mortars… in 
order to try and attack… targets consisting of one building or one vehicle… 
when the ability of artillery or mortar[s]… to hit that target are negligible 
and the chances of that artillery or mortars of hitting the surrounding 
civilian houses is 99.9 per cent.’41 
The Majority of the Trial Chamber adopted the position that ‘a target, 
such as Markale market, can be hit from a great distance with one shot if 
the area is pre-recorded’ and concluded ‘that the mortar shell which struck 
Markale was fired deliberately at the market’. As the market was not a 
legitimate military objective in itself, the Majority found that the crime of 
attack on civilians had been committed.42  
The Appeals Chamber reached the same conclusion, but, interestingly, 
by a different route. Citing testimony to the effect that ‘an experienced 
mortar crew could reach to within 200 m or 300 m of their target on the 
very first shot’, and considering that ‘the closest military target to the 
market was 300 m away’, the Appeals Chamber concluded that ‘whether 
the SRK was aiming for the market itself or for some other target within the 
surrounding 300 m, it was aiming for a target within a civilian area’, and 
the shelling, thus, ‘deliberately targeted civilians’.43  
In other words, the Appeals Chamber treated a shell impact location that 
                                                     
39 Galić, Confidential [Prosecutor’s] Submission of Expert Report [of Richard Higgs], 
27 February 2002, pp 3258, 3249. 
40 Ibid.  
41 Galić, Testimony of Pyers Tucker, 18 June 2002, pp 10028-10029. Consider also, 
Galić, Judgment (Trial Chamber), §457, referring to arguments by Defence experts to the 
effect that the party launching the shell ‘could not have intended to hit Markale market since 
the theory of probability predicts that the likelihood of hitting a target the size of the market 
[assumed to be ca. 36m x 30m] by firing a 120 mm mortar shell from a distance [of between 
1400m to 6464m] is very low, even assuming ideal firing conditions’. 
42 Galić, Judgment (Trial Chamber), §§494-495, 596. 
43 Galić, Judgment (Appeals Chamber), §335. 
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was 300m away from the closest identified target, within a civilian 
populated area, as either directed at civilians or as insufficiently directed 
and therefore indiscriminate in effect, foreshadowing the Trial Chamber’s 
approach in Gotovina. Interestingly, it is the Defence that made the case 
that mortars have wide-area effects. On appeal, it argued that the Trial 
Chamber ‘should have paid a specific attention to the real difficulties 
encountered by any Commander when a war is waged in urban conditions’. 
The Defence considered it ‘clearly proven that the mortar… is designed as 
an area weapon, therefore relatively imprecise and that errors in firing 
could easily and frequently occur. The “danger radius” is equal to or more 
than 500 metres.’44 In response, the Prosecution successfully argued that it 
was incumbent on the Defence to explain how errors and inaccuracy could 
possibly be acceptable in the context of IHL when these problems are 
known in advance.45 The controversy is, thus, not so much about whether a 
mortar is or is not ‘accurate’, but rather, whether it is dirigible enough for 
use in a populated area, respectively what risk of civilian harm is deemed 
acceptable. This question is at the core of the Gotovina-case. 
 
 
Gotovina et al. 
 
The case deals with shelling in Knin, Croatia, on 4 – 5 August 1995. 
According to the Trial Chamber, Knin was in range of seven 122mm BM-
21 Grad MBRLs (18-20km away) and of at least seven 130mm cannons 
(25-27 km away). The total number of munitions fired was not confirmed 
but the Trial Chamber could establish impact locations of 900 shells 
beyond reasonable doubt.46 
The Trial Chamber made one weapon specific remark. It considered 
‘that although MBRLs are generally less accurate than Howitzers or 
mortars, their use by the HV in respect of Knin on 4 and 5 August 1995 
                                                     
44 Galić, Defence Appellant’s Brief, 19 July 2004, §§207-208. 
45 Galić, Prosecution Response Brief, 6 September 2004, §15.13, and at §12.19: ‘… 
evidence that mortars are inherently inaccurate is of no assistance to Appellant. Assuming 
Appellant is correct, and his mortar crews were not capable of a high degree of accuracy, it 
was incumbent upon him to ensure that these uncertainties were factored into targeting 
decisions; i.e. when deciding which type of weaponry is appropriate to the target and 
associated risks… While this unpredictability was a relevant factor when determining 
whether particular weaponry was appropriate for firing into a mixed military/civilian 
environment, it is no excuse to blame factors of uncertainty which are within the knowledge 
of the decision-maker.’ 
46 Gotovina, Judgment (Trial Chamber), 15 April 2011, §1241. 
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was not inherently indiscriminate.’47 Like in Martić, the implication of this 
statement for the legality of firing MBRLs into a populated area remains 
ambiguous, especially as the Trial Chamber did not cite a REP/CEP or 
other relevant measure in support of its statement. 
The Trial Chamber’s analysis focused on delivery accuracy even though 
experts had provided information about the fragment projection range of a 
120mm round (1600m2 to 2100m2, depending on height of burst) and the 
‘lethal area’ of a 155mm round (50m).48 The Trial Chamber noted that if 
MRBL fire was directed using ‘300-metre-diameter circles’ drawn on a 
map, that would have ‘yield[ed] very inaccurate fire results on a specific 
target in Knin’, compared to other fire control methods.49 After discussing 
various PE measures for different weapon systems submitted by expert 
witnesses, the Trial Chamber considered it ‘a reasonable interpretation of 
the evidence that those artillery projectiles which impacted within a 
distance of 200 metres of an identified artillery target were deliberately 
fired at that artillery target.’50 By implication, shells landing further away 
were presumed to have been fired at civilians or to have been insufficiently 
directed, resulting in an indiscriminate attack, from which intent to attack 
civilians may be inferred. 
Various objections to what became known as the ‘200m-Standard’ were 
raised on appeal (summarized in the table below).  
 
The 200m-Standard was rejected by expert witnesses from both sides 
(materials not admitted into evidence), but experts for the Defence 
considered that the fires were appropriate. They characterized them as 
‘general support fires’ intended to achieve a neutralization or harassment 
                                                     
47 Ibid, §1897. 
48 Gotovina, Prosecution Submission of Expert Report of Lt. Colonel Konings Pursuant 
to Rule 94bis, 18 Jan 2008, p 4779. 
49 Gotovina, Judgment (Trial Chamber), §1896. 
50 Ibid, §1898. 
 200m-Standard A metric standard Acceptability/legality of 
explosive weapon use in 
Knin 
Trial Chamber ✔ ✔ ✘ 
Experts for the 
Defence ✘ ✘ ✔ 
Experts for the 
Prosecution ✘ (✘) ✘ 
Amici ✘ ✔ ✔ 
Appeals Chamber ✘ ? ? 
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effect. Artillery weapons, they underlined, are ‘area weapons’ whose 
‘fundamental effectiveness depends on this fact ... It can only achieve a 
significant destructive purpose if used in very considerable quantities’.51 
Artillery, therefore, cannot be expected to comply with a 200m-Standard of 
accuracy, which they deemed ‘totally inconsistent with the science and 
practice of artillery and rocket fire.’52 These experts considered that the 
Trial Chamber had failed to recognize the many factors that can have 
increased delivery error in the case at hand, including long firing range, 
lack of accurate meteorological data, the techniques used for locating the 
target, the battery and for compensating for azimuth, the mixing of 
ammunition lots, the questionable quality of the materiel used, inadequate 
stability/grounding of the MBRLs, inexperienced gunners, and the fact that 
targets were not registered and fires were not observed. One expert 
observed in that regard:  
 
All rounds at issue… were both unregistered and unobserved. Thus, tracking 
doctrine, all 900 rounds effectively were “first rounds,” since none of the 
rounds fired over two days could have been adjusted closer to the target than 
the initial rounds fired.53 
 
Consequently, these experts considered that there was 
 
… absolutely no justification for concluding that rounds falling outside the 200 
metre box were indicative of a deliberate attempt to fire on separate (and 
possibly inappropriate) targets.54 
 
Experts for the Prosecution agreed that the 200m-Standard was 
simplistic and failed to take into account the characteristics of artillery 
weapon systems. They recognized that a metric standard has some 
validity,55 but considered that legal assessments should be made against a 
broader set of factors. In particular, they underlined the importance of 
                                                     
51 Gotovina, ‘Observations by General Sir Timothy Granville-Chapman…’, Notice of 
Filing of Public Redacted Version of Appellant Ante Gotovina’s Second Motion to Admit 
Additional Evidence Pursuant to Rule 115, 31 July 2012, Annex E, p 4670. 
52 Gotovina, ‘Exhibit 21: Expert Report of Lieutenant General Wilson A. Shoffner, US 
Army (retired)’, Appellant Ante Gotovina’s Motion to Admit New Evidence Pursuant to 
Rule 115, 4 November 2011, p 3539. 
53 Gotovina, ‘Exhibit 20: Expert Report of Major General Robert Scales, US Army 
(retired)’, Appellant Ante Gotovina’s Motion to Admit New Evidence Pursuant to Rule 115, 
4 November 2011, p 3544. 
54 Gotovina, ‘Observations by General Sir Timothy Granville-Chapman…’, p 4670. 
55 E.g. Gotovina, ‘Lt General Applegate’s Comments on Expert Witness Report’, p 
5672. 
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tactics, techniques, procedures and rules of engagement in reducing risk of 
civilian harm. In their view, the fires were inappropriate without significant 
mitigating measures, specifically, because fire was directed into a civilian 
populated area. These include specific rules of engagement, accurate and 
up-to-date target lists, a detailed description of targets and their environs, 
the appropriate selection of weapons, fuses and aim-points based on a 
careful target analysis, the definition of restricted engagement areas, the use 
of observation and the registration of fires at the earliest possible 
opportunity, the calibration of weapons, and the use of appropriate 
adjustment techniques (e.g. smoke rounds, transfer fire). According to one 
expert, the attacker ‘at the very least, failed to exercise due care in the 
application of artillery fire’, evidenced, among other things, by the 
inappropriate selection of weapons, specifically, ‘the frequent and extended 
use of MRLs in urban areas’. In his view  
 
… the nature of the fire – not least in the use of MRLs – was inconsistent with 
the engagement of only point or small area targets and careless in their 
consideration of the impact on the local population. ... If the HV did have 
observation, I would have expected artillery fire into Knin to have been 
adjusted and modulated in order to minimize civilian casualties... If they did not 
have observation, the widespread and extended use of artillery fire was even 
more indiscriminate and careless of the lives of those within the town.56 
 
A group of lawyers who submitted an amicus brief (denied by the 
Appeals Chamber) called the measure of 200m ‘an unrealistic operational’ 
and ‘impossible standard’. Remarkably, though, these lawyers did not 
object to the articulation of a metric standard as such. They acknowledged 
that ‘assessing legality of attack effects requires some benchmark of 
acceptable error’ and invited the Appeals Chamber to consider ‘the 
consistency between a 400-meter standard and the realities of operational 
artillery employment’.57 
On appeal, the Majority rejected the 200m-Standard but did not 
articulate an alternative standard, which led to the collapse of the case and 
the acquittal of the accused. Two judges filed strongly worded dissenting 
opinions. Judge Pocar pointed out that the Majority had failed to determine 
                                                     
56 Gotovina, ‘Lt General Applegate’s Comments on Expert Witness Report’, pp 5684-
5683. See also Gotovina, ‘Comments by Lieutenant General (Retired) C C Brown…’, 
Notice of the Filing of Public Redacted Version of Prosecution Response to Gotovina’s 
Second Rule 115 Motion, and Request for Change of Status in Corrigendum, 3 August 
2012, Public Annex II, pp 5636, 5631, 5625. 
57 Gotovina, Amicus brief, 12 January 2012, §§16-7. See also, ‘Lt General Applegate’s 
Comments on Expert Witness Report’, p 5684. 
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whether the artillery attacks on Knin and other towns were lawful or not in 
light of IHL, and raised several critical questions: 
 
Does the Majority consider that the correct legal standard was a 400-metre 
standard? A 100-metre standard? A 0-metre standard?… the Majority also fails 
to clarify on which basis the correct legal standard should have been 
established. Does the Majority consider that a legal standard can be established 
on a margin of error of artillery weapons? Does the Majority consider that a 
trial chamber is entitled in law to establish a presumption of legality to assess 
the evidence of the shelling attacks and the artillery impacts in order to 
establish the lawfulness of the attack?….58 
 
	
Concluding Remarks and Outlook: Toward a Metric Standard to 
Judge Wide-Area Effects? 
 
To this day, Judge Pocar’s questions remain unanswered. This is 
problematic from the perspective of civilian protection and with a view to 
legal certainty. The International Criminal Court’s (ICC) confrontation with 
these issues is on the horizon. For instance, in its request for authorization 
of an investigation into the situation of Georgia, the Prosecution describes 
Grad MLRS and cluster munitions as ‘weapons that cannot be accurately 
used against military targets in civilian areas’ and argued that ‘[b]y their 
nature, the use of Grad MLRS in urban areas renders them incapable of 
striking solely military objectives or of avoiding extensive damage to 
civilian property within the radius of 100-150m from the intended target’.59 
And in the case of Laurent Gbagbo, Pre-Trial Chamber I concluded in 
relation to the shelling of Abobo market, Abidjan, on 17 March 2011, that 
‘the area falling within the radius of action’ of the 120mm mortar was 
‘densely populated’ and that ‘mortar shells have a highly destructive impact 
                                                     
58 Gotovina, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Pocar to the Judgment (Appeals Chamber), 
§13. 
59 ICC, Situation in Georgia, Corrected Version of Request for Authorisation of an 
Investigation Pursuant to Article 15, ICC-01/15-4-Corr, 16 October 2015, §§196, 201. The 
Prosecution notes that the decision of whether to charge with the commission of the war 
crime of intentional attack on civilians or civilian objects under 8(2)(b)(i)-(ii) or of 
launching a disproportionate attack under 8(2)(b)(iv) requires an ‘assessment of the exact 
nature and scale of the used weapons and their effects, the known area of ‘spread’ of sub-
munitions, the character of the targeted area and the physical proximity of residential 
civilian areas to military objectives, or the availability of alternative weapons’. 
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and are inherently inaccurate, as the exact distance … and the precise 
trajectory depend on a series of circumstances beyond human control’.60 
Although what can be gleaned from the analysis of ICTY cases above is 
limited in several regards,61 judgments and court records can help identify 
the boundaries of acceptable behavior and indicate how the protection of 
civilians can be enhanced, including, if necessary, by means of additional 
normative restrictions on the use of explosive weapons with wide-area 
effects.  
Some key points that emerge from the case discussion include: 
 The ICTY does not follow one single method for characterizing and 
assessing the effects of explosive weapon use in populated areas on 
civilians for the purpose of making legal determinations under IHL 
and ICL. Often, it is not apparent from a judgment how operational 
measures and restrictions used to manage risk of harm to civilians or 
own/friendly forces are translated into legal findings. 
 The ICTY’s jurisprudence recognizes wide-area effects of explosive 
weapons as a key concern for the protection of civilians in populated 
areas. In the cases discussed, the Tribunal tends to express this 
concern in terms of dispersion area and delivery accuracy.62 
 Although the ICTY assesses the legality of a weapon’s use in light of 
the circumstances of an individual attack (or even a 'single-round-
incident'), its jurisprudence reflects more categorical determinations 
about a weapon’s legality (per se) in the circumstances of a 
populated area. Martić, for example, can be read as a categorical 
                                                     
60 ICC, The Prosecutor v Laurent Gbagbo, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges 
against Laurent Gbagbo, ICC-02/11-01/11, 12 June 2014, §63. 
61 ICTY jurisprudence dealing in detail with doctrines and practices of explosive 
weapon use is scarce. The three selected cases concern indirect-fire, surface-to-surface 
explosive weapons to the exclusion of other delivery methods and types. The framing of 
harm from explosive violence in case materials is subject to prosecutorial choices and 
defence strategies and the strict evidentiary standards of a criminal procedure. The cases 
focus on a few attacks or even single-round-incidents and do not adequately reflect the 
human suffering caused during the wars in the Balkans by explosive and other forms of 
violence. Any normative finding in an ICL framework is highly context-dependent. 
62 Cf ICTY, The Prosecutor v Dragomir Milošević, IT-98-29/1, Judgement (Trial 
Chamber), 12 December 2007, which addresses concerns raised by explosive weapon use, 
irrespective of delivery accuracy. The Trial Chamber found that the modified air-bomb is an 
‘indiscriminate weapon’, both, due to its inaccuracy, which meant it could only be ‘directed 
at a general area’ (against targets of ‘hundreds of square meters’) and its ‘extremely high 
explosive force’, a reference to its blast and fragmentation effects. (Ibid, §§95, 97, 912; See 
also D. Milošević, Prosecution’s Notice of Filing of English Language Version of Expert 
Report of Berko Zečević, 16 April 2007, pp 4128-4126.) In the same case, intent to terrorize 
civilians was inferred from the use of mortars, described as accurate, and from the use of 
modified air bombs, described as inaccurate. 
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rejection of non-guided, high-dispersion explosive weapons in 
densely populated civilian areas. 
 Where and how a categorical line against the use of explosive 
weapons with wide-area effects should be drawn is disputed. Clearly, 
though, when explosive weapons are used in a civilian populated 
area, there is a point at which the effects are such that the question of 
whether the (risk of) harm to civilians was intended or incidental 
takes second place. The risk of civilian harm is so high (and 
foreseeably so) that it is no longer plausible to justify civilian harm 
by reference to it being an unintended, tragic side-effect. 
 Even though experienced military experts share a common 
understanding of the purpose and effects of artillery (and other 
explosive weapons), views diverge significantly on what constitutes 
acceptable effects and risk of civilian harm in a populated area. As 
the Appeals Chamber Judgment in Gotovina illustrates, this 
translates into controversy and uncertainty about the legal limits of 
explosive weapon use in populated areas. 
 Metrics are commonly used in military doctrine and practice to 
manage risk of harm to civilians and to own forces from explosive 
weapons. Such measures can be expressed in absolute terms or 
relative to a target’s dimensions. They can form the basis for 
restrictions or procedural requirements and can take into account, 
both, delivery accuracy and area of effects. In the cases discussed, 
when expert witnesses characterize risk of civilian harm, they tend to 
have regard to the total area of impact locations in the statistical 
sense, rather than the area where 50% of rounds can be expected to 
fall. 
 Even before the Trial Chamber Judgment in Gotovina, the ICTY 
used metrics to judge the legality of explosive weapon use in 
populated areas. In spite of criticism of the 200m-Standard, expert 
testimony and legal opinion suggest that a metric measure has some 
validity and there is scope for using such a measure to draw a clear 
line against impermissibly high risk of civilian harm from wide-area 
effects.63 
                                                     
63 Greater attention to delivery accuracy and area of effects in individual attacks or 
single-round incidents should, however, not detract from consideration of the wider pattern 
of civilian harm resulting from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas. To 
effectively enhance the protection of civilians, the indirect, though foreseeable, civilian 
harm, including damage to critical infrastructures, explosive remnants of war and 
reverberating effects, must also be reduced. See, e.g., I. Robinson, ‘The Obligation to Take 
into Account Reverberating Effects: Proportionality and Precautions in Attack’, in ICRC, 
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An open conversation among military-technical and legal professionals 
about how elements of existing military policy and practice aimed at 
reducing harm to civilians can be translated into legal assessments would 
further the articulation of a more widely shared, normative standard against 
which practices of explosive violence can be judged. Judicial bodies can 
contribute to the elaboration of more specific guidance to explosive weapon 
users about what is expected of them in terms of measures aimed at 
avoiding, and at any rate, minimizing harm to civilians by situating legal 
assessments more explicitly vis-à-vis technical and operational standards. 
  
                                                                                                                          
Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas: Humanitarian, Legal, Technical and Military 
Aspects, Expert Meeting, Chavannes-de-Bogis, Switzerland, 24 - 25 February 2015, June 
2015, pp 21-23; C. Wille, The Implications of the Reverberating Effects of Explosive 
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Good practices on restricting use 
of explosive weapons in populated areas 
Sahr MUHAMMEDALLY 
Senior Program Manager MENA & South Asia, 
Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC), New York 
 
There are limited military policies that are publicly known that limit the 
use of explosive weapons in populated areas. Reporting by civil society, 
ICRC, media shows growing civilian harm in populated areas with the use 
of explosive weapons. A survey of known practices by militaries suggests 
that interpretation of IHL obligations supplemented by policy restrictions 
govern the use of explosive weapons in populated areas. 
The first example is AMISOM (African Union Mission in Somalia, 
regional peacekeeping mission operated by the African Union with 
approval from UN Security Council) deployed to fight Al-Shabaab. Al-
Shabab Mogadishu were launching attacks at AMISOM. AMISOM 
responded indirect fire including artillery which resulted in civilian harm in 
Mogadishu a populated area. AMISOM was under much criticism for 
causing civilian casualties. My organization CIVIC (Center for Civilians in 
Conflict) along with a retired major general from the UK undertook an 
assessment of the gaps in AMISOM policies on the use of certain weapons. 
We developed an indirect fire policy and AMISOM implemented it. This 
policy had a three-step process: avoid, attribute and amend. AMISOM 
should avoid the use of indirect fire. Where allegations occur AMISOM 
would attribute responsibility by investigating & assessing incidents, 
making amends to those who have been injured, acknowledging civilian 
harm, and providing financial assistance 
One of the concerns in using indirect fire was inaccuracy problems and 
lack of proper training. It took leadership on AMISOM’s part to recognize 
that and to implement a policy to remedy the problems. AMISOM started 
conducting collateral damage estimates before using certain weapons; in-
theatre training on the use of certain weapons; conducting after action 
reviews to take into account civilian harm; and created a civilian casualty 
tracking analyses cell (CCTARC). The CCTARC is the tool that allows 
military to assess the impact of operations on civilians, to gather the 
information to cross check with the external sources and identify what 
causes civilian harm, to recognize if additional training and new guidance 
is needed for forces in order to minimize civilian harm in a future situation. 
This cell was also supported by two UN Security Council resolutions. 
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CIVIC helped AMISOM create this tracking in 2015. The implementation 
of the AMISOM indirect fire policy resulted in a reduction in civilian harm.  
Meanwhile in ISAF (International Security Assistance Force, a NATO-
led security mission in Afghanistan), as the tempo of the conflict was 
increasing in 2006-2007-2008, there were a lot of concerns of civilian 
casualties caused by air strikes which eventually led to several changes in 
policies and training. Tactical directives were issued by a successive ISAF 
commander from 2008-2011, specifically trying to address and give 
commanders guidance on minimizing civilian harm and protecting 
civilians, but also suggesting additional restraints on the use of certain kind 
of weapons in certain areas. For example, there were restriction on the use 
of air strikes on residential compounds, cluster bombs were prohibited in 
2007; the use of indirect fire was also limited as it couldn’t be used on a 
moving target or in populated areas, Suggestions were made on using 
alternatives instead of indirect fire, such as snipers. Forces started to get a 
lot of increased training on the use of indirect fire to increase their 
proficiency. Some of these changes came about as ISAF was receiving 
better information from all the various regional commands and 
crosschecking it with external organizations to see what was the cause of 
civilian harm and how ISAF could change it. ISAF also began using tools 
to reduce civilian harm, such as positive identification determination (PID) 
prior to engagement, collateral damage estimates, battle damage 
assessments taking into account civilian harm, and scenario-based trainings 
both in theatre and pre-deployment on civilian casualty mitigation. A 
civilian casualty mitigation team was set up to track analyse the causes of 
civilian harm and to make recommendations in training and guidance. The 
documentation by external organizations on civilian casualties in 
Afghanistan is robust and by the end of ISAF mission one saw a reduction 
in civilian harm as a result of these policies.  
Looking at some other countries, the UK manual of the law of armed 
conflicts also recognizes that using the artillery in populated areas can 
cause incidental harm. The UK also conducts collateral damage estimates 
and battle damage assessments after operations. At the expert working 
group meeting on explosive weapons that the ICRC hosted in December 
2015, Ugandan officials discussed their policies on artillery and reported 
that it is only approved by the highest commander and they used military 
safe distances (MSDs) to determine how close explosive weapons should 
be used in relation to friendly fires. 
There is a lot of information that the US military puts out publicly in 
terms of their joint doctrines on urban operations, joint targeting manual, 
and a protection of civilians manual. We can learn a lot about US doctrinal 
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guidance on use of lethal force in populated areas. For example, US 
guidance on explosive weapons include: Indirect fire training to increase 
proficiency including with those who will call for the fire and forces laying 
and firing the guns; avoiding pre-emptive battery without knowledge of 
absence of civilians; use of precision or low collateral damage munitions; 
increasing safety zone and time that assets monitor area prior to fires during 
registration; avoiding using indirect fires on moving targets. The US 
military also conducts battle damage assessments, pattern of life, and 
positive identification determination. 
In 2015 the US issued a protection of civilians doctrine which sets out 
larger principles on the protection of civilians and recommends alternative 
methods to limit civilian harm, specifically, “(d)uring actions on contact, 
use fire and maneuver rather than indirect fires and airstrikes as the default 
response, and raise the authority for fire clearance to higher command 
levels.”  
Policies are only good in as far as they are implemented. Leadership 
within the military and commanders’ guidance on prioritizing civilian 
protection is also essential As is the recognition that protecting civilians is 
as important as defeating the enemy. This is not only about legal 
obligations to minimize civilian harm but also operational imperative to 













and challenges to IHL 
Thomas DE SAINT MAURICE 
Legal Advisor, International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva 
This issue is part of the broader topic of urban warfare, which is not a 
new phenomenon. Cities have always been the object of battles and of 
strategic importance in wars. 
But it is mainly over the last decades that correlations are made between 
the types of weapons used, the populated environment in which they are 
used and the extent of humanitarian consequences. 
In addition, with the convergence of the growing urbanization and the 
pattern from some fighters to mingle with civilians, and other factors such 
as the willingness to not expose troops to risks, the use of EWPA became 
more and more a common feature of armed conflicts. 
The ICRC itself is in the forefront in conflict situations, directly 
witnessing the devastating impacts on civilians of the use of explosive 
weapons having wide area effects in populated areas. 
In summary, what I would like to show today is that the use in 
populated areas of explosive weapons having a wide impact area, even 
when aiming at a legitimate military target, raise concerns due to the extent 
of incidental civilian casualties and damages. 
Before entering the main part of my presentation, I would like to share 
some elements of definitions. “Explosive weapons” are activated by the 
detonation of a high explosive substance creating blast and fragmentation 
effects. The latter can have “wide area effects” because of the large 
destructive radius of the munition, the inaccuracy of the delivery system or 
the delivery of multiple munitions over a certain area almost 
simultaneously. These include large bombs and missiles, indirect fire 
weapons such as unguided mortars, artillery and rockets, as well as multi-
barrel rocket launchers and certain improvised explosive devices. 
“Populated areas” is not an easy concept to define. This is why we often 
refer to the term “concentration of civilians” as it is somehow defined in 
IHL treaties, in particular, Additional Protocol I of 1977 and Protocol III to 
the CCW on incendiary weapons. The latter defines the phrase as “any 
concentration of civilians, be it permanent or temporary, such as in 
inhabited parts of cities, or inhabited towns or villages, or as in camps or 
columns of refugees or evacuees, or groups of nomads”. 
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The title of my intervention is « Humanitarian consequences and 
challenges in IHL », so I will focus on the humanitarian and legal aspects. 
The impact on civilians of using explosive weapons with wide area 
effects in populated areas can be very diverse. Of course you have the 
potential direct effects around the point of impact.The most obvious effects 
of such weapons are death and physical injury close to the impact point. 
Death or physical injury can be caused by the blast wave; by fragments 
from the weapon or secondary fragments; by collapsed buildings; or by 
burns. 
Medical studies show that the lethality of injuries caused by explosive 
weapons is between 15 and 25% of those injured. And victims who survive 
are often left with life-long disabilities such as a lost limb or brain trauma. 
Less visible is the tremendous impact of explosive weapons on mental 
health. It is well known that some weapons we are talking about are known 
for their psychological effects on the enemy. The effects on soldiers at the 
receiving end of sustained artillery shelling for instance are known and 
documented, sometimes called “shell shock”, they can also be post-
traumatic stress disorders (PTSD). If these are possible effects on well-
trained soldiers, they are certainly not less for civilians, in particular 
children living that ordeal in their own homes. 
Then, beyond the direct effects, and especially in a city where services 
are interconnected and there is a high density of population, some domino 
effects will cause more victims than the direct effects around the point of 
impact. 
There is notably the impact on health care services. Not only because a 
hospital may be directly hit by a shell, but also because electricity and 
water supplies may be cut off; because health-care staff may be killed, 
injured or unable to get to work, etc. So the capacity of health-care facilities 
is weakened just when they are the most needed to face multiple patients, 
often with multiple injuries from the shelling. 
Urban services in general will be severely affected when explosive 
weapons with wide area effects are used in populated areas, leading to 
further diseases, death and displacements.Urban services are vulnerable to 
the use of explosive weapons in populated areas notably because of their 
interdependence. For instance, a damaged electrical transformer can 
immediately shut down the water supply to an entire neighborhood or 
hospital, which will in turn negatively impact public health. The skills 
required to address such interconnectivity and do the repair is often beyond 
the scope of humanitarian organizations. And if the only staff able to put 
the service back died in a bombing, were injured by rockets or have fled the 
shelling, or if they simply do not have safe access because of continued 
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fighting or because the area is still contaminated with UXO from explosive 
munitions that failed to function, the service won’t be back on its feet. 
In addition, the combination of various direct and indirect impacts over 
time are cumulative, making them more and more difficult to address with 
time passing. The more weakened essential services become, the worse life 
becomes for residents. 
If services deteriorate beyond a certain point, classic interventions will 
not prevent a slide into a condition that is too difficult or expensive to 
reverse. The classic humanitarian response (say, water- trucking, or ad hoc 
borehole drilling) is often too focused on immediate needs to incorporate 
such medium or long-term considerations. 
We submit that parties to armed conflicts should be more aware and pay 
more attention, notably in their choice of means and methods of warfare, to 
the vulnerabilities of services essential for civilians living in populated 
areas. 
This infographic video [showed on screen - www.youtube.com/watch? 
v=eqg52WgTkEc] summarizes in a simplified way the potential domino or 
cascading effects on civilians the use of explosive weapons having a wide 
impact area can have in populated areas. 
The extent of these humanitarian consequences has led the ICRC to 
state that “due to the significant likelihood of indiscriminate effects, and 
despite the absence of an express legal prohibition for specific types of 
weapons, the ICRC considers that explosive weapons with a wide impact 
area should be avoided in densely-populated areas”. 
In other words, we consider that using explosive weapons that have a 
wide-area effect against an objective located in a concentration of civilians 
entails a high risk of violating the rules of international humanitarian law 
regulating the conduct of hostilities, in particular, the rules prohibiting 
indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks. I will develop a little bit more 
on these two rules. 
It is important to remember at this stage that IHL in itself strikes a 
careful balance between considerations of military necessity and humanity 
and that the overarching objective of the rules regulating the conduct of 
hostilities is that “the civilian population and individual civilians shall 
enjoy general protection against dangers arising from military operations” 
(art. 51 of AP I). 
A critical principle of IHL is that the parties to the conflict are not 
entitled to an unlimited choice of methods and means of warfare, and by 
“means of warfare”, we mean “weapons”. The choice of weapons is, 
therefore, constrained by the general rules of IHL even when no specific 
rules exist concerning a specific type of weapon. In this framework, 
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choosing a weapon that would lead to an indiscriminate or disproportionate 
attack would be unlawful. 
The prohibition of indiscriminate attacks is found in AP I. Most relevant 
for the use of EWPA are: the prohibition of attacks that use weapons which 
cannot be directed at a specific military objective, or the effects of which 
cannot be limited as required by IHL and are consequently attacks of a 
nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without 
distinction, i.e. indiscriminately. 
One of the issues to be discussed is the designed effects of what is often 
called “area weapons”, meaning designed to create effects over a certain 
area, notably by using multiple munitions, for instance unguided mortars or 
artillery rockets. Their intended use is not to be delivered accurately or 
precisely to a specific point target. The questions are the following: 
• in an urban setting, can this type of weapons be directed at a specific 
military objective as required by the law? 
• are these area weapons able not to strike military objectives and 
civilians without distinction when used in a densely-populated area? 
 
This is an example of a legal and operational question we would like to 
work on further: what is the level of accuracy of a weapon that would be 
acceptable to comply with this provision of the law? The treaty rule gives 
two “examples” of an indiscriminate attack.One is area bombardments are 
prohibited and defined by the Additional Protocol I as an “attack by 
bombardment by any methods or means which treats as a single military 
objective a number of clearly separated and distinct military objectives 
located in a city, town, village or other area containing a similar 
concentration of civilians or civilian objects”. This provision is quite 
important in relation to the use of explosive weapons in populated areas. 
Indeed, it says that the mere fact that there are several military objectives in 
a city does not allow parties to the conflict to consider an entire area as a 
legitimate target of attack. Area bombardments of cities, under the sole 
pretext that the enemy has several military assets in that city, is prohibited 
by law. 
The other example of an indiscriminate attack given by the API is the 
disproportionate attack, i.e. “attack which may be expected to cause 
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian 
objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to 
the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.” 
To be noted, in particular, that the law defines that the military 
advantage to be put in the equation must be “direct” and “concrete”. It is 
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important to note that there are no such qualifiers in the rule to specify the 
types of incidental harm that must be put in the equation. 
And indeed, it is widely recognized that the incidental harm that must be 
taken into account by the military includes not only the direct effects of the 
attack (death, injuries and destructions around the impact point), but also 
the “indirect effects”, or what we often call the “reverberating effects” of 
the attack on civilians. 
This point is particularly relevant in the discussion about the use of 
explosive weapons in populated areas. Indeed, and as mentioned earlier in 
the description of humanitarian consequences, urban areas are more prone 
to suffer from indirect effects of an attack than open areas. In the vicinity of 
the military target, maybe there is a power facility. If this facility is 
damaged and the power is cut, it is likely to interrupt the good functioning 
of a health facility in the neighborhood, and it is likely to deprive thousands 
of people of drinkable water. Those are possible indirect effects of the 
attack on a military objective located in a populated area. 
In the view of the ICRC and many experts, these indirect effects must to 
be taken into account in the proportionality assessment to the extent they 
are foreseeable. Of course, all the consequences of an attack cannot be 
known in advance. But we consider that some “reverberating effects” are 
foreseeable and must, therefore, be considered in the equation. And this is 
another challenge of IHL, not only in legal terms but operationally: it is 
quite unclear whether or not and to what extent military processes take into 
account this aspect when they assess the proportionality of an attack before 
carrying it out. 
To take all feasible precautions in the choice of weapons and methods of 
attack with a view to mitigate civilian harm is one of the precautionary 
measures foreseen in the API.In that matter, not only is the choice of the 
weapon to be used for the attack critical but also the manner in which it will 
be used. Choosing specific types and sizes of warheads for instance, the 
quantity of explosive substances), the kind of fuse (impact, delay, 
proximity), the delivery system, the distance from which to launch the 
munitions, the angle and the timing of the attack… are some of the 
measures that can minimize incidental harm, notably by reducing the size 
of the impact area of an explosive weapon. 
But in certain circumstances, with the weapon available, because it still 
has wide-area effects whatever the precautions taken beforehand and 
because of the environment surrounding the target, excessive incidental 
harm are to be expected and the attack would fall foul of IHL. It does not 
matter if there is no alternative at disposal: you cannot attack, according to 
the law. 
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Fighting an enemy in a populated area often means fighting an enemy 
who mingles with the civilian population, sometimes deliberately in order 
to shield its military activities and in violation of its obligations under IHL. 
Also, too often, parties controlling the populated area subjected to 
attacks do not sufficiently respect the rules on precautions against the 
effects of attack. To reduce the harm caused by the use of explosive 
weapons in populated areas certain precautionary measures have to be 
taken by parties to armed conflict to the maximum extent feasible. This 
includes notably the basic requirement to not place military objectives in or 
near densely populated areas. This is also valid for States: avoid building 
your military headquarters in the middle of a city. 
We have discussed other factors which render a populated area a 
complex environment, for example, density of civilians, complexity 
(interconnectedness) of urban services. According to the law these 
difficulties and notably the behavior of the enemy do not suspend the 
obligation to respect IHL when attacking military objectives in populated 
areas. 
But it is also because it is cognizant of all such challenges, both 
operational and legal, and most of all because it is alarmed by the 
humanitarian consequences of the use of explosive weapons with a wide 
impact area in populated areas that the ICRC will continue to work on this 
issue as far as possible with concerned armed actors, governmental and 
non-governmental experts. 
A lot of Armed Forces appear to lack specific guidance on urban 
warfare, notably on the choice of methods and means of warfare against 
military objectives located in densely-populated areas. With warfare 
increasingly moving into cities, it is urgent for armed forces to adapt their 
policies and practices applying to their choice of weapons and tactics in 
such environments. This is to ensure a better protection of civilians against 
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Chemical weapons: old and new concerns about 
their use in non-international conflicts 
 
Veronika STROMSIKOVA 
Director, Office for Strategy and Policy, Organization 
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, The Hague  
 
We have all seen horrific images of the battles that raged around in 
Ieper, Belgium, 100 years ago during World War I. Here, chemical 
weapons were used in so-called modern warfare for the first time with 
devastating human effect. Sadly, we still see such images today from Syria 
and Iraq, where the very same chemicals are being used as weapons – 
chlorine and sulphur mustard. So, you may be wondering, has anything 
really changed? 
The short answer is yes. For one thing, the global security landscape has 
changed. It continues to evolve even as we speak. As I shall outline a little 
later, much has been accomplished to reduce the threat that chemical 
weapons be used by a State as a means of war against another State.  
However, with allegations of use of chemical weapons by non-state 
actors in the context of non-international armed conflicts reported in the 
daily news, it is clear the user of a chemical weapon has enlarged beyond 
States. A few years ago, the question of chemical weapons used by non-
state actors was discussed in the abstract or in singular events, such as the 
Tokyo Sarin subway attack. However, the use of chemical weapons by non-
state actors or “chemical terrorism” is now a stark reality. 
The additional challenge for us is that national security agencies (NSAs) 
do not consider themselves to be bound by international law and, indeed, 
openly flouts accepted norms to instil fear and terror. This especially 
applies to the use of weapons that have been stigmatised by States. 
Most importantly from a humanitarian perspective, the concept of the 
battlefield has changed. War was waged in trenches during the First World 
War with members of the military comprising mostly of the victims of 
chemical weapons. We have seen that “battles” are now fought in 
populated cities, villages and even in road-side cafés. Civilians are no 
longer “collateral damage,” they are often the main target. 
So, here lies the challenge for us all. There is much to be done if we are 
to protect future generations from the inhumane consequences of toxic 
chemicals used as a weapon, particularly when used in non-international 
armed conflicts or to terrorise peaceful civilian populations. As an 
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organisation, the OPCW is at an important juncture in its relatively short 
history. The global prohibition regime stands at a pivot point between 
tangible disarmament achievements and the demanding task of making 
such gains permanent. 
Today, I would like to underscore the importance of the Chemical 
Weapons Convention (CWC), as a legal instrument in protecting 
individuals against chemical weapons use. It has been a crucial baseline for 
the OPCW’s efforts so far and will continue to be so in the future. 
I will also outline some of the unique features underpinning our 
achievements in global chemical weapons disarmament and what we 
consider new and emerging challenges, on the one hand, and “unfinished 
business” on the other namely, coming to terms with the complex challenge 
of dealing with non-state actors, and bringing on board States not yet party 
to the CWC. Neither should be permitted to flout rules-based norms, nor 
harbour any strategic prerogatives in relation to the use toxic chemicals for 
hostile purposes. 
Finally, I’ll leave you with a few thoughts about what might lie ahead. 
Let me begin by speaking about the CWC and its relationships with 
international humanitarian law (IHL), and its role in international law.There 
is a clear link between the CWC and international humanitarian law. The 
Preamble to the CWC reaffirms the principles and objectives of, and 
obligations assumed under the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the 
Convention on Biological and Toxin Weapons of 1972. The Preamble also 
recognizes that the use of chemical weapons by individuals is specifically 
prohibited as a method of warfare under international law. The law of 
international armed conflict has a long and detailed foundation in this 
regard, including the two treaties I just mentioned, as well as The Hague 
Declaration concerning Asphyxiating Gases (1899).  
A number of non-binding instruments purport to prohibit the use of 
chemical weapons in non-international armed conflicts. The International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), in its Study on Customary 
International Humanitarian Law, expressed the view that State practice 
establishes the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons as a norm of 
customary international law applicable in both international and non-
international armed conflicts. It is also notable that the use of chemical 
weapons is included in the list of war crimes over which the International 
Criminal Court may exercise jurisdiction both in the case of international 
armed conflict and non-international armed conflict. 
In terms of the CWC in its role in international law, the CWC, which 
was adopted in 1993 and entered into force in 1997, has the objective of 
excluding completely the possibility of the use of chemical weapons. It 
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does this by prohibiting States Parties from developing, producing, 
otherwise acquiring, stockpiling or retaining, transferring or using chemical 
weapons. States Parties are also prohibited from assisting, encouraging or 
inducing, in any way, anyone to engage in these activities. Unlike the rules 
in IHL, all of these prohibitions in the CWC apply in all circumstances – 
peace-time, states of emergency, non-international armed conflict, or 
international war. Further, States Parties cannot use riot control agents as a 
method of warfare.  
States Parties are required to criminalise these prohibitions in their 
national law, so that non-state actors – natural and legal persons – are 
likewise bound by these rules as a matter of each State Party’s national law. 
Criminalizing activities such as stockpiling, developing, acquiring a 
chemical weapon is an effective means to prevent the use of a chemical 
weapon in the first instance.  
The 192 States that are party to the CWC have condemned any use of 
toxic chemicals as a weapon by anyone, anywhere, in any circumstances, as 
a violation of international law. Over the years, the CWC regime has built 
an unshakeable foundation of trust between states that declared possession 
of chemical weapons in their mutually held obligations being met in a 
comprehensive, transparent and equitable way. But the baseline for this 
success was, at all times, the CWC and the international community’s 
determination to enforce it. 
The CWC provides a detailed regime that has allowed the international 
community to eliminate a major chemical arsenal in Syria. In 2013, 
investigation of an alleged use of chemical weapons in Syria was requested 
by UN membership from the Secretary General and it was performed with 
OPCW expertise and resources. When Syria subsequently acceded to the 
Convention, the Syrian chemical weapons programme was destroyed in 
less than a year under OPCW verification.  
In terms of our past and future concerns, let me start with what the 
CWC has accomplished in 20 years with regard to international and non-
international armed conflict. 
The Convention is, first and foremost, an instrument for global security. 
As mentioned earlier, OPCW worked very hard to reduce the threat of 
chemical weapons use by a State. It did this not only by ensuring the 
elimination of declared chemical weapons stockpiles, but also by 
establishing a global norm against the use of chemical weapons. The norm 
is truly global as it reflects the Convention’s near universal membership of 
192 States Parties. We saw strong evidence of this norm in 2013 as the 
crisis in Syria began to unfold. Today, the mention of chemicals used as a 
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weapon raises anxiety, it brings feelings of anger and outrage and it brings 
calls for accountability. 
93% of all declared chemical weapons from State military programmes 
have been destroyed. This amounts to more than 66,000 metric tonnes – 
overwhelmingly of chemicals used for mixing lethal nerve agent. To put 
this figure into perspective, a single drop of the nerve agent sarin can kill an 
adult male in seconds. The tragic effect of this agent was seen in August 
2013, when Sarin was used in the Syrian township of Ghouta claiming 
hundreds of lives. 
Most of the States Parties of the CWC declaring possession of chemical 
weapons have eliminated their stockpiles. Those with the lion’s share – 
Russia and the United States – are scheduled to complete destruction of 
their remaining stocks by the end of 2020 and 2023. This means we now 
stand at the threshold of the complete elimination of an entire category of 
weapons of mass destruction, covering more than 98% of the world’s 
territory and population. However, while much has been achieved with the 
Convention, much remains to be done. 
Egypt, Israel, North Korea and South Sudan have not yet joined the 
Chemical Weapons Convention. To remove any doubts about these 
countries intentions vis-à-vis chemical weapons, it is imperative that they 
accede at the earliest opportunity. This is especially important in the face of 
widely held suspicions that North Korea possesses a large stockpile and 
production capability. 
There are also concerns with chemical weapons abandoned by States on 
the territory of other States, as was the case with retreating Japanese forces 
on the territory of China at the end of World War II. There are also old 
chemical weapons dating back to World War I that continue to turn up in 
farmers’ fields as remnants of war. Working with our Member States, the 
OPCW will continue to address these issues, as required under the CWC. 
Also, still within the realm of a state-controlled activity, are those 
chemicals used as riot control agents – not just toxic chemicals that act as 
irritants but also those that can incapacitate and even result in death. We 
heard earlier this morning about questions surrounding this issue. It is an 
issue that continues to be studied and discussed at the OPCW amongst our 
States Parties, with the Australian-Swiss-led initiative on central nervous-
acting agents in the forefront of these debates.  
So, it seems a world free of chemical weapons is not a reality yet, nor is 
it one that we can afford not to be vigilant about. 
I shall now turn to the future and its challenges. The use of chemical 
weapons by non-state actors is, as I have mentioned, not a threat but a 
nascent reality. The internet has provided terrorist groups greater access 
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than ever before to knowledge and information about toxic chemicals, their 
properties, and how to deploy them.  
It is worth noting that a chemical weapon, as defined in the Convention, 
includes any “toxic chemical” when used as a weapon to harm or to kill and 
is not limited to only the warfare agents possessed by States’ military 
programmes. Sarin, Mustard Gas, VX, are warfare agents that were mass 
produced and stockpiled by States Parties along with their delivery systems, 
and clearly the OPCW’s focus. Thankfully, nerve agents have so far been 
beyond the reach of terrorist groups’ capabilities, but this has not prevented 
them from resorting to less sophisticated options.  
Chlorine was not only used 100 years ago, but also used recently in 
Syria and Iraq. In fact, other toxic industrial chemicals could represent a 
real threat and, when used for purposes prohibited by the Convention, are 
considered to be a chemical weapon under the OPCW’s purview. 
The fact that toxic chemicals are ubiquitous is a challenge. . We know 
that new chemicals are developed every day. We also know that the 
chemical industry is expanding to regions of the world that previously did 
not have such an industry. Without adequate security measures, toxic 
chemicals can be readily acquired by individuals with hostile intentions. 
Moreover, industry could be subject to attack by conventional means to 
cause a chemical weapons-like effect. 
However, it is also important to recognize that a thriving chemical 
industry is a strong foundation for economic and technological 
development. Chemicals bring many benefits to human-kind – in medicine, 
in agriculture, in consumer production. Therefore, chemistry for peaceful 
purposes has, and will continue to have, a key role in society. 
For the future, the CWC will serve as a fundamental tool to counter the 
use of chemical weapons by non-state actors. As I noted earlier, the 
Convention requires all 192 States Parties to criminalise the use of 
chemical weapons, as well as the development, stockpiling, acquisition, or 
transfer of chemical weapons. Such a legal framework is critical for global 
security and to protect citizens from harm. However, even after 20 years of 
the CWC being in force, more than 70 States Parties still do not have 
adequate national legislation against CWC prohibited activities. This is a 
key concern of the OPCW and one that it has been actively addressing, 
through our training and assistance activities to States Parties and, most 
recently, through the establishment of the Sub-Working Group on Non-
State Actors of the OPCW Executive Council’s Open-Ended Working 
Group on Terrorism.  
In closing, the OPCW has had a tangible track record in the area of 
chemical weapons disarmament and non-proliferation.  
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In the context of the Sub-Working Group, we have been examining how 
the OPCW can contribute further to global efforts to counter terrorism. We 
have been looking primarily at what can be done in the areas of legal 
accountability of non-state actors, measures to prevent the hostile use of 
toxic chemicals by non-state actors and what could be done to ensure an 
effective response to a chemical terrorist attack. We have sought to broaden 
our reach by working with our Member States to ensure that their domestic 
law not only reflects CWC prohibitions but also has the means to enforce 
them. 
While we have made progress in identifying concrete activities that the 
OPCW could undertake, in this context of this panel, I would like to 
highlight that States Parties of CWC have affirmed the significance of the 
customary international humanitarian law rules prohibiting the use of 
chemical weapons in both international and non-international armed 
conflict. Whether such a prohibition exists as a matter of customary 
international law in peacetime, or whether there is an international crime of 
using chemical weapons in all circumstances remains a point of discussion. 
Here the convergence of IHL and other regimes of international law can 
shed light on these emerging areas of law.  
The prohibition of using chemical weapons during armed conflict is 
well established in IHL. Through the implementation of the provisions of 
the CWC, the international community has done much to reduce the risk 
that anyone could access and use such weapons. But the fact that 
allegations of use of chemical weapons continue to make headlines is a 
stark reminder that international law is only as strong as its implementation, 
its enforcement and its ability to respond to evolving threats. 
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Outer space militarization: 
when late is too late 
Xavier PASCO 
University of Paris-Sorbonne; Foundation for Strategic Research, 
Paris 
Since the end of the Cold War and U.S.-Soviet military competition, 
military space activity has experienced a new dynamic resulting from two 
major changes: 
Firstly, the Cold War-era has transformed into a new geopolitical 
context that has had direct effects on the nature and the structure of the 
military space programmes. Additionally, the “space club” countries, and 
among them especially the United States, have come to see space activities 
as a powerful tool that can provide political, economic and military benefits 
in this new geopolitical environment. For example, a number of 
information technology related applications have rapidly emerged and have 
become key assets in the transformation of space into a new strategic arena. 
Secondly,, the technology itself has evolved, resulting in more 
affordable and efficient space systems. Although it remains difficult for 
newcomers to invest in the space domain, the diffusion of new space 
technologies worldwide, including improved equipment and training for 
their use, is an enduring trend. A number of emerging countries are 
planning to increase their investment in space technologies and make them 
an important element of their national planning. 
These trends mainly define a new era in space with enduring 
consequences on current and future military developments. 
 
 
1. A bit of history: from “strategic space” to “controlled space” 
 
In order to provide useful perspectives on these ongoing evolutions, it is 
worth recalling a few structuring features of the recent history of space 
activities. Historically, relationships between space and security have been 
determined by military strategies and their historical and legal contexts. 
In the first place, space activities have initially been structured by their 
link with the nascent nuclear-related strategic issues. This initial link can be 
described as representing the essence of what can be called the “strategic 
space age”. Space was born from the nuclear induced “military revolution”. 
This “strategic space age” has remained alive over the years and has 
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remained an unsurpassable basis for structuring the space systems and their 
use. The primary objective then was for the U.S. and for the Soviet Union 
to avoid the “threat of the surprise attack”, as stated by a famous report 
produced in 1955 for President Eisenhower. A key link had quickly been 
established between the advent of the ballistic missile technology and the 
invention of the nuclear warhead. A new “Pearl Harbor” with such 
weapons would be fatally destructive this time. Everything would have to 
be done to prevent any surprise of this sort. Satellites quickly appeared as 
presenting good characteristics to play a central role as “sentinels” for this 
new era. They would help to detect ballistic missile launches; to detect 
nuclear tests; and to monitor nuclear and ballistic-related infrastructures 
and silos. They might also help, as it was believed in those first days, to 
prevent more directly any ballistic attack by providing new tools destined 
to intercept incoming missiles.  
Obviously, space law has conformed to the emerging strategic space 
built by the nuclear era. Basically, the law that exists today for space 
activities was built in those years. The very acceptance of satellite 
overflying sovereign States has also been linked to this necessity. In this 
respect, the first Sputnik has initiated a general allowance that has helped 
shape this strategic role for space. The so-called “Outer Space Treaty” 
signed in January 1967 can also be defined as a “pragmatic” legal tool 
perfectly compatible with this strategic necessity of developing “useful” 
military space applications such as monitoring, early warning, 
communications. The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) itself, signed 
between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in May 1972, has made the “national 
technical means” (the infamous NTMs, i.e. the satellites) a cornerstone and 
a prime contributor to the strategic balance. 
It is worth noting at this stage that these initial perceptions have quickly 
convinced both superpowers that space systems shall be protected and 
space” sanctuarized” in a sense as they were viewed as a key element of a 
mutual “life insurance”. Space would be militarized, but it would not have 
to be “weaponized”. In other terms, space systems could serve military 
systems on Earth while both camps would avoid taking space weapons per 
se into orbit at the risk of an unuseful destabilization of the whole strategic 
balance. The “military“ use of space was a primary condition for the mutual 
deterrence to ever exist. Space weapons would contradict these simple but 
efficient postures. It is worth keeping this basic principle in mind and 
relating to this specific context. This may be about to change as other 
contexts have emerged since then, adding their own logic to those founding 
principles. 
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Indeed, a major evolution has logically occurred with the demise of the 
Cold War as a structuring feature of international relations. The early 
nineties marked a profound change in the perception by the U.S. of their 
own role as the “sole” remaining superpower. The concept of fighting 
“major theater wars” has rapidly emerged as the next key building step that 
would be used to redefine the military and security tools for the U.S. to use 
to assert and confirm their new role as sole international leader. The first 
Gulf war can be seen in this respect as a landmark in this adaptation 
process, at least in the military domain, if not in political and strategic 
thinking. In order to implement this new power posture, space, among other 
tools, would play a critical role, allowing the U.S. military forces to 
strongly differentiate from their counterparts by providing unique 
efficiency and military outreach. The first Gulf war can be considered in 
this respect as a test of what had to be adapted to make space more 
responsive to the needs of the combat level and not only confine the 
systems in a major strategic intelligence role. This has been the time when 
satellites have had to become operational at so-called “operative” and 
“tactical” levels, in addition to their strategic use. This conversion has 
represented a key driver along the two last decades. From now on, space 
systems shall be viewed as a “force multiplier” on the battlefield. This 
would answer to new requirements and needs for more data and 
information communicated on near-real time to the lowest level of the 
combating units. In addition, this was the time when the precision-guided 
weapons had been introduced, making the U.S. space-based Global 
Positioning System (widely known under its acronym GPS) very much 
emblematic of the use of space systems in combat systems. This era has 
been defined as the “operative/tactical” space age, that has not replaced the 
“strategic space age” but that has added new functions and new uses to 
military space. 
Rapidly, a third “space age” has emerged from this transformation, as 
technological changes induced by the more operational uses of space 
systems would make them more versatile and better fitted to enlarged 
security uses, beyond the sole military operative/tactical uses. 
Improvements brought to space technologies in the nineties have quickly 
put space sensors and communication systems at the heart of modern 
intelligence and information systems. In other terms, space applications 
have become an indistinct element of global security and defense 
architectures. This has been the time of “systems of systems” intended to be 
part of comprehensive information systems answering a wide range of 
needs including: military security but also environmental security, 
“Homeland defense” needs (or security of the citizen), as well as economic 
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and industrial security. Space systems would then become a critical 
infrastructure in the sense that it would provide a bonus to nations that are 
the most advanced technologically, the most powerful from an economic 
standpoint and the most influent on the political scene. A natural synergy 
between military and civilian applications has tended to develop quickly, 
sometimes dubbed as being “dual-use” space technologies. Indeed, the 
merger was certainly much more profound with global information systems 
serving both military and civilian interests, but also more and more often 
designed for interacting with existing modern information infrastructures. 
This evolution, mixing military and civilian technologies and process 
into strategic information architectures, has definitely allowed space 
applications to gain a greater visibility. By doing so it has also made space 
systems a more likely key vulnerability. For strategist and military, any 
vulnerability might be considered as a likely target. Such vulnerabilities 
have to be dealt with. Space would have to be protected against any attack. 
Again, the U.S., being the first user of space systems by far, would be the 
first to elaborate a so-called “space control” policy. This is the age we have 
now reached, the age of “controlled space”. It is about not only protecting 
military space systems, but more largely any space object with major 
economic and societal role, involving human security directly or indirectly. 
As soon as in 1999, space wasdeclared by the U.S. Secretary of Defense as 
representing a “national vital interest”, implicitly suggesting that it would 
be legitimate for any sovereign State (in this case the U.S.) to protect its 
space systems by any mean.  
 
 
2. A new need to “control” space as a coming new source of conflicts? 
 
This has had direct consequences on the re-emergence of concepts of 
space weapons, showing a significant difference with the context of the 
Cold War when space systems had to be protected and space “sanctuarized” 
for the mutual benefit. In the post-Cold war era, space systems could 
unfortunately be seen as desirable targets, precisely because they could be 
used in military operations in a much more efficient manner. Possible 
adversaries would then have to develop ways to destroy or incapacitate 
them. 
Whatever the level of technical developments in this domain, the change 
of context has given birth to new policy and law initiatives starting from the 
late 2000s. At the time when China proceeded with its first anti-satellite test 
in January 2007, a number of diplomatic initiatives were proposed to de-
conflict this area. In 2008, the European Union proposed the international 
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adoption of a “Code of Conduct” for space that, while it would not be 
legally binding, would act as a regulation regime allowing better 
transparency. Different versions of the text have been proposed but it has 
not reached yet the critical mass of supporting countries and this initiative 
has remained in a limbo. Russia and China are supporting the adoption of a 
legally-binding treaty asking for a “prevention of the deployment of 
weapons in outer space”. This treaty has been opposed in the recent years 
mainly by the U.S. and partly by the European countries as it does not 
address the issue of ground-based space weapons (precisely the one used by 
China in 2007) and on the ground that such a treaty would hardly be 
verifiable. Other concurrent initiatives have been pushed at the United 
Nations level in order to deal more largely with the safety of the use of 
space (including the collective management of space debris) as well as the 
need for guaranteeing the “development of sustainable space activities”. 
While these issues continue to be addressed by specialized U.N. 
committees, progress remains slow and does not address the whole range of 
risks and threats. 
Nowadays, the “controlled space” age has led to the involvement of an 
increasing number of actors, with heavy political issues at stake, in a debate 
traditionally confined to military and strategy specialists. Curbing the cause 
of satellite destructions (whether it comes from debris or from international 
activities), managing orbital positions and traffic or managing radio 
interferences have become key issues addressed by a broader collective 
security debate. It is high time to address those issues in the relevant 
international forums and it must not be held hostage from possible nascent 
conflicts in space in new “controlled space age”. 
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Nuclear weapons: IHL considerations revisited, 
20 years after the ICJ Advisory Opinion 
Camille GRAND 
Director of the Foundation for Strategic Research, Paris 
Even if it were a non-binding, not completely conclusive and opened to 
different interpretations the Advisory Opinion of the ICJ in 1996 was an 
important milestone in the international debate regarding the legality of the 
use of nuclear weapons as it set some major principles regarding such use 
even under extreme circumstances. It was followed by a number of UNGA 
resolutions as well as multiple references in the disarmament fora such as 
the NPT Review Conferences. 
This debate has recently rebounded with the campaign focused on the 
humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons leading to revisit IHL 
considerations before morphing into something different since the 2015 
NPT Conference with the work of the Open Ended Working Group 
(OEWG) focusing on promoting a ban treaty.  
 
 
The “Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons” debate 
 
Started by the ICRC in 2010 and promoted by several governments and 
NGO, the debate over the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons (HINW) 
gained traction in international fora and became for a couple of years a 
prominent issue in the global discussion on nuclear weapons and nuclear 
disarmament. 
Addressing this humanitarian dimension opened a debate on the serious 
(some say catastrophic) consequences of the use of nuclear weapons in a 
context in which nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945. 
This legitimate debate has moved from a parallel like-minded initiative 
sponsored by the governments of Norway, Mexico, and Austria with the 
conferences held in Oslo (March 2013), Nayarit (February 2014) and 
Vienna (December 2014) to a major issue in the debates of the 2015 NPT 
Review Conference. A large number of countries have participated in those 
like-minded events and have endorsed statements expressing concern about 
the potential humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons. 
Going one step beyond, Austria introduced a “Pledge” presented at the 
Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons which 
has been endorsed by circa 100 States to date, but not by any Nuclear 
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Weapons States (according to the NPT), nuclear capable States, or any 
State under a nuclear umbrella. 
As the debate unfolds, this food-for-thought paper tries to frame it by 
listing the associated questions (and answers when available), possible next 
steps and ultimate goals of the debate which remain unclear in the 
aftermath of the NPT Review Conference. 
 
 
Questions associated with humanitarian consequences debate 
 
The current debate tends to mix several sub-issues which need to be 
differentiated in order to address the concerns associated with humanitarian 
impact. Data used in the debate come from multiple sources 
 Consequences of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings (only actual 
uses to date); 
 Available data about the history of nuclear testing; 
 Historical data about incidents/accidents involving nuclear weapons; 
 Facts associated with major civilian nuclear accidents (Chernobyl 
and Fukushima in particular); 
 Modeling about the local, regional and global consequences of a 
limited or major nuclear use. 
 
Before going into the debate, it is worthwhile noting that a lot of the 
factual elements put forward date back to the Cold War era and tend to 
leave aside progresses regarding safety of NW, the end of atmospheric 
testing, the significant decrease in the global stockpile of nuclear weapons. 
Modelings of nuclear use and nuclear accidents are themselves open to 
debate but do raise important issues and help understand potential 
consequences of a nuclear use or accident. 
Promoters of the HINW debates often point “new” evidences which 
justify raising the profile of the issue. This point is questionable as 
humanitarian debates - inter alia – about a nuclear winter, campaigns to 
stop nuclear testing and efforts to prevent a nuclear war or accidents based 
have been constant features of the nuclear debate for decades. The most 
recent studies follow a long list of studies conducted by academics, NGOs, 
international organizations, on the potentially dramatic consequences of a 





1. Would a major nuclear war have major humanitarian 
consequences? 
 
In spite of the reduction in the stockpiles of nuclear weapons (NWs) and 
of the lower average yield of modern NW, it is not contested that a major 
nuclear war or any significant exchange of nuclear weapons in a regional 
context would have major consequences, in terms of fatalities and 
casualties, and lead to long term health and environmental damage. The 
examples of Hiroshima and Nagasaki have given a clear example of the 
massive consequences of the use of rudimentary fission devices in urban 
areas. Most recent studies suggest that such devastating consequences 
would be repeated or worse in the event of a nuclear conflict. 
Nuclear weapons States (NWS) themselves do not contest this point; 
they emphasize the fact that it is precisely the devastating and terrifying 
nature of a nuclear war that is at the very foundation of nuclear deterrence. 
It has also led to establish a strong taboo on the use of nuclear weapons and 
the development of policies that emphasize the non-use of nuclear weapons 
(except under extreme circumstances). In a nutshell, and from this 
perspective, if nuclear weapons did not imply such grave consequences, 
they would probably have been used in conflict since 1945, when leaders 
and scholars alike immediately understood the different nature of nuclear 
weapons and progressively established policies of restraint. 
Moreover, modern targeting policies (at least of the most advanced 
NWs, i.e. P5) have evolved from counter-cities targeting to more precise 
targeting (counterforce or targeting decision-making) which partially 
mitigate the humanitarian consequences on civilians of nuclear attacks. But 
this does only marginally alter the two previous points. 
Lastly, proponents of nuclear deterrence argue that conventional war 
can also lead to vast destruction and massive casualties (including of 
civilians), as both World Wars and several “regional” conflicts have 
demonstrated. Hiroshima and Nagasaki only accounted for a fraction of the 
fatalities of World War 2, and conventional air bombing raids conducted by 
Germany against Britain, by the Allies against Germany, by the US against 
Japan also led to massive civilian casualties (Dresden and Tokyo bombings 
remain the worse examples of those). From that perspective, proponents of 
deterrence argue that nuclear weapons have, since 1945, played a role in 





2. Would any use of nuclear weapons have humanitarian 
consequences? Can the consequences of a nuclear use be mitigated? 
 
The draft final document of the 2015 NPT revcon noted “its deep 
concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of 
nuclear weapons”. The use of word “any” has been debated amongst State 
Parties. It can indeed be argued that any use of a single nuclear device can 
have significant humanitarian consequences, especially in the event of a 
nuclear explosion in an urban or densely-populated area.  
There are, however, some scenarios in which a nuclear use would have 
only limited humanitarian consequences. Under certain circumstances, 
asingle shot of a low-yield device in a deserted area (or at sea) on military 
targets or the use of a nuclear weapon to provoke an electro-magnetic pulse 
(EMP) could have limited humanitarian consequences if any. The 
environmental damage would however have to be precisely assessed. 
It is clear that any use of a nuclear weapon would have massive political 
consequences and it is quite absurd to envisage a limited nuclear war as 
easily manageable. The humanitarian consequences of “any” use ar, 
however, not as clear. 
 
 
3. Are nuclear weapons stockpiles safe and reliable? Is there a serious 
risk of a nuclear accident? 
 
A third axis of the debate revolves around the risks associated with an 
accidental detonation following a mismanagement of a device. 
This concern is based on a number of incidents involving nuclear 
weapons, including some serious accidents. At this stage, while 
acknowledging that risk zero does not exist, it is interesting to note that 
none of the recorded accidents or incidents has involved a nuclear 
detonation. There have been a handful of recorded radioactive leaks or 
pollution associated with the mismanagement of nuclear weapons, but none 
qualify as provoking humanitarian consequences. The promoters of HINW 
campaign usually point at “near-misses” to argue that NWS involved have 
been “lucky”. Without underestimating the seriousness of past declassified 
accidents, it could also be argued that given the massive amounts of nuclear 
weapons operated during the Cold War, the safety of the stockpile has been 
historically quite robust. 
Moreover, the overwhelming majority of recorded events have taken 
place during the Cold War and in the early decades of the nuclear age. 
Since then, safety and reliability of nuclear weapons have been constantly 
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improved by the introduction of multiple safety and security systems and 
procedures aimed at preventing unintended uses or accidental detonations. 
In such a context, it can be argued that the combination of security 
improvements and of the massive reduction of the number of weapons have 
reduced the risk of accidents at least for the most advanced NWS which 
have made significant progress towards much safer arsenals. This might not 
be the case for newcomers such as North Korea. 
As the security of nuclear weapons remain – for good reasons – a 
mostly classified matter and in the absence of a clear benchmarking, it 
remains difficult to assess with high certainty whether the claim that 




4. Did nuclear weapon tests have a humanitarian impact? 
 
Nuclear testing has had very significant humanitarian consequences in 
the past, especially atmospheric testing. Populations were displaced by all 
NWS, in different numbers. Environmental consequences were also locally 
massive and in many cases probably irreversible. 
The impact of the Soviet era testing in Semipalatinsk is well 
documented. They have had significant impact on the health of a large 
population in the area. It is estimated that more than one million inhabitants 
have been affected, including more than 30.000 with severe consequences. 
Moreover, the health consequences of testing in Semipalatinsk have 
impacted the next generation with newborns being affected of deformities 
beyond average rates, and multiple recorded occurrences of diverse 
diseases that can also be identified as consequences of exposure to 
radiations. 
All NWS also face cases of personnel involved in testing affected in the 
long term with diverse health issues. 
Fully implemented with the last atmospheric test by China in 1980, the 
end of atmospheric testing (which was also motivated by humanitarian, and 
environmental concerns at the time of the signature of the PTBT) and the 
prohibition of nuclear testing under the CTBT (in spite of the lack of entry 
into force) have considerably reduced the humanitarian impact of testing. 
Even non-signatories of the CTBT (Pakistan, India, DPRK) which have 
conducted nuclear tests have only conducted underground tests. As long as 
all NWS (except DPRK) observe a moratorium on testing, the issue of 
testing appears mostly as an historical problem (with on-going 
consequences in some specific cases such as Semipalatinsk or Bikini). 
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5. Can the taboo on nuclear use be preserved in the long term? 
 
The strongest argument put forward by the advocates of the 
humanitarian approach is the concern that the taboo on nuclear use might 
not be sustainable in the long term. Therefore, there would be a serious risk 
of use in the 21st century, because of an accident or of a regional conflict 
escalating to a nuclear exchange with severe humanitarian consequences. In 
order to make this point, the scenario of a conflict in South Asia is often 
used to model the consequences of a nuclear exchange. 
This is, of course, a serious issue for consideration\ as the hypothesis of 
a nuclear exchange cannot be ruled out entirely. Developments in the field 
of proliferation with new actors such as the DPRK, evolving defense 
policies putting more emphasis on nuclear weapons on the part of several 
NWS such as Russia, high alert postures, all suggest that nuclear stability 
and non-use cannot be taken for granted in the 21st century. 
As this challenge goes well beyond the humanitarian issue per se, the 
debate should focus on the role of the humanitarian approach (if any) in 
preventing a nuclear conflict. Nuclear realists would argue that deterrence 
remains the safest way to prevent nuclear escalation (and preserve peace 
amongst major powers) as it has done in the last 70 years, when proponents 
of the humanitarian approach seek to establish a new norm banning the use 
of nuclear weapons based on humanitarian concerns and see it as the most 
efficient way to avoid nuclear use. The fact that this approach has not been 




The humanitarian approach: key debates 
 
Although some analysts argue that the humanitarian approach campaign 
has reached its limits and cannot achieve much more under the current 
circumstances, it is interesting to examine how the debate could unfold in 
the future and what are the key points to be addressed to make the best 
possible use of the debate. 
 
 
1. Is the humanitarian approach applicable to nuclear disarmament? 
 
The countries and NGOs promoting the humanitarian impact debate put 
forward a dual approach using two precedents.  
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On the one hand, they argue that NW should be prohibited on 
humanitarian grounds just as chemical weapons and biological weapons 
were prohibited in the past through the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the 1972 
BTWC and the 1993 the CWC, which have progressively established a 
regime evolving from prohibition of use to complete elimination of CW 
and BW, with success as the number of uses since WWI has been limited to 
a handful. It is interesting to note that key possessing States were actively 
involved in the negotiations of these international treaties. 
On the other hand, and using the models of the Ottawa process on 
landmines and of the Oslo process on cluster munitions, others argue that 
an approach involving like-minded countries and the civil society can 
establish a new norm that will gradually spread. 
These two points are valid for the weapons concerned, but is it true for 
nuclear weapons? 
The most difficult problem to tackle is the deterrent role of NW that no 
other weapon perform (even other WMD) which makes them unique. NWS 
give them a specific role in their defense posture which cannot easily be 
replaced, when there were military substitutes for landmines, cluster 
bombs. 
In the absence of endorsement by NWS (in spite of the participation of 
the US and the UK in the latest conference in Vienna), the efforts to 
negotiate an international instrument outside the UN framework seem 
unlikely to achieve success in the foreseeable future. Many analysts and 
governments (including NWS) question the value of such an instrument in 
the absence of a serious engagement of all (or at least some) NWS. 
 
 
2. Is the humanitarian approach about eliminating nuclear weapons? 
 
Until 2015, there was an unresolved debate amongst the proponents of 
the humanitarian approach between those (Austria, ICAN) who were 
seeking elimination of nuclear weapons through a new path, and those 
(ICRC, Switzerland) who chose a more focused humanitarian approach on 
mitigating the risks and consequences of a nuclear event by establishing a 
set of norms and principles. 
The debates of the open ended workshop (OEWG) have resolved that 
dilemma as a majority of participants have chosen a path towards a nuclear 
weapon convention aimed at prohibiting nuclear weapons altogether. 
Amongst participants in the OEWG, the proponents of a step by step 
approach focused on the humanitarian consequences have been put in a 
minority position. 
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3. Could the humanitarian approach improve safety and security of 
existing nuclear stockpiles? 
 
This is a central point in the debate. Given past incidents involving 
nuclear weapons, there is a legitimate concern about the safety and security 
of nuclear weapons. It should be possible for NWS to increase transparency 
on the security measures they implement, in order to provide assurances 
about their efforts to limit risks. Forms of benchmarking and peer review 
could be useful additions. There are, of course, national security concerns 
associated with transparency regarding nuclear weapons safety, but this 
could be manageable. 
A further effort to limit or eliminate weapon systems on hair-trigger 
alert could also reduce risks of accidental launch. 
Lastly, an international effort to work on consequence management of a 
nuclear event could be pursued as it is clear that even a major accident or a 
limited use could require an international response to address the 
immediate and longterm consequences. 
The work of the OEWG seems to have left aside these issues to focus on 
the promotion of a NW ban. 
 
 
4. Legality and legitimacy of nuclear weapons use 
 
One of the key features of the HINW campaign is to reopen the debate 
about the legality of the use of nuclear weapons. The 1996 ICJ Advisory 
Opinion accepted the logic of use under extreme circumstances, but already 
set some limits. I quote the central element of the opinion : “It follows from 
the above-mentioned requirements that the threat or use of nuclear weapons 
would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in 
armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian 
law; However, in view of the current state of international law, and of the 
elements of fact at its disposal, the Court cannot conclude definitively 
whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful 
in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a 
State would be at stake.”. 
The legal approach raises important issues related to internal law, 
international humanitarian law and laws of war in the event of a nuclear 
war such as:  
 The non-discriminatory nature of NW with the difficulty to 
distinguish combatants and civilians; 
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 The impossibility to guarantee the protection of neutral countries in 
the conflict; 
 The difficulty to insure a criteria of proportionality when using or 
threatening to use NW; 
 Potentially unacceptable environmental damages; 
 The serious risk to create excessive and disproportionate human 
suffering. 
 
While the debate partially ignores evolutions of nuclear planning and 
nuclear technology, it is a legitimate debate from a political and a legal 
standpoint. It needs to be better informed from a strategic, legal and 
scientific standpoint as, once again, it conflicts with the legitimacy of 
deterrence. If NWS can argue (as they did successfully in 1996) that the use 
of NW could be acceptable under some extreme circumstances, it is clear 
that this does not offer a general principle of legality under any 
circumstances. 
This debate has gained importance as some NW possessors have clearly 
signaled their intention to lower the nuclear threshold in a manner that 
could be inconsistent with the ICJ recomendations of 1996. 
The political and legal debates are intertwined as admitting that the use 
of NW is in essence inhumane or would have unacceptable humanitarian 
consequences is paving the way to weaken the case for the legality of use 
and potentially makes the weapons themselves illegal on humanitarian 
grounds. This is, of course, politically unacceptable for NWS. 
 
 
5. Nuclear weapons use versus nuclear deterrence 
 
A more fundamental issue is at stake in the HINW debate. Raising the 
humanitarian issue aims at undermining in the long term the legitimacy of 
nuclear deterrence which is not about use.  
Since 2000, attacks on the logic of deterrence have been a constant 
feature of the international nuclear debate. While this is a legitimate debate, 
it is a matter of priority. Should the disarmament community focus on 
reducing nuclear stockpiles and work towards their ultimate elimination, or 
should it seek to delegitimize deterrence leaving aside concrete steps 
towards nuclear reductions?  
The latter seems to the proponent of the humanitarian approach a more 
promising approach as they view the efforts of NWS too slow and limited, 
and note that all NWS are engaged in long term modernization processes 
which suggest that they intend to retain nuclear weapons for decades. It 
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does, however, raise a serious issue as such an approach (if successful) 
could lead to a world with nuclear weapons but without nuclear deterrence 
which would not be safer. 
This is a fundamental element of the debate that seems to be lacking. 
Opening such a debate on to exercise deterrence while taking into account 

















Nuclear weapons: IHL considerations revisited, 
20 years after the ICJ Advisory Opinion 
Gro NYSTUEN 
Senior Partner, International Law and Policy Institute, Oslo 
I have been asked to talk about nuclear weapons and IHL, with a special 
focus on the ICJ Advisory Opinion. The focus of my presentation is: The 
confusion and possible conflation between ad bellum and in bello in the 
Advisory Opinion. 
The Advisory Opinion and its implications have been subject to 
extensive debate in these past 20 years. There have been very different 
opinions as to whether the Advisory Opinion clarified or confused 
questions pertaining to IHL and nuclear weapons, and whether it had any 
bearing on international customary law.  
Let me say at the outset that I think perhaps the Advisory Opinion has 
been given too much weight in the international law debate pertaining to 
nuclear weapons - it is just an Advisory Opinion, not some kind of 
international lex superior.  
Already before the ICJ delivered its opinion, some commentators were 
very cautious as to whether it was a good idea to pose the famous question 
about the legality of nuclear weapons to the ICJ. One reason was the 
uncertainty about the outcome. But many States and civil society 
organisations alike were convinced that the Court could not reasonably 
come to any other conclusion than that the use of nuclear weapons must be 
forbidden under international law. The result, as we know, was not as 
crystal clear as many had hoped.  
This lack of clarity one might suggest, was partly linked to the question 
that was posed to the ICJ by the General Assembly, which was: ‘Is the 
threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted under 
international law?’. 
I will address some of the IHL implications of the Advisory Opinion – 
not all of them. What I will focus on is the blurring of the lines in the 
Advisory Opinion between jus ad bellum (when is it lawful to resort to the 
use or threat of armed force) and jus in bello (what means and methods can 
lawfully be used in war, regardless of the war’s justification, and why this 
is potentially very unfortunate for the protection of IHL.  
There are particularly two features is the Advisory Opinion that 
contribute to this blurring - the first is the very famous sentence on extreme 
circumstances of self-defence, and the second is the implication by the 
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Court that threats are in general regulated by international humanitarian 
law.  
The first aspect of the Advisory Opinion that I will discuss is the famous 
sentence in para. 105 2 E (in the dispositif of the Advisory Opinion):  
The Court stated that it could not ‘conclude definitively whether the 
threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme 
circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of the State would 
be at stake.’  
This sentence could be seen as leaving open the question of whether a 
State could lawfully justify its use of nuclear weapons – even when such 
use violated jus in bello – by reference to ‘extreme’ self-defence.  
Of course, the court didn’t say that such an extreme circumstance would 
allow for jus ad bellum considerations to override in bello – it just said that 
it could not conclude on the matter. Possibly, because of this “disclaimer”, 
the Court did not enter into a legal discussion on the relationship between 
jus ad bellum and jus in bello.  
Many scholars have argued that the unfortunate implication of this 
famous paragraph could be seen to indicate that jus ad bellum 
considerations can override jus in bello obligations. 
Other scholars have commented that the Court’s opinion recognizes that 
the rules of jus ad bellum and jus in bello are ‘cumulative, not alternative’, 
and that ‘[T]here is, therefore, no need to read the second part of… the 
paragraph as setting up the jus ad bellum in opposition to the jus in bello.’ 
In other words, one could read the sentence as if it says: one cannot exclude 
that the use of nuclear weapons would be lawful in extreme circumstances 
of self-defence - but only when the conditions of IHL were satisfied 
Several commentators have argued against this interpretation; because 
the preceding sentence in para. 105 states that the threat or use of nuclear 
weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of IHL. The inference is 
that this does not always (only generally) apply - and this is underlined by 
the sentence that follows which refers to extreme circumstances of self-
defence, in other words - exceptional circumstances.  
I do not have the authoritative answer to how this wording was meant, 
but it did cause a great deal of concern. It goes without saying that only a 
situation of armed conflict triggers IHL, and that most situations of armed 
conflict arguably could be seen as ‘extreme circumstances of self-defence’. 
If it is the seriousness of the ad bellum situation that determines whether or 
not nuclear weapons can be used, then by implication, IHL is effectively set 
aside. Application of IHL cannot depend on ad bellum considerations: (It 
would lead to arguments along the following lines: we don’t have to protect 
your civilians because you started this war in violation of the UN Charter).  
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The body of law that constitutes IHL is in itself an emergency regime 
and, therefore, it does not contain any basis for derogation in times of 
crisis. It cannot be modified or set aside because of alleged or actual 
deficiencies in the legal basis for an armed conflict or because of the 
seriousness of an armed conflict. This standpoint is often characterized as 
the ‘separation principle’, and departure from the separation principle thus 
means departure from established legal norms. 
Some of the scholars who challenge the ‘separation principle’ premise 
their argument on the ‘just war’ model, and the reasoning often stems more 
from a moral and philosophical standpoint rather than a legal one. This 
position is known as the ‘conflationist’ position. It is of course not clear 
that the Court actually meant to express such a position. 
The second aspect of the ICJ Advisory Opinion that I find unfortunate 
with regard to blurring of the lines between IHL and ad bellum, has not 
been subject to the same amount of public debate as the sentence in para 
105. This aspect pertains to how the ICJ, on several occasions in the 
Advisory Opinion, mixed these two bodies of law together, possibly 
without intending to do so. 
The Court stated several times that the threat of use of nuclear weapons 
would be a violation of not only jus ad bellum as reflected in the UN 
Charter, but also of international humanitarian law.  
The ICJ had described its task as ‘clear’ in that it was to ‘determine the 
legality or illegality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons.’ The Court, in 
applying article 38 of its Statute with regard to the relevant legal sources to 
be relied on, stated that the ‘[M]ost relevant applicable law….is that 
relating to the use of force enshrined in the United Nations Charter and the 
law applicable in armed conflict which regulates the conduct of 
hostilities...’ 
It is thus clear that the Court, as a point of departure, did recognize the 
two distinct and separate legal regimes. These two legal regimes are, 
however, not sufficiently separated throughout the Advisory Opinion. The 
concept of ‘threat of use of force’ is treated throughout the Advisory 
Opinion as if it were also generally regulated by international humanitarian 
law. The Court even stated explicitly that if the use of nuclear weapons 
were prohibited in bello, then the threat of use of nuclear weapons would 
also be prohibited under the same rules. I will come back to this in a 
minute. 
At the outset, the Court noted that both threats and use of force was 
prohibited ad bellum: “The notions of ‘threat’ and ‘use’ of force under 
Article 2, para. 4, of the Charter stand together in the sense that if the use of 
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force itself in a given case is illegal – for whatever reason – the threat to 
use such force will likewise be illegal.” 
This approach seems to be consistent with the so-called ‘Brownlie 
Formula’ often cited in discussions about the use of force: ‘[if] the promise 
is to resort to force in conditions in which no justification for the use of 
force exists, the threat is itself illegal.’ 
This formula is a statement that specifically pertained to jus ad bellum. 
Why it was extended into jus in bello by the ICJ is unclear. IHL, by and 
large, does not regulate threats.  
In its analysis of existing treaty law pertaining to other weapons, such as 
poisonous weapons or gas and other weapons of mass destruction, the 
Court limited its discussions to use and did not bring up the question of 
threats. The reason for not discussing threats in this context was probably 
that none of the other arms treaties regulate threats. Also, when the Court 
looked at various other treaties relevant to nuclear weapons, such as treaties 
on nuclear weapons free zones, its discussions were limited to use or 
deployment, probably for the same reason: these instruments do not 
regulate threats. 
In its discussion of IHL and nuclear weapons, the Court referred to the 
St. Petersburg Declaration and its prohibition against the use of ‘weapons 
which uselessly aggravate the suffering of disabled men or make their death 
inevitable’. The Court then outlined a synopsis of IHL and its core rules 
and principles, emphasizing that ‘States do not have unlimited freedom of 
choice of means in the weapons they use.’ 
After summing up the core content of IHL and the underlying rationale 
for these rules, the Court stated (somewhat surprisingly): ‘If an envisaged 
use of weapons did not meet the requirements of humanitarian law, a threat 
to engage in such use would also be contrary to that law.’ 
Thus, the Court gave an explicit statement of law, expressing the view 
that threats of using weapons in violation of IHL must be equally illegal as 
the actual use. The Court did not, however, explain how it came to this 
conclusion.  
If one considers the body of law that pertains to the conduct of 
hostilities, the operative word is “conduct”, not “threats of conduct”.  
The two specific provisions that pertain to threats under the rules of IHL 
are laid down in AP I to the Geneva Conventions. These two provisions 
pertain to the prohibition that no quarter will be given (article 40 in AP I), 
and to threats of terror against the civilian population (article 51 (2) of AP 
I.) (This prohibition is also to be found in AP II, article 13.) 
Clearly, threatening the use of nuclear weapons could constitute 
violations of both of these provisions, given that the legal requirements 
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were fulfilled. The question is whether threatening the use of nuclear 
weapons will always violate these rules.  
Let me take the first of these provisions on threats under IHL: 
threatening denial of quarter. Article 40 of AP I states that: ‘It is prohibited 
to order that there shall be no survivors, to threaten an adversary therewith 
or to conduct hostilities on this basis.’  
In its Written Statement to the ICJ in connection with the proceedings, 
the Solomon Islands argued that threats of use of nuclear weapons would 
violate the rule on quarter. The Solomon Islands stated: ‘Given the 
inevitability of the lethal effects of nuclear weapons, threatening their use 
must surely also violate the rights of potential victims as set forth in article 
40 of the First Additional Protocol…’ 
The question in this context is whether it could be argued that any use of 
nuclear weapons would always and inevitably lead to a situation where 
there would be no survivors?  
Despite limited experience with the use of nuclear weapons in 
hostilities, there seem to exist ways of using nuclear weapons that would 
not necessarily have such an effect. Even in Hiroshima and Nagasaki there 
were survivors.  
The ICRC Commentary to article 40 of AP I notes that article 40 does 
not imply that the Parties to the conflict abandon the use of a particular 
weapon, but that they forgo using it in such a way that it would amount to a 
refusal to give quarter. 
One should also note that other provisions more specifically aimed at 
means of warfare, such as article 51 (4) of AP I on indiscriminate attacks, 
have not been interpreted to constitute prohibitions of specific weapons. It 
seems difficult to sustain the point of view that while article 51(4) (b) does 
not constitute a de facto prohibition against the use of, for example, 
biological or chemical weapons, it nevertheless would constitute a ban on 
nuclear weapons.  
The other provision in AP I that explicitly deals with threats is article 51 
(2), which states that: “Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of 
which is to spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited.” 
So the same question arises: Are threats of the use of nuclear weapons 
per se a violation of this rule? 
According to the ICRC Commentary to this provision, the second 
sentence of article 51(2) applies to acts or threats of terror that go beyond 
ordinary acts of war. Notwithstanding that ordinary acts of war in most 
circumstances are terrifying to those who might be at the receiving end or 
in the vicinity of such acts, the prohibition against acts or threats of 
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violence against civilians requires that the primary purpose is to spread 
terror.  
According to the Commentary, this provision is intended to prohibit acts 
of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the 
civilian population without offering substantial military advantage or 
threatening to carry out such acts. 
The fact that there are two explicit provisions on threats in AP I 
suggests that there is no general prohibition on threats of violating 
provisions in AP I, as the Court suggests that there is. My view is that there 
is no general prohibition on threats to violate IHL. The main purpose of 
IHL is to regulate the conduct of hostilities and to do this in a way that 
separates combatants from civilians and thus makes it possible to protect 
civilians from the effects of hostilities.  
The issue of to what extent IHL actually deals with threats, (and hence, 
whether the Brownlie formula can be extended to IHL) might not seem 
very important. The reason I have for picking on this relatively narrow 
element of the ICJ Advisory Opinion is that it reinforces the blurring of the 
lines between jus ad bellum and jus in bello. And, as I have already 
stressed, if jus ad bellum considerations are used to determine to what 
extent IHL applies, then the legal regime for protecting those affected by 
armed conflict will disintegrate. 
All of the legal regimes dealing with specific weapons, such as chemical 
weapons, blinding laser weapons, landmines and cluster munitions, only 
regulate the use, not threats of use. In other words, they address the 
humanitarian impacts of weapons. But in the discussions on nuclear 
weapons, because of the ICJ Advisory Opinion, the concept of threats of 
use has been prominent. 
This issue might become one of the issues that will come up in 
connection with the forthcoming discussions on a treaty prohibiting nuclear 












































































To what degree do the difficulties in tracing 
the author of the attack and assessing the extent 
of the effects remain a challenge for addressing 
the legal issues raised by “cyber-weapons”? 
 
Marco ROSCINI 
Professor of International Law, University of Westminster, London 
As the US Department of Defense has noted, there is no internationally 
agreed definition of what a ‘cyber weapon’ is.1 There is agreement, 
however, that at least certain cyber capabilities can constitute a weapon. 
Certain states have expressly qualified cyber capabilities as weapons and 
many also have active operational cyber weapons development programs in 
place.2 In April 2013, for instance, the US Air Force upgraded six cyber 
capabilities to ‘weapon’ status,3 and the new US Law of War Manual 
expressly provides for a legal review of weapons that employ cyber 
capabilities, although it cautions that not all cyber capabilities are 
necessarily weapons or weapon systems.4  
For the purposes of this paper, I will consider cyber capabilities as 
weapons when they are designed, intended or used to cause injury or 
damage to an adverse party in an armed conflict.5 Cyber weapons include a 
                                                     
1 US Department of Defense, ‘Cyberspace Policy Report’, November 2011, p. 2. 
2 Marco Roscini, Cyber Operations and the Use of Force in International Law (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 170. 
3 Andrea Shalal-Esa, ‘Six U.S. Air Force cyber capabilities designated “weapons”‘, 
Reuters, 8 April 2013, www.reuters.com/article/net-us-cyber-airforce-weapons-idUSBRE 
93801B20130409. 
4 US Department of Defense, Law of War Manual, June 2015, p. 1008. See also US Air 
Force Instruction 51-402, as updated in July 2011, which requires a legal review of cyber 
capabilities used in cyber operations. The review includes establishing at a minimum: ‘3.1.1. 
Whether there is a specific rule of law, whether by treaty obligation of the United States or 
accepted by the United States as customary international law, prohibiting or restricting the 
use of the weapon or cyber capability in question. 3.1.2. If there is no express prohibition, 
the following questions are considered: 3.1.2.1. Whether the weapon or cyber capability is 
calculated to cause superfluous injury, in violation of Article 23(e) of the Annex to Hague 
Convention IV; and 3.1.2.2. Whether the weapon or cyber capability is capable of being 
directed against a specific military objective and, if not, is of a nature to cause an effect on 
military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction’ (‘Legal Reviews of 
Weapons and Cyber Capabilities’, US Air Force Instruction 51-402, 27 July 2011, p. 3 
http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB424/docs/Cyber-053.pdf). 
5 See William H. Boothby, ‘Methods and Means of Cyber Warfare’, 89 International 
Law Studies (2013), p. 390. 
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delivery system, a navigation system and a payload.6 The delivery system 
could go from e-mails to malicious links in websites, hacking, counterfeit 
hardware and software. System vulnerabilities are the main navigation 
systems that provide entry points for the payload by enabling unauthorized 
access to the system. The payload is the component that causes damage: if 
the code, however sophisticated, is designed solely for the purpose of 
infiltrating a computer and stealing information, as in the cases of Duqu 
and Flame, it would not be a ‘weapon’, as it is neither intended nor capable 
of causing damage.7  
The problems with attributing the use of cyber weapons are proverbial. 
Anonymity is in fact one of the greatest advantages of cyberspace. This has 
important consequences for the application of the law of armed conflict. If 
we cannot identify and attribute the cyber attacks with sufficient certainty 
to states, for instance, we will not be able to apply the law of international 
armed conflict to them. A belligerent may also be encouraged to use cyber 
weapons in a way not consistent with the law of armed conflict because 
there is a good chance that it will be able to hide under the invisibility cloak 
of plausible deniability. 
Two situations must be distinguished: the identification of the source of 
the attack, which is essentially a technical matter, and the attribution of the 
attack to a state or non-state actor, which is a legal exercise. The two 
situations are different and should not be confused. The identification 
problem is not unique to cyberspace, it is only more difficult. An IP address 
identifies the origin and the destination of the data: with the cooperation of 
the Internet Service Provider (ISP) through which the system corresponding 
to the IP address is connected to the internet, it could be associated with a 
person, group or state. The IP address, however, can be ‘spoofed’, or the 
corresponding computer system could only be a ‘stepping stone’ for an 
attacker located elsewhere.8 Hiding behind botnets (i.e. hijacked 
computers) is also a good way of anonymizing cyber operations.  
If the assumption is that the origin of cyber attacks can never be 
identified, the law of armed conflict (and any other international law) 
clearly becomes very difficult to apply. But the case for identification is not 
as hopeless as is too frequently described: sufficient evidence can be found 
                                                     
6 Fred Schreier, ‘On Cyber Warfare’, DCAF Horizon 2015 Working Paper no. 7, pp. 66-
67, www.dcaf.ch/Publications/On-Cyberwarfare. 
7 Thomas Rid and Peter McBurney, ‘Cyber-Weapons’, RUSI Journal 157 
(February/March 2012), p. 11. 
8 Scott J. Shackelford and Richard B. Andres, ‘State Responsibility for Cyber Attacks: 
Competing Standards for a Growing Problem’, 42 Georgetown Journal of International Law 
(2011), p. 982. 
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thanks to technical means, e.g. traceback tools, together with information 
from other sources, such as human sources and communications intercepts.9 
Furthermore, as has been observed, ‘international law does not require 
States to be correct; it only requires them to be reasonable when arriving at, 
and acting on, their conclusions’.10 Further developments in computer 
technology and internet regulations are also likely to make identification 
easier in the future.11 I should caution that advocating for reducing or 
removing anonymity in cyberspace, and on the internet in particular, is a 
double-edged sword: it would lead to identifying not only the authors of 
malicious cyber attacks, but also, say, pro-democratic hacktivists who use 
social media to protest against autocratic regimes. 
Assuming that the authors of a cyber operation are eventually identified, 
the problem arises as to whether their conduct can be attributed to a state 
under the law of state responsibility: it is one thing to say that the hack 
came from IPs in Russia and another is to say that Russia is responsible for 
it. As already noted, if identification is essentially a technical matter, 
attribution is a legal exercise. Although it is not entirely implausible that a 
special regime of international responsibility could develop as a 
consequence of the peculiar features of cyber operations, in the present lack 
of any indications in that sense such conclusion would certainly be 
premature.12 The applicable rules are, therefore, those contained in Chapter 
II of Part One of the 2001 International Law Commission (ILC)’s Articles 
on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, which 
substantially reflect customary international law. I cannot see any 
insurmountable problems with applying these rules in cyberspace that 
require the rethinking of these rules. With cyber weapons, the real problem 
                                                     
9 Michael Schmitt, ‘Normative Voids and Asymmetry in Cyberspace’, Just Security, 29 
December 2014, www.justsecurity.org/18685/normative-voids-asymmetry-cyberspace/; 
William A. Owens, Kenneth W. Dam, and Herbert S. Lin, Technology, Policy, Law, and 
Ethics Regarding U.S. Acquisition and Use of Cyberattack Capabilities (Washington: The 
National Academies Press, 2009), pp. 138-141. 
10 Schmitt. ‘Normative Voids’. 
11 In a previous Round Table, Nils Melzer observed that, ‘in the early days of air 
warfare, hostile airplanes could be detected only once they were near enough to be visible 
and audible. But then the radar was invented and solved the problem – until the stealth 
fighter came along’ (Nils Melzer, ‘Towards a Code of Conduct for Cyber Space’, in Wolff 
Heintschel von Heinegg (ed.), International Humanitarian Law and New Weapons 
Technologies (Milano: FrancoAngeli, 2012), p. 172). 
12 Article 55 of the ILC Articles provides that ‘[t]hese articles do not apply where and to 
the extent that the conditions for the existence of an internationally wrongful act or the 
content or implementation of the international responsibility of a State are governed by 
special rules of international law’. Read the text of the Articles in Yearbook of the 
International Law Commission, 2001, vol. II, Part Two, pp. 26-30.  
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is one of finding sufficient evidence, not of changing and even less 
lowering, the standards of attribution under the law of state responsibility. 
As the ICJ in the Nicaragua Judgment highlighted well before the advent 
of cyber technologies, ‘the problem is not… the legal process of imputing 
the act to a particular State… but the prior process of tracing material proof 
of the identity of the perpetrator.’13 
There are increasing calls to deal with this cyber attribution problem by 
making a state responsible for all cyber attacks that emerge from within its 
borders, even if the attacks are not sponsored by that state. This view is 
inconsistent with the current law of state responsibility: the ILC Articles on 
state responsibility provide that a state is responsible for the conduct of 
individuals or groups that are not organs only when they are ‘in fact acting 
on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that State in 
carrying out the conduct’ (Article 8). At least one commentator has 
suggested that, due to the inherently clandestine nature of cyber activities 
and the technical difficulty of identifying the authors, the looser Tadić test 
should be preferred to the Nicaragua test to attribute the use of cyber 
weapons under the law of state responsibility.14 This view is untenable: 
indeed, it is exactly because of the identification problems characterizing 
cyber weapons and the potential for a false flag that the ‘effective control’ 
test is preferable, as it would prevent states from being frivolously or 
maliciously accused of cyber operations. Clear support for the application 
of the effective control test to cyber operations can be found in the speech 
given by the then US State Department’s Legal Advisor, Harold Koh, at the 
US CYBERCOM in 2012, where he claims that states are internationally 
responsible for cyber acts undertaken through ‘proxy actors’ when they ‘act 
on the State’s instructions or under its direction or control.’15 Azerbaijan 
also denounced cyber attacks conducted by a group of hackers called the 
‘Armenian Cyber Army’ under the ‘direction and control’ of Armenia.16 
Let us now move to the problem of assessing the effects of cyber 
weapons. First, while it is true that cyber weapons can produce effects 
practically immediately, operationally they are much slower: targets need 
to be identified, access to the target system needs to be gained and 
                                                     
13 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. US), 
Merits, Judgment, 27 June 1986, ICJ Reports 1986, para. 57. 
14 Scott J. Shackelford, ‘From Nuclear War to Net War: Analogizing Cyber Attacks in 
International Law’, 27 Berkeley Journal of International Law (2009), p. 235. 
15 CarrieLyn D Guymon (ed.), Digest of United States Practice in International Law, 
2012, p. 596. 
16 Letter dated 6 September 2012 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent 
Mission of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, 7 
September 2012, UN Doc A/66/897–S/2012/687, p. 1. 
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vulnerabilities identified, the payload has to be developed and deployed.17 
The belligerents, then, have plenty of opportunities to assess the possible 
effects, consult a military lawyer and consider the legality of the operation. 
In fact, it is believed that several planned cyber attacks (like those by 
NATO on Serbia’s air defences and by the United States on Libya’s air 
defence system) were cancelled because of the concerns about their 
collateral effects.18 Speed of effects, then, could hamper retaliation, but 
does not necessarily prevent compliance with the law of armed conflict by 
the attacker. 
It has also been said that, because malware may spread uncontrollably, 
its effects are difficult to assess and, therefore, cyber weapons are by 
definition inconsistent with the principle of distinction. But this is not 
necessarily true. It all depends on how the malware is designed and on the 
characteristics of the targeted system. Malware can be designed to spread 
indiscriminately: for instance, malware that disrupts the air traffic control 
system may not be able to distinguish between civilian and military aircraft. 
But malware could also be introduced into a closed military network,19 or 
be written so as to negatively affect exclusively certain systems, as was the 
case of Stuxnet. The same considerations apply to the principle of 
proportionality: proportionate cyber attacks are possible if the software is 
written with this purpose in mind and the targeted system is sufficiently 
known. While Stuxnet was promiscuous, for instance, it made itself inert if 
the specific Siemens software used at Iran’s Natanz uranium enrichment 
plant was not found on infected computers, and contained safeguards to 
prevent each infected computer from spreading the worm to more than 
three others, before self-destructing on 24 June 2012.20 In addition, it 
caused no more than inconvenience to infected computers other than the 
Natanz operating system, as the worm did not self-replicate indefinitely so 
as to slow down computer functions.21 
                                                     
17 Herbert S. Lin, ‘The Technology of Offensive Cyber Operations’, in Technological 
Challenges to the Humanitarian Legal Framework, 11th Bruges Colloquium, 21-22 October 
2010, p. 38, www.coleurope.eu/sites/default/files/uploads/page/collegium_41_0.pdf. 
18 Jeffrey T.G. Kelsey, ‘Hacking into International Humanitarian Law: The Principles of 
Distinction and Neutrality in the Age of Cyber Warfare’, 106 Michigan Law Review (2007-
08), pp. 1434-1435; Rid and McBurney, ‘Cyber-Weapons’, p. 6. 
19 Commentary to Rule 43, in Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to 
Cyber Warfare (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 146. 
20 Jeremy Richmond, ‘Evolving Battlefields: Does Stuxnet Demonstrate a Need for 
Modifications to the Law of Armed Conflict?’, 35 Fordham International Law Journal 
(2011-2012), p. 856. 
21 Richmond, ‘Evolving Battlefields’, p. 861. 
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Of course, targeteers will almost inevitably have to be assisted by cyber 
engineers when assessing the possible effects of cyber weapons and making 
decisions with regard to a cyber attack, unless they are trained cyber 
experts themselves.22 Collecting information about the architecture of the 
attacked network (network mapping) or operating system (footprinting) 
through cyber exploitation or traditional intelligence gathering will be of 
decisive importance in this context, as the effects of a cyber weapon greatly 
depend on the characteristics of the targeted systems. It should also be 
recalled that the duty to take precautions in attack and against the effects of 
an attack extends to cyberspace.23 
My conclusion is that the difficulties related to the attribution of the use 
of cyber weapons and their effects are not an impossible challenge for 
existing rules of the law of armed conflict. At the same time, I do not want 
to give the impression that I am downplaying the problems – that indeed 
exist – arising from the application in the cyber context of rules adopted 
well before the Information Age. These provisions need now to be re-
interpreted in an evolutionary way so as to take into account the 
dependency of today’s societies on computers, computer systems and 
networks. As recalled by the former President of the Israeli Supreme Court, 
Aharon Barak, in another context, ‘new reality at times requires new 
interpretation. Rules developed against the background of a reality which 
has changed must take on a dynamic interpretation which adapts them, in 
the framework of accepted interpretational rules, to the new reality.’24 The 
arguments in favour of evolutionary interpretation apply even more 
strongly to the law of armed conflict: the forward-looking character of this 
law is demonstrated by the inclusion in Additional Protocol I of Article 36 
on the study, development, acquisition or adoption of a new weapon, 
means, or method of warfare, and of the Martens Clause. The debate on 
how the existing law of armed conflict applies in cyberspace, then, needs to 
continue. 
                                                     
22 Heather Harrison Dinniss, Cyber Warfare and the Laws of War (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 206-207. 
23 US Law of War Manual, p. 1006. See Roscini, Cyber Operations, pp. 232-239. 
24 Public Committee Against Torture in Israel et al. v. The Government of Israel et al., 
Israel’s Supreme Court, HCJ 769/02, 11 December 2005, para. 28 (Barak). Vice President 
Rivlin also stated that ‘international law must adapt itself to the era in which we are living’ 
(ibid., para. 2 (Rivlin)). 
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Unmanned maritime systems: 
does the increasing use of naval weapons systems 
present a challenge for IHL? 
Wolff HEINTSCHEL VON HEINEGG 
Chair of Public Law, especially International Law, European Law 
and Foreign Constitutional Law, Viadrina University, 
Frankfurt (Oder); Council Member, IIHL 
1. Systems and Vehicles 
 
Naval mines and torpedoes could well qualify as unmanned maritime 
systems. Still, they are excluded here because 
-  they are regulated by the 1907 Hague Convention VIII and 
-  because they are normally recoverable or designed to return (you do 
not want a torpedo or a naval mine to return to its origin). 
 
The terms ‘unmanned maritime systems’ (UMS) and ‘unmanned 
maritime/seagoing vehicles’ (UMVs/USVs) seem to indicate that the 
former consist of various components and are far more complex than the 
latter. Indeed, ‘system’ means a ‘complex whole’ or a ‘set of things 
working together as a mechanism or interconnecting network’.1 According 
to the U.S. DoD, 
 
UMS comprise unmanned maritime vehicles (UMVs), which include both 
unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) and unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs), 
all necessary support components, and the fully integrated sensors and payloads 
necessary to accomplish the required missions.2 
 
Although those definitions seem to suggest that UMVs/USVs are but 
components of UMS it would not be correct to hold that UMVs/USVs do 
not qualify as ‘systems’ because they are composed of various subsystems.3 
                                                     
1 Concise Oxford English Dictionary, p. 1462 (12th ed., 2011). 
2 U.S. Department of Defense, Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2013-2038, 
p. 8. 
3 For example, the major UUV’s subsystems are: the pressure hull, the hydrodynamic 
hull, ballasting, power and energy, electrical-power distribution, propulsion, navigation and 
positioning, obstacle avoidance, masts, maneuver control, communications, locator and 
emergency equipment, payloads. See National Defense Research Institute, A Survey of 
Missions for Unmanned Undersea Vehicles, p. 46 et seq. (RAND Corp. 2009). 
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Since a distinction between ‘systems’ and ‘vehicles’ does not prove helpful 
it seems to be correct to consider the terms ‘UMS’ and ‘UMV’ as widely 
synonymous. 
Accordingly, UMS are self-propelled or remotely-navigated craft that 
are normally recoverable and designed to perform certain functions at sea 
by operating on the surface, semi-submerged or undersea. UMS are 
remotely operated, remotely controlled/supervised or they perform some or 
all of their functions independently from a human controller or operator. 
 
 
2. Missions/Tasks of UMS 
 
UMS can perform a wide variety of missions or tasks. While the focus 
of this paper is on military uses it is important to bear in mind that UMS, in 
particular UUVs, are today used for the performance of the following 
important civilian/non-military tasks: 
(1) offshore oil and gas missions; 
(2) undersea cable deployment and inspection; 
(3) commercial salvage; 
(4) aquaculture; and 
(5) science missions, such as oceanography and marine archaeology.4 
According to the DoD Roadmap, current military missions performed 
by UMS (USVs and UUVs) include ‘mine warfare, mine neutralization, 
reconnaissance, surveillance, hydrographic surveying, environmental 
analysis, special operations, and oceanographic research’.5 Similarly, the 
UUV Master Plan identifies nine specific mission categories and prioritizes 
them as follows:6 (1) Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); 
(2) mine countermeasures (MCM); (3) anti-submarine Warfare (ASW); (4) 
inspection/identification; (5) oceanography; (6) communication/navigation 
network node (CN3); (7) payload delivery; (8) information operations (IO); 





                                                     
4 RAND (supra note #), p. 41 et seq. 
5 DoD Roadmap (supra note #), p. 109. 
6 U.S. Department of the Navy, The Navy Unmanned Undersea Vehicle (UUV) Master 
Plan, p. 16 (November 2004). 
7 For a detailed description of those missions/tasks see RAND Report (supra note #), p. 
13 et seq. 
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3. Legal Status and Navigational Rights in General 
 
Although UMS navigate in sea areas they cannot without difficulty be 
considered ships. The international law of the sea lacks a uniform definition 
of the term ‘ship’. UNCLOS8 uses the terms ‘vessel’ and ‘ship’ 
interchangeably, without providing a definition of either term. In other 
treaties a ‘ship’ is defined as either (1) ‘any sea-going vessel of any type 
whatsoever, including floating craft, whether self-propelled or towed by 
another vessel, making a sea voyage’9; (2) ‘a vessel of any type whatsoever 
operating in the marine environment […] includ[ing] hydrofoil boats, air-
cushion vehicles, submersibles, floating craft and fixed or floating 
platforms’10; (3) ‘every description of water craft, including non-
displacement craft and seaplanes used or capable of being used as a means 
of transportation on water’11; or (4) ‘any self-propelled sea-going vessel 
used in international seaborne trade for the transport of goods, passengers, 
or both’12. While those treaties do not prohibit treating UMS as vessels or 
ships, in particular, UNCLOS is designed for manned systems. In view of 
these difficulties UMS are not characterized as ships or vessels but rather as 
‘craft’.13 It is quite probable that a considerable number of States is not 
prepared to either recognize as or to assimilate UMS to ships/vessels. Still, 
for the purposes of the present manual UMS could be considered as vessels. 
This should be accompanied by a recommendation to governments to agree 
on a joint statement to that effect. That would render a formal modification 
or amendment of the existing international law unnecessary. Moreover, it 
would be possible to characterize UMS as warships, if they are operated by 






                                                     
8 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 
3, 397. 
9 1962 Amendments to the 1952 Convention for Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by 
Oil, 11 April 1962, Annex, Article 1(1), 600 UNTS 332. 
10 International Convention for Prevention of Pollution from Ships of 1973, as amended 
by the 1978 Protocol of 17 February 1978, 1340 UNTS 61, 184. 
11 Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea. 
12 United Nations Convention on Conditions for Registration of Ships (not in force), 
Article 2(4). 
13 U.S. Navy/U.S. Marine Corps/U.S. Coast Guard, The Commander’s Handbook on the 
Law of Naval Operations (NWP 1-14M), paras. 2.3.4-2.3.6 (Edition July 2007).  
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3.1. Sovereign Immunity 
 
If UMS are operated by the armed forces or any other government 
agency of a State, they may not necessarily qualify as warships or State 
ships, but in view of the fact that they either constitute State property or 
serve exclusively non-commercial governmental functions, they do enjoy 
sovereign immunity and may be interfered with by other States in very 
exceptional circumstances (e.g. in an international armed conflict) only. 
Accordingly, it is correct to hold: ‘USVs and UUVs engaged exclusively in 
government, non-commercial service, are sovereign immune craft.’14 
It is important to note that an independent legal status of sovereign 
immunity applies to UMS operating independently from another platform. 
Therefore, it is correct to hold that ‘USV/UUV status is not dependent on 
the status of its launch platform.’15 If the UMS is tethered to a controlling 
platform, it is difficult to attach to it an independent legal status. However, 
in view of the distinction between ROVs and AUVs becoming increasingly 




3.2. Navigational Rights 
 
According to NWP 1-14M, ‘USVs and UUVs retain independent 
navigation rights’ and they, thus, are considered as enjoying the same 
navigation rights as surface vessels and submarines. Other States have not 
(yet) given statements to that effect although they in fact make use of UMS 
for governmental, scientific and commercial purposes. Hence, it is safe to 
conclude that UMS enjoy the right of freedom of navigation in the high 
seas and in the EEZ as well as the rights of innocent passage, transit 
passage and archipelagic sea lanes passage. 
 
 
4. UMS and IHL 
 
4.1. Exercise of Belligerent Rights 
 
Although it may be unsettled whether UMS qualify as, or are 
assimilated to, warships State practice seems to suggest that they are, and 
                                                     
14 NWP 1-14M (supra note #), para. 2.3.6. 
15 Ibid. 
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will be, used not only for attack purposes but also for the exercise of other 
belligerent rights, such as inspection of vessels. Since the exercise of those 
belligerent rights will predominantly occur in high seas areas, there is a 
need for transparency because not only enemy vessels may be affected but 
also neutral vessels. Therefore, in times of international armed conflict 
UMS should be identifiable as belonging to the armed forces of a 
belligerent. Moreover, those controlling or pre-programming them should 
be under regular armed forces discipline in order to ensure compliance with 
the law of armed conflict. 
 
 
4.2. UMS as Means of Warfare 
 
Whereas many UMS are used for ISR or oceanography, some are 
designed for attack purposes, such as those employed for ASW, MCM or 
mine-laying. If and to the extent UMS are employed for the purposes of 
attack, they qualify as means of warfare16 and their employment is subject 
to weapons law and targeting law. 
 
a) Weapons Law 
According to Article 35(2) AP I, it is prohibited to employ means or 
methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary 
suffering. According to Article 35(3) AP I, it is prohibited to employ 
methods and means of warfare which are intended or may be expected to 
cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment. 
According to Article 51(4) lit. b) and c) AP I, it is prohibited to employ a 
means of combat which cannot be directed at a specific military objective 
or whose effects cannot be limited as required by AP I. Those prohibitions 
are customary in nature17 but not equally relevant for the employment of 
current UMS as means of warfare. 
As regards the capability of being directed at a specific military 
objective, it must be borne in mind that UMS are equipped with weapons 
that use the same or similar technologies as, for instance, modern naval 
mines or torpedoes. They carry weapons that home into targets that have 
been identified by magnetic, electromagnetic or other signatures allowing 
for a sufficiently reliable identification as lawful military objectives.  
Regularly, the effects of current naval weapons systems will not be 
excessive in relation to the military advantage anticipated. In this context it 
                                                     
16 As defined in Rule 1 (t) AMW Manual. 
17 See Rules 5, 88, 89 AMW Manual. 
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is important to take into consideration the environment in which they are 
employed, in particular the characteristics of saline waters, and the fact that 
they will in most cases be used against targets which are not surrounded by 
civilian or specially protected objects. Apart from that, such considerations 
are not relevant under weapons law but rather under the law of targeting. 
The same holds true with regard to the protection of the marine 
environment. No naval weapons system in existence is to be expected to 
inflict to the marine environment the kind of damage prohibited by Article 
35(3) AP I. 
It is, therefore, safe to conclude that UMS are lawful means of warfare, 
whether they are remotely operated/controlled or whether they operate with 
a certain degree of autonomy. However, UMS that operate with some 
autonomy must be capable of employment in accordance with the targeting 
law rules referred to in the next sub-section, and these will include the 
precautions in attack obligations set forth there. 
 
b) Targeting Law 
If UMS are employed for attack purposes, the same rules apply as in the 
case of the use of manned platforms qualifying as means of warfare. The 
target must be a lawful military objective, collateral damage may not be 
expected to be excessive in relation to the military advantage anticipated 
and, finally, the required precautions in attack must be taken. 
With regard to the latter it may be asked whether at sea different 
standards apply. According to Article 57(4) AP I, military operations at sea 
are subject to ‘all reasonable precautions’. Irrespective of the question 
whether the difference between the standards of feasibility and 
reasonableness is to be considered a ‘tenuous nuance’18, it follows from the 
wording of Article 57(4) AP I that the standard of reasonableness only 
applies to naval operations that may have an effect on the civilian 
population or civilian objects on land without being directed against targets 
on land. Sea-to-sea, as sea-to-air and air-to sea, operations, whose effects 
may not extend to land, continue to be governed by the customary 
obligation to take precautions in attack, which include the feasibility 
standard.19 
Accordingly, and without prejudice to the duty of constant care20, the 
employment of UMS for purposes of attack must be in accordance with the 
following requirements: 
                                                     
18 ICRC Commentary, MN 2230. 
19 San Remo Manual, para. 46; AMW Manual, Rules 30 to 39. 
20 Article 57(1) AP I. 
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-  The system and/or operator target must be able to verify the legality 
of the target21 
-  The system and/or operator must be capable of determining the 
probability of collateral damage22 
-  If collateral damage is expected to be excessive in relation to the 
military advantage anticipated, the attack may not be executed23 
-  If not excessive but still to be expected, there is an obligation to 
minimize or avoid collateral damage by all feasible precautions24 
-  Unless circumstances do not permit, an advanced effective warning 
must be given.25 
 
The obligation to avoid or minimize collateral damage by the choice of 
a different weapon (‘weaponeering’) will regularly have no effect because 
of the feasibility standard, because UMS do not, and probably will not, 
carry more than one type of weapon. The obligation to give an advanced 
warning will come into effect, if UMS are employed for mine-laying 
purposes, in particular within the EEZ of a neutral State. 
 
c) Law of Neutrality 
In times of an international armed conflict, the employment of UMS is 
subject to the law of maritime neutrality (unless the use of force has been 
authorized by a Chapter VII decision of the UN Security Council26). It is 
important to emphasize that it the law of neutrality applies to all military 
UMS whether they are used for attack purposes or not. 
Accordingly, UMS may not engage in hostile actions in neutral waters 
or use neutral waters as a sanctuary or base of operations.27 In the EEZ of a 
neutral State, they must be employed with due regard for the rights and 
duties of the coastal State.28 The due regard rule also applies to the hostile 
use of UMS on the high seas.29 
Belligerent UMS have the rights of transit passage and archipelagic sea 
lanes passage.30 Accordingly, neutral States may not suspend, hamper, or 
                                                     
21 Article 57(2) lit. (a)(i) AP I; San Remo Manual, para. 46(b). 
22 San Remo Manual, para. 46(a). 
23 Article 57(2) lit. (a)(iii) AP I; San Remo Manual, para. 46(d). 
24 Article 57(2) lit. (a)(ii) AP I; San Remo Manual, para. 46(c). 
25 Article 57(2) lit. (c) AP I. 
26 San Remo Manual, para. 7; AMW Manual, Rule 165. 
27 San Remo Manual, para.s 14-16. 
28 San Remo Manual, para. 34. 
29 San Remo Manual, para. 36. 
30 San Remo Manual, para. 28. 
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otherwise impede those rights.31 Belligerent UMS enjoy the right of 
innocent passage, unless the neutral coastal State has, on a non-
discriminatory basis, conditioned, restricted or prohibited passage through 
its territorial sea.32 The right of non-suspendable innocent passage may not 
be suspended.33 
The parties to an international armed conflict must respect the sovereign 
immunity of neutral UMS, which are employed for non-commercial 
governmental purposes. Neutral civilian UMS may only be interfered with, 
if they qualify as lawful military objectives. It needs to be stressed that the 
capture of neutral civilian UMS under prize law will, if at all, apply in very 
exceptional situations only. Usually, UMS are not used for the transport of 
cargo that could constitute contraband. 
 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
The fact that UMS are already in use for a variety of purposes and that it 
is highly probable that they will be increasingly used in the future, does not 
seem to pose a challenge to IHL. If UMS qualify as means of warfare, i.e. if 
designed or used for attack purposes, they are subject to weapons law and 
targeting law. They are not unlawful per se, and employment for attack 
purposes will regularly be in accordance with targeting law.  
The only unresolved issue pertains to their status as warships, as defined 
by international law, and their entitlement to the exercise of belligerent and 
navigational rights. 
                                                     
31 San Remo Manual, para. 29. 
32 San Remo Manual, para. 19. 
33 San Remo Manual, para. 33. 
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IX. The Red Cross and 




























Permanent Representative of Switzerland to the United Nations 
and the other international organizations in Geneva  
 
I was asked to provide you a short assessment of the outcome of the 
32nd International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent with 
regard to the process on strengthening respect for international 
humanitarian law (IHL) and on the way forward. 
The regular participants of the Sanremo Roundtable are very well aware 
of the background of this resolution as we had the opportunity to present 
this important process already one year ago. Let me briefly recall the 
process that led us to the 32nd International Conference. 
I hope that all of those present agree with me that in legal terms, 
international humanitarian law is in good shape. It has come to age, but in 
essence it remains an appropriate framework to regulate the conduct of 
parties to armed conflicts and to provide protection to the persons affected. 
There may be some areas that require strengthening the legal/normative 
framework – notably with regard to the protection of persons deprived of 
their liberty in non-international armed conflicts – but IHL in general gives 
the adequate responses to the challenges we observe in contemporary 
warfare. You will also agree with me, that, on the other hand, we observe 
today a blatant lack of respect for the existing rules. It is with regard to the 
implementation that we need to redouble efforts (at the national and 
multilateral levels) if we want to increase protection for the persons 
affected by armed conflicts. 
This is exactly the preoccupation of the process that led us to the 32nd 
International Conference. On the basis of a mandate of the 31st 
International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent in 2011, 
Switzerland and the ICRC undertook an important consultation process 
open to all States Parties to the Geneva Conventions aimed at identifying 
options for improving the application of IHL. We consulted States on the 
possibilities of reinvigorating the existing mechanisms and looked at how a 
new mechanism to facilitate the implementation of IHL could be designed. 
Early in these discussions, States observed that what is lacking the most 
is an institutional space for them to regularly assess the state of IHL 
implementation and the current challenges (including the diverging 
interpretations of this body of law). Contrary to most other multilateral 
treaties, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 do not provide States an 
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opportunity to discuss challenges and means to address them on a regular 
basis. You are very well aware that, given the very obvious need to 
strengthen the implementation of IHL, other mechanisms have filled this 
vacuum. However, they rarely do so from an IHL angle properly speaking. 
It is only normal for the UN Human Rights Council to look at situations of 
armed conflicts from a human rights perspective and for the UN Security 
Council to do so from the perspective of international peace and security. 
While these discussions are tremendously helpful to raise awareness of the 
challenges or to develop solutions with regard to specific issues – such as 
the protection of the medical mission [UN Security Council Resolution 
2286], this is not enough. 
It is not enough because IHL still does not receive the attention it 
deserves on the multilateral policy agenda. It is not enough because these 
bodies do not necessarily bring together the right people: we need to 
discuss IHL implementation among those who are responsible at the 
national level to implement the law, notably from the Ministries of Defence 
and armed forces as well as from the justice sector. And it is not enough 
because these bodies often address IHL in situations of a perceived 
urgency. We need a space for States to discuss and cooperate expertly, 
calmly and systematically. We still lack such a forum. 
Our proposal was thus for the 32nd International Conference to 
recommend to States the establishment of a forum of States on IHL. We 
also included in the draft resolution a “blueprint” of this new mechanism, 
including the functions that could be attached to it and other modalities 
(such as, participation of observers, budgetary issues, institutional structure, 
its non-contextual and non-politicized nature). The draft resolution was 
based on the outcome of the consultation process and reflected what we 
thought could be a compromise position among the variety of views 
expressed by States. The proposals that were included in the draft 
resolution thus enjoyed the broad support of the States that were involved 
in these consultations (over 140 States in a total of nine meetings). 
As we did not have a proper negotiation mandate in the consultation 
process, the 32nd International Conference was the moment for States to 
put their cards on the table. I spare you the details of the lengthy 
negotiations which took place day and night between December 8 and 10. 
Some of you who participated in this exercise can testify to the hard work 
we did at the International Conference. But I would like to underline some 
aspects that I think came out very clearly from this Conference: 
- First, as compared to the 31st International Conference of the Red 
Cross and Red Crescent in 2011, we observed that the broader 
geopolitical environment is today more strained. IHL is today more 
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relevant for a larger number of States, especially those engaged in 
armed conflicts, which automatically increases the attention that 
States pay to a discussion such as ours. 
- Second, institution building has become a hard task. Resources are 
scarce and the work load is high for many diplomatic services. States 
are also wary not to set up new mechanisms hastily, fearing that they 
will evolve into some sort of “Frankenstein’s son” that would grow 
out of their control ten or twenty years down the road. 
 
In the very last hours of the International Conference, we arrived at a 
compromise with those States that had the most serious concerns. In short, 
all States agreed at the International Conference to enter into an 
intergovernmental process 1) “to find agreement on features and functions 
of a potential forum of States” on IHL and 2) “to find ways to enhance the 
implementation of IHL using the potential of the International Conference 
[of the Red Cross and Red Crescent] and IHL regional forums”.  
We – along with the ICRC and so many other States – had honestly 
hoped for a more expeditious and more courageous decision at the 32nd 
International Conference. But we have now received a mandate that is more 
focused than the previous mandate. It allows us to concentrate discussions 
on the specifics of the features and functions of the forum of States and will 
thus – as we expect – also reassure States that fear the establishment of a 
heavy, bureaucratic, intrusive and burdensome institution. What we want 
and what so many States agree would be a useful addition to the current 
compliance system is a nimble and effective forum for States to exchange 
experiences and share best practices with a view of increasing their 
respective capacities to uphold the norms they have signed on. 
We are aware that the road may be long and windy. There are a few 
challenges ahead of us: 
- The first challenge is to ensure that States feel responsible for this 
new phase of the process as well as its final outcome. While 
Switzerland and the ICRC will continue to co-facilitate this process, 
States need to take more ownership. Inviting more States to work 
alongside us in our facilitation efforts will also multiply outreach 
effects. 
- The second challenge is to ensure that the discussions remain 
relevant. We are determined – as co-facilitators of the process – to 
bring this process to a successful outcome. We do want to establish a 
mechanism that is useful, although modest: it is impossible to find 
the silver bullet for all challenges in the implementation of IHL that 
we observe in contemporary armed conflicts. But increasing 
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awareness of their roots, causes and consequences, while developing 
collectively answers to overcome these implementation challenges, is 
a first step to gradually create an environment in which respect for 
the law becomes the norm and not the contrary. 
 
In the coming months we will, together with all interested States, set up 
the organizational issues and the work plan of this process. We had a first 
collective brainstorming in June and will organize a second exchange of 
views this coming October. The goal is for us to develop a process that is 
effective and efficient and that is in full accordance with the guiding 
principles of the process. We were encouraged by the constructive 
contributions made by many States in these first exchanges. The purpose is 
for States to decide at the end of November on the procedural matters 
including a work plan so as to take up the substantive discussions swiftly in 
the beginning of next year. 
Rest assured that Switzerland remains deeply committed to this process. 
We have worked hard in the past four years and look forward to working 
even harder in the years to come. Our preoccupation is obvious, as isthe 
need for real efforts and real results.  
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Strengthening IHL protecting persons 
deprived of their liberty: 
main achievements and next steps1 
Helen DURHAM 
Director of International Law and Policy, 
International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva 
As you know, protecting detainees is one of the key activities of the 
ICRC and currently of great operational importance. Between 2011 and 
2015, the number of detainees visited by the ICRC rose from around 
500.000 to over 900000. During their daily visits to detainees, ICRC 
delegates witness severe humanitarian issues. They range from ill-treatment 
and disappearances, over grave shortcomings in conditions of detention 
such as the provision of inadequate infrastructure or insufficient basic 
goods and services, to lack of protection for vulnerable groups, such as 
women, children and the elderly. Another important issue is arbitrary 
detention without necessary judicial guarantees. 
Reasons for this grave situation are multi-faceted and complex: in some 
cases, authorities disrespect applicable law and standards; in other cases, 
they lack sufficient means to provide for elementary needs of detainees. 
Especially in the context of non-international armed conflicts (NIAC), a 
reaffirmation and clarification of applicable norms could provide important 
safeguards for the life, health and dignity of detainees. 
Concretely, during consultations with States over the past four years, we 
have continuously heard that there is very little legal or policy guidance on 
deprivation of liberty close to the battlefield, in particular, on questions 
such as to whom the fact of detention should be notified, or when a 
detainee must be allowed to contact his or her family. 
Moreover, closely linked to humanitarian concerns such as 
disappearances, ill-treatment or the overcrowding of prisons is also the 
question of grounds and procedures for internment. In our operational 
dialogue with States, armed groups, and multinational operations, we 
frequently see internment regimes that permit internment based on very 
broad and sometimes arbitrary grounds, for very long periods, often 
without independent and impartial review. Such regimes easily lead to 
arbitrary or prolonged detention, which detainees unfortunately often spend 
                                                     
1 The views expressed in this presentation are those of the author alone and do not 
necessarily reflect the views of the ICRC. 
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in harsh conditions and which leaves their families in uncertainty on the 
fate of their beloved ones. 
Against this background, the process to strengthen IHL protecting 
persons deprived of their liberty is of utmost importance. While the 32nd 
International Conference made very clear that no new treaty will be 
negotiated, the ICRC is convinced that even a legally non-binding outcome 
can strengthen the protection of detainees. Such an outcome will need to 
reiterate and clarify fundamental protections for detainees and apply in all 
NIACs – meaning internal and extraterritorial ones – and to all parties to 
NIACs. It should provide parties to conflicts with concrete and 





This process goes back to an internal ICRC Study which highlighted 
that - whereas IHL applicable in international armed conflicts contains 
robust and detailed provisions on most aspects of deprivation of liberty in 
relation to these conflicts - IHL applicable in non-international armed 
conflicts contains only very basic rules. 
Against this background, the 31st International Conference in 2011 
invited the ICRC to pursue further research, consultation and discussion in 
cooperation with States and to propose a range of options and the ICRC’s 
recommendations for strengthening the law protecting detainees in armed 
conflict. 
Based on this mandate, the ICRC facilitated four regional consultations 
of government experts in 2012 and 2013; two thematic consultations of 
government experts in 2014; one all-State meeting in 2015; and numerous 
informal bilateral and multilateral consultations. 
In terms of substance, these meetings have shown that most States 
believe that detention in non-international armed conflict is the area of law 
in most urgent need of attention. More specifically, States have largely 
supported the ICRC’s proposal to focus on four areas of humanitarian 
concern in such conflicts: 
o conditions of detention; 
o particularly vulnerable detainees; 
o grounds and procedures for internment; and 





Resolution 1 of the 32nd International Conference 
 
The 2012-2015 consultations led to the adoption of Resolution 1 at the 
32nd International Conference last December. This Resolution shifts this 
process from ICRC-led consultations to state-led work towards concrete 
and implementable outcomes. Indeed, Resolution 1 recommends further in-
depth work with the goal of producing concrete and implementable 
outcomes even if of a legally non- binding nature. As you may note, this is 
a compromise formula that leaves open which kind of outcomes States 
envisage. In the ICRC’s view, any meaningful outcome of this process 
needs to strengthen the protection of detainees in the hands of state or non-
state parties to armed conflicts. 
The resolution further recommends that this work shall be undertaken 
by States in close cooperation with the ICRC. In fact, the Resolution invites 
the ICRC to facilitate the work of States and to contribute its humanitarian 
and legal expertise. At the outset of this work, however, States and the 
ICRC will need to collaborate in determining the modalities of further work 





In line with Resolution 1, the ICRC intends to proceed in two steps: 
• First, States and the ICRC need to determine the modalities of further 
work. This includes important procedural questions, including: 
o How a state-led but ICRC-facilitated process shall be 
organized; and 
o What should the next steps be? 
 
Nevertheless, it is key to maintain the momentum of the initiative and to 
avoid a situation where discussions regarding modalities end up blocking 
forward movement. Therefore, this month, the ICRC organizes a number of 
bilateral meetings and exchanges of views among States in regional 
groupings in order to hear States’ views on how to continue the process. 
These discussions will then continue in a more formal setting later this 
year. 
Substantial discussions will only continue as a second step once and if 
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Let me now turn to the resolution on sexual and gender-based violence 
(SGBV), which was jointly submitted by the ICRC and the International 
Federation. 
Much has been done in the past years by States, the UN and others to 
put the matter of SGBV on the international agenda. Aspects of it were also 
addressed at previous International Conferences, and the Red Cross and 
Red Crescent Movement has been working on various elements of SGBV2. 
However, sexual violence in situations such as armed conflicts remains 
an appalling reality and there is increasing evidence of SGBV in disasters 
and other emergencies. The ICRC and the International Federation, 
therefore, thought it timely to submit a draft resolution specifically 
dedicated to SGBV to the 32nd International Conference. 
The comments we received from States and National Societies during 
consultations on the resolution showed a strong shared concern about 
matters of SGBV even though, for example, the degree may have differed 
to which they encouraged addressing situations outside armed conflict or 
gender-based violence apart from sexual violence. Against this background, 
we think that the consensual adoption of the resolution by the members of 
the 32nd International Conference can be seen as a considerable success3. 
The resolution adopted contains important language such as its 
condemnation, in the strongest possible terms, of sexual and gender- based 
violence, in all circumstances, and particularly in armed conflict, disasters 
and other emergencies. Other important aspects in our view are, for 
example, the explicit recognition that, while women and girls are 
disproportionately affected, men and boys can also be victims/survivors of 
                                                     
1 The views expressed in this presentation are those of the author alone and do not 
necessarily reflect the views of the ICRC. 
2 The ICRC, for example, committed in 2013 to expand and enhance its activities 
addressing sexual violence in situations such as armed conflicts over the following four 
years. 
3 In addition, the very active participation in the two thematic Commissions on SGBV at 
the International Conference and the significant number of pledges by States and National 
Societies on this topic further attest to the success of the Conference. 
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SGBV, a point that is often overlooked. Significant for everyone working 
on preventing and responding to SGBV is also the clear recognition that, 
despite its prevalence, SGBV is often invisible and that it is, therefore, 
essential to be proactive. 
As regards sexual violence in armed conflict, the resolution recalls all 
existing IHL provisions that prohibit acts of sexual violence, binding upon 
State and non-state parties to armed conflict; underlines the need for States 
to comply with their obligations to put an end to impunity; and calls upon 
States to disseminate the existing prohibitions of sexual violence under IHL 
and to fully integrate them in the activities of their armed and security 
forces and detention authorities. The importance of protection, access to 
justice, appropriate investigation and prosecution and of access to non-
discriminatory and comprehensive multidisciplinary care for 
victims/survivors is also underlined. 
In addition – and this emphasizes the added value of a resolution 
adopted by the International Conference – the resolution strongly 
encourages the work of components of the Movement on SGBV, in line 
with their mandates and institutional focuses. 
In view of that, and in continuation of its previous work, the ICRC runs 
both specific programs on sexual violence in situations such as armed 
conflicts and integrates sexual violence matters into existing activities. 
For example, we strive to integrate both medical and psychological 
support in our health activities for victims of sexual violence. We may 
provide economic support to victims to assist them in rebuilding their lives. 
In consultation with local communities, as part of our risk reduction and 
community-based approach, we work to raise awareness, identify risk 
factors and develop protection strategies against sexual violence. 
The ICRC also builds the capacity of its staff to work on matters of 
sexual violence. The issue is continuously included in internal 
trainingcourses, and participation in in-depth external training for 
middle/senior managers at field-level is offered. 
Furthermore, our Advisory Service on IHL currently works on 
producing a checklist to assist States in ensuring that appropriate normative 
frameworks, policies and regulations are in place, capable of effectively 
preventing and responding to sexual violence in armed conflict and other 
contexts. The topic is also included in various events on IHL, such as the 
recent 16th Annual Regional Seminar on IHL in Pretoria. 
Finally, we support the Movement in mobilizing around the topic of 
sexual violence. For example, the ICRC, together with the International 
Federation and National Societies, is organizing a series of working groups 
at the regional level on SGBV in order to both co-produce Movement-wide 
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training material and exchange information and best practice. Over the 
coming months, there will be regional working group meetings in Beirut, 
Bogota and Nairobi, addressing various issues related to SGBV. 
In conclusion, the ICRC is convinced that sexual violence in situations 
such as armed conflict is not inevitable but can and must be eliminated. We 
are committed to joining forces with States, other components of the 















































Director of International Law and Policy, 
International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva  
 
Over the last few days we have explored together a number of themes, 
all related to questions about weapons and international law. We have 
heard much about the need for balance, the important role played by 
evidence, the relationship between the law enforcement paradigm and the 
laws of war as well as the tension between the ‘whacky future’ and what 
we see as feasible today. We reflected on the fact that international law 
regulating weapons is the most expanding area of normative developments 
and the interface between specific treaty law and ‘softer’ regulation. It is 
also evident from many of our discussions that ‘technology is a good 
servant but a terrible master’. 
The Round Table started with powerful speeches, including a message 
from the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki Moon, who notably reminded us 
all that the overarching objective of our discussions is to enhance the 
protection of civilians during armed conflicts. 
We heard from many speakers that the law applicable to weapons issues 
is dynamic and adaptable, as shown by the number of treaties adopted over 
the last few decades, and as demonstrated by the vivid debates taking place 
nowadays on the current challenges, notably linked to technological 
developments. 
This Round Table also reminded us all how much political 
considerations often contaminate discussions on some weapons issues 
(nuclear, outer space, and other areas). 
The importance of weapon reviews was stressed by the participants to 
ensure that military uses weapons in compliance with IHL. Focus on the 
role of national implementation identified that it should be further 
encouraged in light of low level of compliance with Art. 36. Speakers 
identified some incentives for those who have not yet put in place such 
mechanism: interest of the commander to know that the weapons used in 
the battlefield are not unlawful; public interest to know that new weapons 
being developed are not unlawful; interest of partners in alliances to know 
that allies have reviewed legality of the weapons used. 
Transparence of legal review mechanisms was also discussed and 
viewed as a way to address possible divergent interpretation of the law, 
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create confidence-building and develop standards and information 
exchanges on reviewing new technologies. 
We heard the different experiences of how States manage to adequately 
face the challenge of soldiers having to carry out law enforcement 
operations, in essence requiring proper identification of the applicability of 
different legal regimes.  
The debate on the use of explosive weapons with a wide impact area in 
populated areas showed the extent to which this issue is a concern both for 
humanitarian actors who witness their devastating effects but also for some 
military who explained the importance of keeping some of these weapons 
in their arsenal. We also heard that the same military had already adopted 
some measures limiting in certain circumstances the use of certain kinds of 
explosive weapons. 
Challenges for the future are huge and difficult as shown by discussions 
about compliance and accountability, including how to engage non-state 
armed actors in their use of weapons, future technologies, autonomous 
weapons, outer space but also how armed actors will deal with the issue of 
today’s weapons such as explosive weapons in populated areas. 
It is clear that to continue to advance these complex issues more 
exchanges and discussions between humanitarians, practitioners, lawyers, 
military, academics and government are needed. This year’s Sanremo 
Round Table was a unique place to explore these issues with a diverse 
audience, learning from each other’s experience and specific points of 
view. I wish you a safe journey home, I would like to thank all those who 
have made this event a success and I hope to see you next year to continue 








Fausto POCAR President, International Institute of Humanitarian Law, Sanremo 
After the concluding remarks made by Helen Durham on a number of 
issues, I wilI not try to make a comprehensive summing up of the questions 
dealt with in this rich and thought-provoking Round Table. Without 
repeating the comments she has offered, which I largely share, I would like 
to add a couple of comments on some other issues that might be of some 
interest. 
Firstly, I wish to underline that the debate on the review of weapons has 
been particularly interesting and has addressed in a concrete manner the 
standards to be applied for effective reviews suitable to satisfy 
requirements for compliance with IHL and its prohibition or restriction in 
the use of weapons. Of course, discussions have shown that the debate may 
continue and that there are some basic issues that remain on the table, 
including whether the general obligation to determine the illegality of new 
weapons is a result obligation or poses the obligation to adopt specific 
procedures. In such a case, the question inevitably arises of the extent to 
which States are under the obligation to disclose how they conduct their 
review and the degree of transparency which has to be ensured under article 
84 of Additional Protocol I, particularly in light of the military and other 
constraints in these delicate matters. Promoting international co-operation 
regarding IHL best practices is critical for the application of these 
international provisions. 
Another issue which deserves to be touched upon is accountability. 
Accountability is a basic issue in IHL and has been dealt here particularly 
with respect to non-state actors. It appeared to be a matter of debate and 
concern that the Statute of the International Criminal Court adopted a 
restricted notion of crimes against humanity by referring to the 
perpetrator’s acts as being part of a state or organizational policy. This 
approach restricts the notion as it exists under customary international law 
as assessed by international case law so far; in particular, in cases before 
the ICTY it has been discussed and explicitly concluded that the existence 
of an organizational policy is not a requirement for crimes against 
humanity. How can that situation be remedied? It has been suggested that 
the Rome Statute be revised in order to bring it in line with customary 
international law, but of course this is a long exercise and perhaps it is not 
desirable to open the issue of a revision of such Statute. I believe that the 
Court itself should resolve the problem by not sticking to a too strict 
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interpretation of the Statute and referring rather to customary international 
law to that effect. So far, the Court has been hesitant to proceed in this way, 
although it is entitled to do so under article 21 of the Statute that allows for 
the application of customary international law either directly or for 
interpreting the Statute’s provisions. In the last judgment rendered by the 
Court, in the Bemba Gombo case, there is an indication that customary 
international law could be used as a means of interpretation of the Statute. 
The judgment didn’t eventually do so but explained that it can use that tool. 
I believe that the Court should be encouraged to make more use of 
customary international law to interpret the Statute. This approach is 
legitimate and has been largely used by the ICTY in its early days, proving 
to be extremely important in the assessment and the development of 
international criminal law and of IHL. 
My next point refers to the last session concerning the debate on the 
Swiss-ICRC Initiative and on the last Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Conference. It is encouraging to hear from Ambassador Zellweger that the 
failure of the Conference on this topic has not been taken as a reason to 
abandon the exercise. I believe that in light of the current world situation 
one could easily expect some difficulties to arise at the Conference. Setting 
aside the initiative would not be the right response. The challenge is rather 
to put the initiative on the right track, that is, to find a way that the 
Conference in 2019 will take it up again and make a step forward. In my 
view, a step forward would be a step, and I think I share the views 
expressed by Ambassador Zellwegert to pursue the initiative at a pace 
consistent with the goals that it aims to achieve, i.e. not too slowly and in a 
realistic way. In that respect, I share what has been said here by other 
members of the Institute. The Institute is ready to help with the modalities 
that we may discuss together. As it has supported the initiative in past 
years, it is ready to contribute to its success in the future. 
One last word on a point that has largely been reported today and came 
up in discussion in the past days although mostly incidentally: the problem 
of sexual and gender-based violence. As a judge who had the opportunity to 
substantially contribute to identify and shape the elements of sex crimes 
under international criminal law in the ICTY and the ICTR, I am 
particularly sensitive to this issue and I believe that the resolution of the 
Red Cross and Red Crescent Conference on this issue should be taken up 
and followed up also here in Sanremo, and that we should leave adequate 
space to this burning problem in the future work of the Institute also with 
the next edition of the Round Table in mind. 
Let me conclude by warmly thanking the co-ordinators of the Round 
Table and all speakers, panelists and those who have intervened in the 
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debate and attended the sessions in these two days. We have had a 
productive debate on all the issues we have taken up and I am most grateful 
to everybody for their participation. My warm thanks to all members of the 
staff of the Institute and external staff who have also co-operated in the 


























ABM Anti-Ballistic Missile 
AC Appeals Chamber 
AMISOM African Union Mission in Somalia 
ANSA Armed Non-State Actors 
AOAV Action on Armed Violence  
API Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
APII Additional Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
APM Anti-Personnel Mine 
APMBT Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty 
ASW Anti-Submarine Warfare 
AUV Autonomous Underwater Vehicle 
BSS Bande sahélo-saharienne 
BTWC Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention 
BW Biological Weapons 
BWC Biological Weapons Convention 
CCM Convention on Cluster Munitions 
CCTARC Civilian Casualty Tracking Analysis Cell 
CCW Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons 
CEDH Cour Européenne des Droits de l’Homme 
CEP Circular Error Probable 
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CER Collateral Effect Radius 
CHOD Chief of Defense 
CIVIC Center for Civilians in Conflict 
CN3 Communication/Navigation Network Node 
CSNU Commandement spatial des Nations Unies 
CSO Civil Society Organization 
CTBT Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
CTC Counter-Terrorism Committee 
CTITF United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task 
Force 
CW Chemical Weapons 
CWC Chemical Weapons Convention 
DCA Droit des conflits armés 
DCDC Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre 
DEP Deflection Error Probable 
DOD  Department of Defence 
DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
DRC Democratic Republic of Congo 
ECHR European Court of Human Rights 
EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone 
ELN Ejército de liberatión nacional 
EMP Electro-Magnetic Pulse 
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ENMOD Environmental Modification Convention 
EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal  
ERW Explosive Remnants of War  
EU European Union 
EWIPA/EWPA Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas 
FAB 100/250 Russian general-purpose bomb  
FAE Fuel-Air Explosive  
FAMAS Fusil d’assaut de la manufacture d’armes de Saint-Etienne 
FARC Fuerzas armadas revolucionarias de Colombia 
FFM Fact-Finding Mission  
GAO Groupes armés organisés 
GAT Groupe armé terroriste  
GGE Groups of Governmental Experts 
GICNT Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism 
HINW Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons 
HPCR Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research Program at 
Harvard University 
HR Human Rights 
HV Hrvatska Vojska (the Croatian Army) 
IAC International Armed Conflict 
IAG Implementation and Assessment Group 
ICAN International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons 
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ICC International Criminal Court 
ICJ International Court of Justice 
ICL International Constitutional Law 
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross 
ICSANT International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of 
Nuclear Terrorism 
ICTR International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
IED Improvised Explosive Device 
IHL International Humanitarian Law 
IIHL International Institute of Humanitarian Law 
IL International Law 
ILC International Law Commission 
IO Information Operations 
ISAF International Security Assistance Force 
ISIL Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 
ISP Internet Service Provider 
ISR Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance 
JIM Joint Investigative Mechanism 
KUR Key User Requirements 
LOAC Law of Armed Conflict 
MBRL Multiple Ballistic Rocket Launchers 
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MCM Mine Countermeasures 
MINUSCA Mission multidimensionelle intégrée des Nations  
 Unies pour la stabilisation en Centrafrique 
MINUSMA Mission multidimensionelle intégrée des Nations Unies  
 pour la stabilisation en Mali 
MoD Ministry of Defence  
MPI Mean Point of Impact 
 
MRLS Multiple Rocket Launching System 
MSD Military Safe Distances 
MTCR Missile Technology Control Regime 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
NGOs Non-Governmental Organisations 
NIAC Non-International Armed Conflict 
NNWS Non-Nuclear-Weapon States 
NPT Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
NSA National Security Agency 
NTM National Technical Means 
NW Nuclear Weapons 
NWP Naval Warfare Publication 
NWS Nuclear Weapon States 
OEWG Open-Ended Working Group 
OPCW Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons 
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OPEX Opérations extérieures 
PID Positive Identification Determination 
PTBT Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 
PTSD Post-Traumatic Stress Disorders 
RCA République centrafricaine 
REP Range Error Probable 
ROE Rules of Engagement 
ROV Remotely Operated Vehicle 
SALW Small Arms and Light Weapons 
SGBV Sexual and Gender-Based Violence 
SGM Secretary-General Mechanism 
SO1 Staff Officer of the first class  
SOP Statement of Principles 
TC Trial Chamber  
TCS Time-Critical Strike 
TNT Trinitrotoluene 
UK United Kingdom 
UMS Unmanned Maritime Systems 
UMV Unmanned Maritime Vehicle 
UN United Nations 
UNCCT United Nations Counter-Terrorism Center 
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UNGA United Nations General Assembly 
UNICLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
UNMISS United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan 
UNSC United Nations Security Council 
UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution 
US United States 
USSR Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics 
USV Unmanned Surface Vehicle 
UUV Unmanned Undersea Vehicle 
UXO Unexploded Ordnance 
WHS World Humanitarian Summit 
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction 
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The 39th Round Table on current issues of International Humanitarian Law (IHL),
held in Sanremo, gathered together international experts, representatives of
governments and international organizations, academics and military officers to
engage in open and fruitful discussions on the complex issues of weapons and
international rule of law. 
The Round Table provided an important opportunity to address the crucial topic
of the protection of civilians which, now more than ever, constitutes a critical and
delicate issue in today’s international and non-international armed conflicts.
Non-state actors, urban warfare, weapons smuggling and autonomous
armaments are some of the issues currently at stake. Considering the multiple
transformations characterising the contemporary international scenario, it is an
extremely difficult task for all the actors to implement IHL in this specific area. 
The proceedings of this Round Table, in line with the Sanremo Institute’s
tradition, aim to further develop and contribute to the ongoing debate on these
issues.
The International Institute of Humanitarian Law is an independent, non-profit
humanitarian organization founded in 1970. Its headquarters are situated in Villa
Ormond, Sanremo (Italy). Its main objective is the promotion and dissemination of
international humanitarian law, human rights, refugee law and migration law. Thanks to
its longstanding experience and its internationally acknowledged academic standards,
the International Institute of Humanitarian Law is considered to be a centre of
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